The Histories
Book XXXVI:
It may occur to some to ask why I have not given a dramatic turn to my narrative, now
that I have so striking a theme and a subject of such importance, by recording the actual
speeches delivered; a thing which the majority of historians have done, by giving the
appropriate arguments used on either side. That I do not reject this method altogether I
have shown in several parts of my work, in which I have recorded popular harangues and
expositions delivered by statesmen; but that I am not inclined to employ it on every
occasion alike will now be made clear; for it would not be easy to find a subject more
remarkable than this, nor material more ample for instituting a comparison of such a
character. Nor indeed could any form of composition be more convenient to me. Still, as I
do not think it becoming in statesmen to be ready with argument and exposition on every
subject of debate without distinction, but rather to adapt their speeches to the nature of
the particular occasion, so neither do I think it right for historians to practice their
skill or show off their ability upon their readers: they ought on the contrary to devote
their whole energies to discover and record what was really and truly said, and even of
such words only those that are the most opportune and essential. . . .
This idea having been firmly fixed in the minds of all, they looked out for a suitable
opportunity and a decent pretext to justify them in the eyes of the world. For indeed the
Romans were quite rightly very careful on this point. For instance, the general impression
that they were justified in entering upon the war with Demetrius enhances the value of
their victories, and diminishes the risks incurred by their defeats; but if the pretext
for doing so is lame and poor the contrary effects are produced. Accordingly, as they
differed as to the sentiments of the outer world on the subject, they were very nearly
abandoning the war.
When the Carthaginians had been some time deliberating how they should meet the message
from Rome [an ultimatum to break up their army and navy] they were reduced to a state of
the utmost embarrassment by the people of Utica anticipating their design by putting
themselves under the protection of Rome. This seemed their only hope of safety left: and
they imagined that such a step must win them favor at Rome: for to submit to put
themselves and their country under control was a thing which they had never done even in
their darkest hour of danger and defeat, with the enemy at their very walls. And now they
had lost all the fruit of this resolve by being anticipated by the people of Utica; for it
would appear nothing novel or strange to the Romans if they only did the same as that
people. Accordingly, with a choice of two evils only left, to accept war with courage or
to surrender their independence, after a long and anxious discussion held secretly in the
Senate-house, they appointed two ambassadors with plenary powers, and instructed them,
that, in view of the existing state of things, they should do what seemed for the
advantage of their country. The names of these envoys were Gisco Strytanus, Hamilcar,
Misdes, Gillimas, and Mago. When they reached Rome from Carthage, they found war already
decreed and the generals actually started with their forces. Circumstances, therefore, no
longer giving them any power of deliberating, they offered an unconditional surrender.
I have spoken before about what this implies, but I must in this place also briefly
remind my readers of its import. Those who thus surrender themselves to the Roman
authority, surrender all territory and the cities in it, together with all men and women
in all such territory or cities, likewise rivers, harbors, temples, and tombs, so that the
Romans should become actual lords of all these, and those who surrender should remain
lords of nothing whatever. On the Carthaginians making a surrender to this effect, they
were summoned into the Senate-house and the Praetor delivered the Senate's decision, which
was to this effect: "They had been well advised, and therefore the Senate granted
them freedom and the enjoyment of their laws; and moreover, all their territory and the
possession of their other property, public or private." The Carthaginian envoys were
much relieved when they heard this; thinking that, where the alternatives were both
miserable, the Senate had treated them well in conceding their most necessary and
important requirements. But presently the Praetor went on to state that they would enjoy
these concessions on condition of sending three hundred hostages to Lilybaeum within
thirty days, sons of members of the Hundred or the Senate, and obeying such commands as
should be imposed on them by the consuls. This dashed their satisfaction for a time,
because they had no means of knowing what orders were to be given them through the
consuls; however, they started at once, being anxious to report what had occurred to their
countrymen with all speed. When they arrived in Carthage and stated the facts, the
citizens considered that the envoys had in all respects acted with proper caution; but
they were greatly alarmed and distressed by the fact that in the answer no mention was
made of the city itself.
