History:
Book III: 107-118
107: Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained encamped facing
each other. But when the season for the new harvest was come, Hannibal began to move from
the camp at Geronium; and making up his mind that it would be to his advantage to force
the enemy by any possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town
called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district round Canusium
were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the camp as occasion required. The
town itself, indeed, had been reduced to ruins the year before: but the capture of its
citadel and the material of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army;
for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but
the fact also that it commanded the surrounding district. They therefore sent frequent
messages to Rome asking for instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not
be able to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being plundered,
and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate passed a resolution that they
should give the enemy battle: they, however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched
the Consuls to the seat of war.
It was to Aemilius [L. Aemilius Paullus, Consul for 216 B.C.] that all eyes turned, and
on him the most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and he was
thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage to the state. The Senate
determined to bring eight legions into the field, which had never been done at Rome
before, each legion consisting of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I
have state before, habitually enroll four legions per year, each consisting of about four
thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual necessity arises, they raise the
number of foot to five thousand and of the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number
in each legion is the same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great.
Of the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls for whatever
service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with
their quota of allies [thus two citizen legions and two allied legions combined]; and they
rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was
the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight
legions into the field [thus eight citizen legions and eight allied legions
combined--about 90,000 men].
108. With earnest words of exhortations, therefore, to Aemilius, putting before him the
gravity in every point of view of the result of the battle, they despatched him with
instructions to seek a favorable opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage
worthy of Rome. Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known the
will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them to do their duty in terms
which evidently came from his heart. He addressed himself especially to explain and excuse
the reverses which they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly that
the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement. AThe causes," he
argued, Aof their defeats in former battles were many, and could not be reduced to one or
two. But those causes were at an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed
themselves to be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time both
Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly trained soldiers: the
combatants on the contrary had been raw levies, entirely inexperienced in danger; and what
was most important of all, they had been entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they
had been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an enemy that they
had never once set eyes upon. Those who had been defeated on the Trebia were drawn up on
the field at daybreak, on the very next morning after their arrival from Sicily; while
those who had fought in Etruria [at the defeat at Lake Trasimene], not only had never seen
the enemy before, but did not do so even during the very battle itself, owing to the
unfortunate state of the atmosphere.
109. But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first place both Consuls
were with the army: and were not only prepared to share the danger themselves, but had
also induced the Consuls of the previous year to remain and take part in the struggle.
While the men had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had been
engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years. The conditions therefore
under which the two former battles were fought being quite different, it was but natural
that the result of the coming struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or
rather impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of either side
were equal, had for the most part come off victorious, should, when drawn up altogether,
and nearly double of the enemy in number, be defeated.
"Wherefore, men of the army," he continued, "seeing that we have every
advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing necessary---your
determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say more to you on that point. To men
serving others for pay, or to those who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no
greater danger to expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake
are of little importance---such men may need words of exhortation. But men who, like you,
are fighting not for others, but themselves---for country, wives, and children; and for
whom the issue is of far more momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need
only to be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who would not wish
if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not be, to die with arms in his hands,
rather than to live and see the outrage and death of those dear objects which I have
named?
"Wherefore, men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes
the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all their consequences.
Enter upon this battle with the full conviction, that in it your country is not risking a
certain number of legions, but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an
army as this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she has of
confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety are in your hands. Do not
frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your country the gratitude you owe her; and make it
clear to all the world that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse
men than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part of those who were
then fighting, and through a combination of adverse circumstances." With such words
Aemilius dismissed the troops.
110. Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced to where they heard
that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day they arrived within sight of them, and
pitched their camp at about fifty stadia distance. But when Aemilius observed that
the ground was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not engage
there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they must rather try to draw him
off, and lead him to ground on which the battle would be more in the hands of the
infantry. But Caius Terentius [C. Terentius Varro, Consul for 216 B.C.] being, from
inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute and misunderstanding between the
two leaders, which of all things is the most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two
Consuls are present, that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the
next day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with a view of
approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active opposition of his colleague.
Hannibal set his light-armed troops and cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the
Romans while they were still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion
in their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of their heavy-armed
in front; and then sending forward their light-armed and cavalry, began to get the best of
the fight all along the line: the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance,
while certain companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed, and
helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an end to a struggle which had
not at all answered to the hopes of the Carthaginians.
