The Polis as the highest good
Every State is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view
to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But,
if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the
highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any
other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king, householder, and master
are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects.
For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a
household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference
between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the
king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a
king; when, according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and are
ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any
one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in
other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into
the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of
which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what the different kinds of rule
differ from one another, and whether any scientific result can be attained about each one
of them.
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or
anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a
union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female, that the
race may continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but
because, in common with other animals and with plants, mankind have a natural desire to
leave behind them an image of themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may
be preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to
be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a
subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature
has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the
smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing for a single
use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But
among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no
natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the
poets say,
"It is meet that Hellenes should rule over
barbarians; "
as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman,
master and slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right when he
says,
"First house and wife and an ox for the plough,
"
for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association established by nature
for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas
'companions of the cupboard,' and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.'
But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the
supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village. And the most natural
form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the
children and grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And this is
the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes
were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family
is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of
government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says:
"Each one gives law to his children and to his
wives. "
For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that
the Gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under
the rule of a king. For they imagine, not only the forms of the Gods, but their ways of
life to be like their own.
When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be
nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare
needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if
the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and
the nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its
nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause
and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.
Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a
political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is
either a bad man or above humanity; he is like the
"Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one, "
whom Homer denounces- the natural outcast is forthwith a lover of war; he may be
compared to an isolated piece at draughts.
Now, that man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals
is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal
whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication
of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to
the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no
further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and
therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he
alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the like, and the
association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.
Further, the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual,
since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be
destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak
of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better than that. But things are
defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when
they no longer have their proper quality, but only that they have the same name. The proof
that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual,
when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the
whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is
sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A
social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state
was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but,
when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the
more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with arms, meant to be used by intelligence
and virtue, which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is
the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony.
But justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the
determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. . . .
[Democracy as the best form of government]
We have now to inquire what is the best constitution for
most states, and the best life for most men, neither assuming a standard of virtue which
is above ordinary persons, nor an education which is exceptionally favored by nature and
circumstances, nor yet an ideal state which is an aspiration only, but having regard to
the life in which the majority are able to share, and to the form of government which
states in general can attain. As to those aristocracies, as they are called, of which we
were just now speaking, they either lie beyond the possibilities of the greater number of
states, or they approximate to the so-called constitutional government, and therefore need
no separate discussion. And in fact the conclusion at which we arrive respecting all these
forms rests upon the same grounds. For if what was said in the Ethics is true, that the
happy life is the life according to virtue lived without impediment, and that virtue is a
mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the
best. And the same the same principles of virtue and vice are characteristic of cities and
of constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city.
Now in all states there are three elements: one class is
very rich, another very poor, and a third in a mean. It is admitted that moderation and
the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune
in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most ready to follow rational
principle. But he who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth, or wealth, or on the
other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to
follow rational principle. Of these two the one sort grow into violent and great
criminals, the others into rogues and petty rascals. And two sorts of offenses correspond
to them, the one committed from violence, the other from roguery. Again, the middle class
is least likely to shrink from rule, or to be over-ambitious for it; both of which are
injuries to the state. Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength,
wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The
evil begins at home; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in which they are
brought up, they never learn, even at school, the habit of obedience. On the other hand,
the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class
cannot obey, and can only rule despotically; the other knows not how to command and must
be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the
one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good
fellowship in states than this: for good fellowship springs from friendship; when men are
at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a city
ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally
the middle classes. Wherefore the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is
necessarily best constituted in respect of the elements of which we say the fabric of the
state naturally consists. And this is the class of citizens which is most secure in a
state, for they do not, like the poor, covet their neighbors' goods; nor do others covet
theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others,
nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely then did
Phocylides pray- 'Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition
in my city.'
Thus it is manifest that the best political community is
formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be
well-administered in which the middle class is large, and stronger if possible than both
the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class
turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is
the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property;
for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy,
or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme--either out of the most
rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of the
middle constitutions and those akin to them. I will explain the reason of this hereafter,
when I speak of the revolutions of states. The mean condition of states is clearly best,
for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is large, there are least
likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less liable
to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small
states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor,
and to leave nothing in the middle. And democracies are safer and more permanent than
oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater
share in the government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in
number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. A proof of the superiority of
the middle dass is that the best legislators have been of a middle condition; for example,
Solon, as his own verses testify; and Lycurgus, for he was not a king; and Charondas, and
almost all legislators.
These considerations will help us to understand why most
governments are either democratical or oligarchical. The reason is that the middle class
is seldom numerous in them, and whichever party, whether the rich or the common people,
transgresses the mean and predominates, draws the constitution its own way, and thus
arises either oligarchy or democracy. There is another reason--the poor and the rich
quarrel with one another, and whichever side gets the better, instead of establishing a
just or popular government, regards political supremacy as the prize of victory, and the
one party sets up a democracy and the other an oligarchy. Further, both the parties which
had the supremacy in Hellas looked only to the interest of their own form of government,
and established in states, the one, democracies, and the other, oligarchies; they thought
of their own advantage, of the public not at all. For these reasons the middle form of
government has rarely, if ever, existed, and among a very few only. One man alone of all
who ever ruled in Hellas was induced to give this middle constitution to states. But it
has now become a habit among the citizens of states, not even to care about equality; all
men are seeking for dominion, or, if conquered, are willing to submit.
What then is the best form of government, and what makes it the best, is evident; and
of other constitutions, since we say that there are many kinds of democracy and many of
oligarchy, it is not difficult to see which has the first and which the second or any
other place in the order of excellence, now that we have determined which is the best. For
that which is nearest to the best must of necessity be better, and that which is furthest
from it worse, if we are judging absolutely and not relatively to given conditions: I say
'relatively to given conditions,' since a particular government may be preferable, but
another form may be better for some people.