At this juncture they say that Mago Brettius delivered a manly and statesmanlike
speech. He said:
"The Carthaginians had two opportunities of taking counsel in regard to themselves
and their country, one of which they had let pass; for in good truth it was no use now to
question what was going to be enjoined on them by the consuls, and why it was that the
Senate had made no mention of the city: they should have done that when they made the
surrender. Having once made that, they must clearly make up their mind to the necessity of
submitting to every possible injunction, unless it should prove to be something unbearably
oppressive or beyond what they could possibly expect. If they would not do this, they must
now consider whether they preferred to stand an invasion and all its possible
consequences, or, in terror of the attack of the enemy, accept without resistance every
order they might impose upon them." But as the imminence of war and the uncertainty
of the future made every one inclined to submit to these injunctions, it was decided to
send the hostages to Lilybaeum. Three hundred young men were forthwith selected and sent
to Lilybaeum amidst loud expressions of sorrow and tears, each of them being escorted by
his nearest friends and relations, the whole scene being made especially moving by the
lamentations of the women. On landing at Lilybaeum the hostages were at once handed over
by the consuls to Quintus Fabius Maximus, who had been appointed to the command in Sicily
at that time. By him they were safely conveyed to Rome and confined in the dockyard of the
six-benched ships.
The hostages being thus disposed of, the consuls brought their fleet to the citadel of
Utica. When news of this reached Carthage, the city was in the utmost excitement and
panic, not knowing what to expect next. However, it was decided to send envoys to ask the
consuls what they were to do, and to state that they were all prepared to obey orders. The
envoys arrived at the Roman camp: the general's council was summoned: and they delivered
their commission. The senior Consul thereupon, after complimenting them on their policy
and readiness to obey, bade them hand over all arms and missiles in their possession
without subterfuge or concealment. The envoys answered that they would carry out the
directions, but begged the Consul to consider what would happen if the Carthaginians
surrendered all their arms, and the Romans took them and sailed away from the country.
However, they gave them up. . . .It was clearly shown that the resources of the city were
enormous, for they surrendered to the Romans more than two hundred thousand stands of arms
and two thousand catapults. . .
The people had no idea what the announcement was going to be, but suspecting it from
the expression of the envoys' countenances, they immediately burst into a storm of cries
and lamentations.
[Shuckburgh: The consuls demanded that the whole people of Carthage should remove to
some other spot, to be not less than ten miles from the sea, and there build a new city
---Livy, Ep. 49].
Then all the Senators [of the Carthaginian Gerousia], uttering a cry of horror,
remained as though paralyzed by the shock. But the report having quickly spread among the
people, the general indignation at once found expression. Some made an attack on the
envoys, as the guilty authors of their misfortunes, while others wreaked their wrath upon
all Italians caught within the city, and others rushed to the town gates. . . .
[Shuckburgh: The Carthaginians determined to resist, and the consuls, who had not
hurried to Carthage, because they believed that resistance from an unarmed populace was
impossible, found, when they approached Carthage, that it was prepared to offer a vigorous
resistance. Scipio Aemilianus, on the strength of his family name, was elected Consul for
147-146 B.C., and immediatly began operations to confine the Carthaginians to the city
itself --Appian, Pun. 91ff; Livy, Ep. 49]
Hamilcar Phameas was the general of the Carthaginians, a man in the very prime of life
and of great physical strength. What is of the utmost importance too for service in the
field, he was an excellent and bold horseman. . . . When he saw the advanced guard,
Phameas, though not at all deficient in courage, avoided coming to close quarters with
Scipio [military tribune in 149-148 B.C.]: and on one occasion when he had come near his
reserves, he got behind the cover of the brow of a hill and halted there a considerable
time....The Roman maniples fled to the top of a hill; and when all had given their
opinions, Scipio said, "When men are consulting what measures to take at first, their
object should be to avoid disaster rather than to inflict it." . . .It ought not to
excite surprise that I am more minute than usual in my account of Scipio and that I give
in detail everything which he said. . . . . . When Marcus Porcius Cato heard in Rome of
the glorious achievements of Scipio he uttered a palinode to his criticisms of him:
"What have you heard? He alone has the breath of wisdom in him: the rest are but
flitting phantoms."
Book XXXVII.
THERE was a great deal of talk of all sorts in Greece, first as to the
Carthaginians when the Romans conquered them, and subsequently as to the question of the
pseudo-Philip. The opinions expressed in regard to the Carthaginians were widely divided,
and indicated entirely opposite views. Some commended the Romans for their wise and
statesman-like policy in regard to that kingdom. For the removal of a perpetual menace,
and the utter destruction of a city which had disputed the supremacy with them, and could
even then if it got an opportunity have still been disputing it---thus securing the
supremacy for their own country---were the actions of sensible and far-sighted men. Others
contradicted this, and asserted that the Romans had no such policy in view when they
obtained their supremacy; and that they had gradually and insensibly become perverted to
the same ambition for power, which had once characterized the Athenians and
Lacedaemonians; and though they had advanced more slowly than these last, that they would
from all appearances yet arrive at the same consummation. For in old times they had only
carried on war until their opponents were beaten, and induced to acknowledge the
obligation of obedience and acceptance of their orders; but that nowadays they had given a
foretaste of their policy by their conduct to Perseus, in utterly destroying the
Macedonian dynasty root and branch, and had given the finishing stroke to that policy by
the course adopted in regard to the Carthaginians; for though this latter people had
committed no act of irretrievable outrage, they had taken measures of irretrievable
severity against them, in spite of their offering to accept any terms, and submitting to
any injunctions that might be placed upon them.