But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, and yet being unable any longer
to lead off his army, encamped with two-thirds of it on the banks of the Apennines---that
chain of mountains which forms the watershed of all Italian rivers, which flow either west
to the Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by the Aufidus,
which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, and is discharged into the
Hadriatic. For the other third of his army he caused a camp to be made across the river,
to the east of the ford, about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more
from those of the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might
protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.
111. Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called for a battle with the enemy,
being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by their previous reverse, and believing
that it was an occasion which required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting
of his soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon the country,
and asked them "What better fortune they could have asked from the gods, if they had
had the choice, than to fight in such ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority
of cavalry on their side?" And when all signified their acquiescence in such an
evident truth, he added: "First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have brought
the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory for us. And, next to me,
for having compelled the enemy to fight---for they cannot avoid it any longer---and to
fight in a place so full of advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to
use many words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When you had had
no experience of fighting the Romans this was necessary. and I did not then suggest many
arguments and examples to you. But now seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans
in three successive battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence
with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by your previous battles
you have got possession of the country and all its wealth, in accordance with my promises:
for I have been absolutely true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present
contest is for the cities and the wealth in them; and if you win it, all Italy will at
once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils, and masters of the wealth
of Rome, you will by this battle become the leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is
a time for deeds, not words: for by God's blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out
my promises to you forthwith." His words were received with approving shouts, which
he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having dismissed the assembly, he at
once formed a camp on the same bank of the river as that on which was the larger camp of
the Romans.
112. Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in making preparations
and getting themselves into a fit state of body. On the day after that he drew out his men
along the bank of the river, and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But
Aemilius, dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would soon be
obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept quiet in his camps,
strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting a considerable time, when no one came
out to attack him, Hannibal put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his
Numidian horse to attack the enemy's water parties from the lesser camp. These horsemen
riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering, Caius Terentius became more than
ever inflamed with the desire of fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and
chafed at the delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense; when
a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of their catalogue of evils it is
their misfortune to undergo.
But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies were face to face, and that
skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were daily taking place, the city was in
a state of high excitement and uneasiness; the people dreading the result, owing to the
disasters which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing and
anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were utterly defeated. All
the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody's mouth; and every temple and house was
full of prodigies and miracles: in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows,
sacrifices, supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in time of danger take
extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon no ceremony of that kind in
such times as unbecoming or beneath their dignity.
113. When he took over the command on the following day, as soon as the sun was above
the horizon, Caius Terentius got the army in motion from both the camps. Those from the
larger camp he drew up in order of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river,
and bringing up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line, selecting
the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he stationed on the right wing along
the river, and their foot next to them in the same line, placing the maniples, however,
closer together than usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater
than its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing, and the
light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole army, which amounted with
its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a little more than six thousand horse. At the
same time Hannibal brought his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and
stationed them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and, getting
them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the enemy. On his left wing,
close to the river, he stationed the Iberian and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry;
and next to them half the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic
foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the Numidian horse.
Having now got them all into line he advanced with the central companies of the Iberians
and Celts; and so arranged the other companies next these in regular gradations, that the
whole line became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities: his
object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to commence the action
with his Iberians and Celts.
114. The armor of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed them with a selection
of the spoils taken in previous battles. The shield of the Iberians and Celts was about
the same size, but their swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust
with as deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and that
requires some room. And the companies coming alternately---the naked Celts, and the
Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered with purple stripes, the whole appearance
of the line was strange and terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was
ten thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand, including the
Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Caius Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius
and Gnaeus Servilius, the consuls of the previous year, on the center. The left of the
Carthaginians was commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the center by Hannibal in
person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the south, as I said
before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of the rising sun did not inconvenience
either of them.
115. The battle was begun by an engagement between the advanced guard of the two
armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed troops was indecisive. But as
soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and
in the true barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and retreat;
but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to man, and, dismounting from
their horses, fought on foot. But when the Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this
encounter and killed most of their opponents on the ground---because the Romans all
maintained the fight with spirit and determination---and began chasing the remainder along
the river, slaying as they went along and giving no quarter; then the legionaries took the
place of the light-armed and closed with the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and
Celtic lines stood their ground and fought gallantly; but, presently overpowered by the
weight of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus breaking up
the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and easily cut their way through
the enemy's line; since the Celts had been drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had
closed up from the wings towards the center and the point of danger. For the two wings did
not come into action at the same time as the center: but the center was first engaged,
because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of the crescent, had come into contact
with the enemy long before the wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy.
