The Histories,
Book XVIII, Chapters 28-32:
In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity
of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their
respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from
each other. I will now endeavor by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For
since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of
conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the
nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have
been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, it will be, I
think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is
that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of
war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck,
as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their
leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.
Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal and the defeats which they
sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics,
but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made
quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two
facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of
ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners.
Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and
having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the
Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself
not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a
company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this
did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.
It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which
might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.
Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper
formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as
a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the
sarissae are sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in
practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the
weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa
projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the
enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their
sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even
these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the
phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the
description in Homer:
So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm; And man on man; and waving horse-hair
plumes In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed In order: in such serried rank they
stood. [Iliad, 13.131]
And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the
front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending
scale of two cubits.
With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance
and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it
advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are
unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They,
therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the
shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the
sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the
front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however,
during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus
make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front
ranks to face about.
Such is the arrangement, general and detailed of the phalanx. It remains now to compare
with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a
Roman soldier in full armor also requires a space of three square feet. But as their
method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man---because he defends his body
with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because
he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing---it is evident that each man must have a
clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear if he is to do
his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two
of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears,
which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor
force his way through easily---seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the
rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigor to the use of their
swords. Therefore, it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible
to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and
strength.
Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those
who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and
place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully
work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time
and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but
natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory.
But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of
its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable
to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities,
depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to
hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or
at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of
even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let
us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it,
but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will
the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to
benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of
provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed
possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a
blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain,
and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance,
but maneuvers for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy
to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.
For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying:
that can be done by referring to accomplished facts. The Romans do not, then, attempt to
extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their
whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle
with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its
opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order
is dislocated; for whether in following the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy,
they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy's reserves can
occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding,
and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If,
then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of
the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow
that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course, those
generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch
camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected
appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important
and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the
Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to handle, because the men
cannot act either in squads or separately.
The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the
field, is equally well-equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is,
moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the
main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as
the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are
also much more often attended by success than those of others.
I thought it necessary to discuss this subject at some length, because at the actual
time of the occurrence many Greeks supposed when the Macedonians were beaten that it was
incredible; and many will afterwards be at a loss to account for the inferiority of the
phalanx to the Roman system of arming.
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