Others again said that the Romans were generally a truly civilized people; and that
they had this peculiarity, on which they prided themselves, that they conducted their wars
openly and generously, not employing night surprises or ambuscades, but scorning every
advantage to be gained by stratagem and deceit, and regarding open and face-to-face
combats as alone becoming to their character: but that in the present instance their whole
campaign against the Carthaginians had been conducted by means of stratagem and deceit.
Little by little---by holding out inducements here, and practicing concealment
there---they had deprived them of all hopes of assistance from their allies. This was a
line of conduct more appropriate by rights to the intriguing chicanery of a monarchy, than
to a republican and Roman policy.
Again, there were some who took the opposite line to these. They said that if it were
really true that, before the Carthaginians had made the surrender, the Romans had behaved
as alleged, holding out inducements here, and making half revelations there, they would be
justly liable to such charges; but if, on the contrary, it was only after the
Carthaginians had themselves made the surrender---acknowledging the right of the Romans to
take what measures they chose concerning them---that the latter in the exercise of their
undoubted right had imposed and enjoined what they determined upon, then this action must
cease to be looked on as partaking of the nature of impiety or treachery.
And some denied that it was an impiety at all: for there were three ways in which such
a thing could be defined, none of which applied to the conduct of the Romans. An impiety
was something done against the gods, or one's parents, or the dead; treachery was
something done in violation of oaths or written agreements; an injustice something done in
violation of law and custom. But the Romans could not be charged on any one of these
counts: they had offended neither the gods, their parents, nor the dead; nor had they
broken oaths or treaties, but on the contrary charged the Carthaginians with breaking
them. Nor again had they violated laws, customs, or their own good faith; for having
received a voluntary surrender, with the full power of doing what they pleased in the
event of the submitting party not obeying their injunctions, they had, in view of that
eventuality having arisen, applied force to them.
Such was the view taken of these things in Greece....
A despatch from Manius Manilius to the Achaeans having reached the Peloponnese, saying
that they would oblige him by sending Polybius of Megalopolis with all speed to Lilybaeum,
as he was wanted on account of certain public affairs, the Achaeans decided to send him in
accordance with the letter of the consul. And as I felt bound to obey the Romans, I put
everything else aside, and sailed at the beginning of summer. But when we arrived at
Corcyra, we found another despatch from the consul to the Corcyreans had come, announcing
that the Carthaginians had already surrendered all the hostages to them, and were prepared
to obey them. Thinking, therefore, that the war was at an end, and that there was no more
occasion for our services, we sailed back to the Peloponnese....
It should not excite surprise that I sometimes designate myself by my proper name, and
at other times by the common forms of expression---for instance, "when I had said
this," or "we had agreed to this." For as I was much personally involved in
the transactions about to be related, it becomes necessary to vary the methods of
indicating myself; that I may not weary by continual repetition of my own name, nor again
by introducing the words "of me," or "through me," at every turn, fall
insensibly into an appearance of egotism. I wished, on the contrary, by an interchangeable
use of these terms, and by selecting from time to time the one which seemed most in place,
to avoid, as far as could be, the offensiveness of talk about one's self; for such talk,
though naturally unacceptable, is frequently inevitable, when one cannot in any other way
give a clear exposition of the subjects. I am somewhat assisted in this point by the
accident that, as far as I know, no one up to our own time has ever had the same name as
myself.
Massanissa, king of the Numidians in Africa, was the best man of all the kings of our
time, and the most completely fortunate; for he reigned more than sixty years in the
soundest health and to extreme old age---for he was ninety when he died. He was, besides,
the most powerful man physically of all his contemporaries: for instance, when it was
necessary to stand, he would do so without moving a foot all day long; and again, when he
had once sat down to business he remained there the whole day; nor did it distress him the
least to remain in the saddle day and night continuously; and at ninety years old, at
which age he died, he left a son only four years old, called Sthembanus, who was
afterwards adopted by Micipses, and four sons besides. Owing, again, to the affection
existing between these sons, he kept his whole life free from any treasonable plot and his
kingdom unpolluted by any family tragedy. But his greatest and most divine achievement was
this: Numidia had been before his time universally unproductive, and was looked upon as
incapable of producing any cultivated fruits. He was the first and only man who showed
that it could produce cultivated fruits just as well as any other country whatever, by
cultivating farms to the extent of ten thousand plethra for each of his sons in
different parts of it. On this man's death, then, so much may reasonably and justly be
said. Scipio arrived at Cirta on the third day after his departure, and settled everything
properly and fairly. . . . A little while before his death he was seen, on the day
following a great victory over the Carthaginians, sitting outside his tent eating a piece
of dirty bread, and on those who saw it expressing surprise at his doing so, he said. . .