The Romans, however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in towards
the center and the part of the enemy which was giving ground, advanced so far that the
Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got on their flanks. Those on the right, facing
to the left, charged from the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left
wing faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right flank, the
exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they ought to do. Thus it came about, as
Hannibal had planned, that the Romans were caught between two hostile lines of
Libyans---thanks to their impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no
longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced to meet those who charged them on
the flanks.
116. Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had taken part in the
cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius still survived. Determined to act up to his own
exhortatory speech, and seeing that the decision of the battle rested mainly on the
legionaries, riding up to the center of the line he led the charge himself, and personally
grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting his soldiers to the
charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same, for he too had taken his place on the
center from the commencement. The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile
charging through the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature of
their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much harm, they yet rendered
the enemy's horse useless by keeping them occupied, and charging them first on one side
and then another. But when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river,
came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied cavalry, seeing his
charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point Hasdrubal appears to have acted with
great skill and discretion. Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more
effective and formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he left
the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of the field where the infantry
were engaged, and brought his men up to support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman
legions on the rear, and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at
many points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed and depressed that
of the Romans.
It was at this point that Lucius Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with
wounds: a man who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he had
throughout its previous years, if any man ever did. As long as the Romans could keep an
unbroken front, to turn first in one direction and then in another to meet the assaults of
the enemy, they held out; but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the
circle becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the field; and
among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls of the previous year, who had
shown themselves brave men and worthy of Rome in the battle. While this struggle and
carnage were going on, the Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they
cut down or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia, among whom was
Caius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as disgraceful to himself, as his
conduct in office had been disastrous to his country.
117. Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which both sides fought with the most
conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less than the conquerors. This is proved by the
fact that, out of six thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Caius Terentius to
Venusia, and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in the
neighborhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners in fair fight, but were
not actually engaged in the battle: of those who were actually engaged only about three
thousand perhaps escaped to the towns of the surrounding district; all the rest died
nobly, to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this occasion, as on
previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to their superiority in cavalry: a lesson
to posterity that in actual war it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the
superiority in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On the side of
Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred Iberians and Libyans, and about
two hundred horse.
The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been engaged in the
actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius left ten thousand infantry in his
camp that, in case Hannibal should disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his
whole army onto the field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going
on, of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy's baggage; or if, on the other hand,
Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a guard in his camp, the number of the
enemy in the field might thereby be diminished. These men were captured in the field in
the following circumstances. Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard
in his camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their instructions,
assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal. At first they held their own: but
just as they were beginning to waver, Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all
along the line, came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own
camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners. In like manner the
Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken refuge in the various strongholds about
the district, amounting to two thousand of the routed cavalry.
118. The result of this battle, such as I have described it, had the consequences which
both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their victory were thenceforth masters of
nearly the whole of the Italian coast which is called Magna Graecia. Thus the
Tarentines immediately submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited
Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning their eyes to the
Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have high hopes of being able to carry even
Rome itself by assault. On their side the Romans, even after this disaster, despaired of
retaining their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm, believing
their own lives and the existence of their city to be in danger, and every moment
expecting that Hannibal would be upon them. For, as though Fortune herself were in league
with the disasters that had already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it
happened that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this panic, the
Praetor who had been sent to the Gaul fell unexpectedly into an ambush and perished, and
his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts.
In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the State. It
exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the city with guards, and deliberated
on the crisis in a brave and manly spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For
though the Romans were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost
their reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their political
constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not only recovered their supremacy
over Italy, by eventually conquering the Carthaginians, but before very long became
masters of the whole world.
I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now recounted the events in
Iberia and Italy embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When I have arrived at the same period in
my history of Greece during this Olympiad, I shall then fulfill my promise of devoting a
book to a formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a description
of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history, but will also be of great help
to practical statesmen, as well as students, either in reforming or establishing other
constitutions.
Source:
