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Ancient History Sourcebook
Aristotle
On the Lacedaemonian Constitution, c. 340 BCE
The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some
few points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect
in form. The older constitutions are generally less elaborate
than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably
is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to
tradition, Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King
Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For
the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony
of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete,
adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants.
. . .The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots
are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and
both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were
anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not phiditia' but andria';
and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that
the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two
constitutions are similar; for the office of the Ephors is the
same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that
whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The
elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by
the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in
Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading
them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only
ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi.
The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the
Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head,
or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids
him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are
of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth
and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which
is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and
to the service of the state, and another to the common meals,
so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common
stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation
in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages
the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many
children, and the companionship of men with one another---whether
this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering
at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered
than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt. On the other hand,
the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which
they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they
are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced
by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is
eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest
office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the
Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the
whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.
Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination
of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because
it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king
forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy
while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for
the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare
the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy
in the common meals and in the habits of daily life. At Lacedaemon,
for instance, the Ephors determine suits about contracts, which
they distribute among themselves, while the elders are judges
of homicide, and other causes are decided by other magistrates.
The license of the Lacedaemonian women defeats the intention of
the Spartan constitution, and is adverse to the happiness of the
state. For, a husband and wife being each a part of every family,
the state may be considered as about equally divided into men
and women; and, therefore, in those states in which the condition
of the women is bad, half the city may be regarded as having no
laws. And this is what has actually happened at Sparta; the legislator
wanted to make the whole state hardy and temperate, and he has
carried out his intention in the case of the men, but he has neglected
the women, who live in every sort of intemperance and luxury.
The consequence is that in such a state wealth is too highly valued,
especially if the citizens fall under the dominion of their wives,
after the manner of most warlike races, except the Celts and a
few others who openly approve of male loves. The old mythologer
would seem to have been right in uniting Ares and Aphrodite, for
all warlike races are prone to the love either of men or of women.
This was exemplified among the Spartans in the days of their greatness;
many things were managed by their women. But what difference does
it make whether women rule, or the rulers are ruled by women?
The result is the same. Even in regard to courage, which is of
no use in daily life, and is needed only in war, the influence
of the Lacedaemonian women has been most mischievous. The evil
showed itself in the Theban invasion, when, unlike the women of
other cities, they were utterly useless and caused more confusion
than the enemy. This license of the Lacedaemonian women existed
from the earliest times, and was only what might be expected.
For, during the wars of the Lacedaemonians, first against the
Argives, and afterwards against the Arcadians and Messenians,
the men were long away from home, and, on the return of peace,
they gave themselves into the legislator's hand, already prepared
by the discipline of a soldier's life (in which there are many
elements of virtue), to receive his enactments. But, when Lycurgus,
as tradition says, wanted to bring the women under his laws, they
resisted, and he gave up the attempt. These then are the causes
of what then happened, and this defect in the constitution is
clearly to be attributed to them. We are not, however, considering
what is or is not to be excused, but what is right or wrong, and
the disorder of the women, as I have already said, not only gives
an air of indecorum to the constitution considered in itself,
but tends in a measure to foster avarice.
The mention of avarice naturally suggests a criticism on the inequality
of property. While some of the Spartan citizens have quite small
properties, others have very large ones; hence the land has passed
into the hands of a few. And this is due also to faulty laws;
for, although the legislator rightly holds up to shame the sale
or purchase of an inheritance, he allows anybody who likes to
give or bequeath it. Yet both practices lead to the same result.
And nearly two-fifths of the whole country are held by women;
this is owing to the number of heiresses and to the large dowries
which are customary. It would surely have been better to have
given no dowries at all, or, if any, but small or moderate ones.
As the law now stands, a man may bestow his heiress on any one
whom he pleases, and, if he die intestate, the privilege of giving
her away descends to his heir. Hence, although the country is
able to maintain 1500 cavalry and 30,000 hoplites, the whole number
of Spartan citizens fell below 1000.
The result proves the faulty nature of their laws respecting property;
for the city sank under a single defeat; the want of men was their
ruin. There is a tradition that, in the days of their ancient
kings, they were in the habit of giving the rights of citizenship
to strangers, and therefore, in spite of their long wars, no
lack of population was experienced by them; indeed, at one time
Sparta is said to have numbered not less than 10,000 citizens
Whether this statement is true or not, it would certainly have
been better to have maintained their numbers by the equalization
of property. Again, the law which relates to the procreation of
children is adverse to the correction of this inequality. For
the legislator, wanting to have as many Spartans as he could,
encouraged the citizens to have large families; and there is a
law at Sparta that the father of three sons shall be exempt from
military service, and he who has four from all the burdens of
the state. Yet it is obvious that, if there were many children,
the land being distributed as it is, many of them must necessarily
fall into poverty.
The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point;
I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest
matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and
so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men,
who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many
examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently,
in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were
bribed did their best to ruin the state. And so great and tyrannical
is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court
them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office,
the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy
has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep
the state together; for the people are contented when they have
a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to
the legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution
is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that
it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This
is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because
they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles because they
are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder
is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible
to the Ephoralty. The election of Ephors out of the whole people
is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present
fashion, which is too childish. Again, they have the decision
of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore
they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but
according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life,
too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution---they
have a deal too much license; whereas, in the case of the other
citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they
run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.
Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may
be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly
virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state
in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold
office for life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old
as well as the body. And when men have been educated in such a
manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there
is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken
bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs.
And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta
they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable
to the Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them,
and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other
manner. Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders
is childish; and it is improper that the person to be elected
should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed,
whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates
the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution;
he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon
this quality in the election of the elders; for no one would ask
to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost
more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.
Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider
at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they
are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The
legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make
them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their
virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with
them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were
held to be conservative of the state.
Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,'
regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided
at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians
every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too
poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator
is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution,
but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular.
For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according
to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed
to retain their rights of citizenship.
The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and
with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are
perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting
up of another king. The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws,
against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified;
the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only---the
virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as
they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved, but when
they had attained empire they fell for of the arts of peace they
knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than
war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have
fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which men
contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they
err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue
which gains them.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is
no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on
great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part
of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look
closely into one another's contributions. The result which the
legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has
made his city poor, and his citizens greedy.
Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are
the principal defects.
Source:
From: Aristotle, The Politics of Aristotle, trans. Benjamin
Jowett (London: Colonial Press, 1900), pp. 30-49.
Scanned by Jerome S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton
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