.
Book XXXVIII.
Hasdrubal, the general of the Carthaginians, was a vain ostentatious person, very far
from possessing real strategic ability. There are numerous proofs of his want of judgment.
In the first place he appeared in full armor in his interview with Gulussa, king of the
Numidians, with a purple-dyed robe over his armor fastened by a brooch, and attended by
ten bodyguards armed with swords; and in the next place, having advanced in front of these
armed attendants to a distance of about twenty feet, he stood behind the trench and
palisade and beckoned the king to come to him, whereas it ought to have been quite the
other way. However, Gulussa, after the Numidian fashion, being not inclined to stand on
ceremony, advanced towards him unattended, and when he got near him asked him "Whom
he was afraid of that he had come in full armor?" And on his answering, "The
Romans," Gulussa remarked: "Then you should not have trusted yourself to the
city, when there was no necessity for your doing so. However, what do you want, and what
do you ask me to do?" To which Hasdrubal replied: "I want you to go as our
ambassador to the Roman commander, and to undertake for us that we will obey every
injunction; only I beg of you both to abstain from harming this wretched city."
Then said Gulussa: "Your demand appears to me to be quite childish! Why, my good
sir, what you failed to get by your embassies from the Romans, who were then quietly
encamped at Utica, and before a blow had been struck, how can you expect to have granted
you now, when you have been completely invested by sea and land, and have almost given up
every hope of safety?" To which Hasdrubal replied that "Gulussa was
ill-informed; for they still had good hopes of their outside allies,"---for he had
not yet heard about the Mauretanii, and thought that the forces in the country were still
unconquered, ---"nor were they in despair as to their own ultimate safety. And above
all, they trusted in the support of the gods, and in what they might expect from them; for
they believed that they would not disregard the flagrant violation of treaty from which
they were suffering, but would give them many opportunities of securing their safety.
Therefore he called on the Roman commander in the name of the gods and of Fortune to spare
the city; with the distinct understanding that, if its inhabitants failed to obtain this
grace, they would be cut to pieces to the last man sooner than evacuate it." After
some more conversation of the same sort, these men separated for the present, having made
an appointment to meet again on the third day from that time.
On Gulussa communicating to him what had been said, Scipio remarked with a laugh:
"Oh, then, it was because you intended to make this demand that you displayed that
abominable cruelty to our prisoners! And you trust in the gods, do you, after violating
even the laws of men?" The king went on to remind Scipio that above all things it was
necessary to finish the business speedily; for, apart from unforeseen contingencies, the
consular elections were now close at hand, and it was only right to have regard to that,
lest, if the winter found them just where they were, another Consul would come to
supersede him, and without any trouble get all the credit of his labors. These words
induced Scipio to give directions to offer Hasdrubal safety for himself, his wife and
children, and ten families of his friends and relations, and permission to take ten
talents of his private property and to bring out with him whichever of his slaves he
chose. With these concessions, therefore, Gulussa went to his meeting with Hasdrubal on
the third day, who again came forward with great pomp and at a dignified step, clothed in
his purple robe and full suit of armor, so as to cast the tyrants of tragedy far into the
shade. He was naturally fat, but at that time he had grown extremely corpulent, and had
become more than usually red from exposure to the sun, so that he seemed to be living like
fat oxen at a fair; and not at all like a man to be in command at a time of such terrible
miseries as cannot easily be described in words. When he met the king, and heard the offer
of the Consul, he slapped his thigh again and again, and appealing to the gods and Fortune
declared that "The day would never come on which Hasdrubal would behold the sun and
his native city in flames; for to the nobly-minded one's country and its burning houses
were a glorious funeral pile."
These expressions force us to feel some admiration for the man and the nobility of his
language; but when we come to view his administration of affairs, we cannot fail to be
struck by his want of spirit and courage; for at a time when his fellow-citizens were
absolutely perishing with famine, he gave banquets and had second courses put on of a
costly kind, and by his own excellent physical condition made their misery more
conspicuous. For the number of the dying surpassed belief, as well as the number who
deserted every day from hunger. However, by fiercely rebuking some, and by executing as
well as abusing others, he cowed the common people: and by this means retained, in a
country reduced to the lowest depths of misfortune, an authority which a tyrant would
scarcely enjoy in a prosperous city. Therefore I think I was justified in saying that two
leaders more like each other than those who at that time directed the affairs of Greece
and Carthage it would not be easy to find. And this will be rendered manifest when we come
to a formal comparison of them....
