This is a selection normally found in readers as "The Old
Oligarch" ever since its identification with Xenophon was disproven in the 1930's (I
believer). But Prof. Fling's 1907 sourcebook has it as Xenophon: On The Polity of the
Athenians. It is, of course, a needed corrective to Pericles' Funeral Oration.
As for the constitution of the Athenians, their choice of this type of constitution
I do not approve, for in choosing thus they choose that thieves should fare better than
the elite. This then is why I do not approve. First of all, then, I shall say that
at Athens the poor and the commons seem justly to have the advantage over the well-born
and the wealthy; for it is the poor which mans the fleet and has brought the state her
power, and the steersmen and the boatswains and the shipmasters and the lookout-men and
the shipwrights---these have brought the state her power much rather than the hoplites and
the best-born and the elite. This being so, it seems right that all should have a share in
offices filled by lot or by election, and that any citizen who wishes should be allowed to
speak. Then, in those offices which bring security to the whole people if they are in the
hands of good citizens, but, if not, ruin, the poor desires to have no share. They do not
think that they ought to have a share through the lot in the supreme commands or in the
cavalry commands, for the poor realize that they reap greater benefit by not having these
offices in their own hands, but by allowing men of standing to hold them. All those
offices, however, whose end is pay and family benefits the poor do seek to hold.
Secondly, some people are surprised that everywhere they give the advantage to
thieves, the poor, and the radical elements rather than to the the elite. This is just
where they will be seen to be preserving democracy. For if the poor and the common people
and the worse elements are treated well, the growth of these classes will exalt the
democracy; whereas if the rich and the the elite are treated well the democrats strengthen
their own opponents. In every land the elite are opposed to democracy. Among the elite
there is very little license and injustice, very great discrimination as to what is
worthy, while among the poor there is very great ignorance, disorderliness, and thievery;
for poverty tends to lead them to what is disgraceful as does lack of education and the
ignorance which befall some men as a result of poverty.
It may be said that they ought not to have allowed everyone in turn to make speeches or
sit on the Council, but only those of the highest capability and quality. As it is, anyone
who wants, a thief maybe, gets up and makes a speech, and devises what is to the advantage
of himself and those like him. From such procedure then a city would not attain the ideal,
but the democracy would be best preserved. For it is the wish of the poor not that the
state should be well-ordered and the poor themselves in complete subjection, but that the
poor should have their freedom and be in control; disorderliness is of little consequence
to it. From what you consider lack of order come the strength and the liberty of the
commons itself. If, on the other hand, you investigate good order, first of all you will
see that the most capable make laws for others; then the the elite will keep the thieves
in check and will deliberate on matters of state, refusing to allow madmen to sit on the
Council or make speeches or attend the general assemblies. Such advantages would indeed
very soon throw the poor into complete subjection.
The license allowed to slaves and foreigners at Athens is extreme, and a blow to them
is forbidden there, nor will a slave make way for you! I shall tell you why this is the
custom of the country. If it were legal for a slave or a foreigner or a freedman to be
beaten by a free man, you would often have taken the Athenian for a slave, and struck him,
for the poor there do not dress better than the slaves and the foreigners! If anyone is
surprised also at their allowing slaves---at least some of them---to live luxuriously and
magnificently there, here too they would be seen to act with wisdom. In a naval state
slaves must serve for hire, that we may receive the fee for their labor, and we must let
them go free. Where there are rich slaves it is no longer profitable that my slave should
be afraid of you. In Sparta my slave is afraid of you. If your slave is afraid of me there
will be a danger even of his giving his own money to avoid personal risks. This then is
why we placed even slaves on a footing of equality with free men; and we placed foreigners
on a footing of equality with citizens because the state has need of foreigners, owing to
the number of skilled trades and because of the fleet.
As for the states allied to Athens, the Athenians enforce democracy in these states
because they know that if the rich and the elite have control the rule of the poor back at
Athens will be short-lived. This then is why they disenfranchise the the elite, rob them
of their wealth, drive them into exile, or put them to death, while they exalt the
thieves. The poor of Athens protect the poor in the allied cities, realizing that it is to
their own advantage always to protect the elite elements in the various cities.....Of such
mainland states as are subject to Athenian rule the large are in subjection because of
fear, the small simply because of need; there is not a city which does not require both
import and export trade, and it will not have that unless it is subject to Athens---the
rulers of the seas....The Athenians alone possess the wealth of the Hellenes and the
foreigners. If a city is rich in shipbuilding timber, where will it dispose of it unless
it win the consent of the Athenians? What if some city is rich in iron or bronze or cloth?
Where will it dispose of it unless it win the consent of the rulers of the seas?
Again, oligarchical states must abide by their alliances and their oaths. If they do
not keep to the agreement, penalties can be exacted from the few who made it. But whenever
the poor of Athens make an agreement they can lay the blame on the individual speaker or
the proposer, and say to the other party that it was not present and does not approve what
they know was agreed upon in full assembly; and should it be decided that this is not so,
the poor have discovered a hundred excuses for not doing what they do not wish to do. If
anything bad result from a decision of the Assembly, they lay the blame on a minority for
opposing and working its ruin, whereas if any good comes about they take the credit to
themselves. They do not allow caricature and abuse of the commons, lest they should hear
themselves the butt of endless jokes, but they do allow you to caricature any person you
wish to. They well know that generally the man who is caricatured is not of the poor or of
the crowd, but someone rich or well-born or influential, and that few of the poor and
democrats are caricatured, and they only because they are busy-bodies and try to overreach
the commons; so they are not angry when such men are caricatured either.
I say, then, that the poor at Athens realize which citizens are good and which are
thieves. With this knowledge, they favor those who are friendly and useful to them, even
if they are thieves, whereas they hate rather the elite. This type of constitution of the
Athenians I do not approve, but as they saw fit to be a democracy, in my opinion they
preserve their democracy well by employing the means I have pointed out.
