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Ancient History Sourcebook
Aristotle
On the Constitution of Carthage, c. 340 BCE
The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form
of government, which differs from that of any other state in several
respects, though it is in some very like the Spartan. Indeed,
all three states---the Spartan, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian---nearly
resemble one another, and are very different from any others.
Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority
of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people
remain loyal to the constitution. The Carthaginians have never
had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under
the rule of a tyrant. Among the points in which the Carthaginian
constitution resembles the Spartan are the following: The common
tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and
their magistracy of the Hundred-Four to the Ephors; but, whereas
the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians
are elected according to merit---this is an improvement. They
have also their kings and their Gerousia, or council of
elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta. Their
kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family,
nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished family
they are selected out of it and not appointed by seniority---this
is far better. Such officers have great power, and therefore,
if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm,
and they have already done harm at Sparta.
Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for
which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally
to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of
the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government,
some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings
and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will
not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous,
the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings
and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also
determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this
is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of
five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted,
that they should choose the supreme council of One Hundred, and
should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are
virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)---these
are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not
elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of
having all suits tried by the magistrates, and not some by one
class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Sparta, are
characteristic of aristocracy.
The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines
to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their
side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen
not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say,
who is poor cannot rule well---he has not the leisure. If, then,
election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of
oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be
a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended;
for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly
the highest of them---their kings and generals---with an eye both
to merit and to wealth. But we must acknowledge that, in thus
deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error.
Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the
highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office,
should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and
to this his attention should be first directed. Even if you must
have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely
a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings
and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse
makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state
becomes avaricious.
For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable,
the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where
virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly
established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing
their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and
it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting
to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred
a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able
to rule best. And even if the legislator does not care to protect
the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for
them when in office. It would seem also to be a bad principle
that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite
practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done
by one man.
The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they
successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion
of the people after another by sending them to their colonies.
This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability
to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should
be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents.
As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the
subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by
legal methods.
Source:
From: The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Benjamin Jowett
(Colonial Press, 1900), pp. 49-51.
Scanned by Jerome S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton
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