Book XXXIX:
[Shuckburgh: After various operations during the autumn of 147 B.C., the upshot of
which was to put the whole of the open country in Roman hands, in the beginning of spring,
146 B.C., Scipio delivered his final attack on Carthage, taking first the quarter of the
merchants' harbor, then the war harbor, and then the market-place. There only remained the
streets leading to the Byrsa and the Byrsa itself. ---Appian, Pun., 123-126;
Livy, Ep. 51].
Having got within the walls, while the Carthaginians still held out on the citadel,
Scipio found that the arm of the sea which intervened was not at all deep; and upon
Polybius advising him to set it with iron spikes or drive sharp wooden stakes into it, to
prevent the enemy crossing it and attacking the mole [the mole of huge stones constructed
to block up the mouth of the harbor], he said that, having taken the walls and got inside
the city, it would be ridiculous to take measures to avoid fighting the enemy. . . .
The pompous Hasdrubal threw himself on his knees before the Roman commander, quite
forgetful of his proud language. . . When the Carthaginian commander thus threw himself as
a suppliant at Scipio's knees, the proconsul with a glance at those present said:
"See what Fortune is, gentlemen! What an example she makes of irrational men! This is
the Hasdrubal who but the other day disdained the large favors which I offered him, and
said that the most glorious funeral pyre was one's country and its burning ruins. Now he
comes with suppliant wreaths, beseeching us for spare life and resting all his hopes on
us. Who would not learn from such a spectacle that a mere man should never say or do
anything presumptuous?" Then some of the deserters came to the edge of the roof and
begged the front ranks of the assailants to hold their hands for a little; and, on Scipio
ordering a halt, they began abusing Hasdrubal, some for his perjury, declaring that he had
sworn again and again on the altars that he would never abandon them, and others for his
cowardice and utter baseness: and they did this in the most unsparing language, and with
the bitterest terms of abuse. And just at this moment Hasdrubal's wife, seeing him seated
in front of the enemy with Scipio, advanced in front of the deserters, dressed in noble
and dignified attire herself, but holding in her hands, on either side, her two boys
dressed only in short tunics and shielded under her own robes. First she addressed
Hasdrubal by his name, and when he said nothing but remained with his head bowed to the
ground, she began by calling on the name of the gods, and next thanked Scipio warmly
because, as far as he could secure it, both she and her children were saved. And then,
pausing for a short time, she asked Hasdrubal how he had had the heart to secure this
favor from the Roman general for himself alone, and, leaving his fellow-citizens who
trusted in him in the most miserable plight, had gone over secretly to the enemy? And how
he had the assurance to be sitting there holding suppliant boughs, in the face of the very
men to whom he had frequently said that the day would never come in which the sun would
see Hasdrubal alive and his native city in flames....
[Shuckburgh: Hasdrubal's wife finally threw herself and her children from the
citadel into the burning streets. ---Livy, Ep. 51].
After an interview with [Scipio], in which he was kindly treated, Hasdrubal desired
leave to go away from the town....
At the sight of the city utterly perishing amidst the flames Scipio burst into tears,
and stood long reflecting on the inevitable change which awaits cities, nations, and
dynasties, one and all, as it does every one of us men. This, he thought, had befallen
Ilium, once a powerful city, and the once mighty empires of the Assyrians, Medes,
Persians, and that of Macedonia lately so splendid. And unintentionally or purposely he
quoted---the words perhaps escaping him unconsciously---
"The day shall be when holy Troy shall fall
And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam's folk."
And on my asking him boldly (for I had been his tutor) what he meant by
these words, he did not name Rome distinctly, but was evidently fearing for her, from this
sight of the mutability of human affairs. . . . Another still more remarkable saying of
his I may record. . . [When he had given the order for firing the town] he immediately
turned round and grasped me by the hand and said: "O Polybius, it is a grand thing,
but, I know not how, I feel a terror and dread, lest some one should one day give the same
order about my own native city." . . . Any observation more practical or sensible it
is not easy to make. For in the midst of supreme success for one's self and of disaster
for the enemy, to take thought of one's own position and of the possible reverse which may
come, and in a word to keep well in mind in the midst of prosperity the mutability of
Fortune, is the characteristic of a great man, a man free from weaknesses and worthy to be
remembered.
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