CHAPTER II: Of the State
of Nature
Sect. 4. To understand political power right, and derive it from its original, we must
consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to
order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will
of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one
having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the
same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the
use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination
or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration
of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear
appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident
in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to
mutual love amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from
whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. His words are,
The like natural inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to
love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal, must needs all have
one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good, even as much at every man's hands, as
any man can wish unto his own soul, how should I look to have any part of my desire herein
satisfied, unless myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in
other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered them repugnant to
this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as much as me; so that if I do harm, I
must look to suffer, there being no reason that others should shew greater measure of love
to me, than they have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals
in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of bearing to
them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of equality between ourselves and
them that are as ourselves, what several rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for
direction of life, no man is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence:
though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to dispose of his person or
possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state
of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is
that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions:
for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the
servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his
business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not
one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one
community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may
authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself,
and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation
comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind,
and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or
what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of
another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others rights, and from doing
hurt to one another, and the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and
preservation of all mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put
into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that
law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all
other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no body that in the
state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil
he has done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where naturally
there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in
prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power over another; but
yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands,
according to the passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to
retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to
his transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and restraint: for these
two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully do harm to another, which is that we
call punishment. In transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live
by another rule than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set
to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to mankind,
the tye, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being slighted and broken by
him. Which being a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it,
provided for by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to
preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as
may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others,
from doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A
RIGHT TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before
they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to
death, or punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their
laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the legislative,
reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is he bound to hearken to
them. The legislative authority, by which they are in force over the subjects of that
commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in
England, France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without
authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish
offences against it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the
magistrates of any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference
to him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and varying from the
right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes degenerate, and declares himself to
quit the principles of human nature, and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly
injury done to some person or other, and some other man receives damage by his
transgression: in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of
punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek reparation from him
that has done it: and any other person, who finds it just, may also join with him that is
injured, and assist him in recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction
for the harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the crime for restraint,
and preventing the like offence, which right of punishing is in every body; the other of
taking reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the
magistrate, who by being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands,
can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law, remit the
punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet cannot remit the
satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he has received. That, he who has
suffered the damage has a right to demand in his own name, and he alone can remit: the
damnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the
offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to
prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind, and
doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end: and thus it is, that every man,
in the state of nature, has a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing
the like injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the punishment that
attends it from every body, and also to secure men from the attempts of a criminal, who
having renounced reason, the common rule and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by
the unjust violence and slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all
mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild savage
beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon this is grounded that
great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And Cain
was so fully convinced, that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after
the murder of his brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so
plain was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish the lesser
breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with death? I answer, each
transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will suffice
to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others
from doing the like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may in
the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it may, in a
commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present purpose, to enter here into the
particulars of the law of nature, or its measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there
is such a law, and that too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a
studier of that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer; as much
as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men,
following contrary and hidden interests put into words; for so truly are a great part of
the municipal laws of countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the
law of nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the
executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is
unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases, that self- love will make men
partial to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion
and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing but confusion
and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath certainly appointed government to
restrain the partiality and violence of men. I easily grant, that civil government is the
proper remedy for the inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be
great, where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he
who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn
himself for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that
absolute monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which
necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of nature is
therefore not to how much better it is than the state of nature, where one man, commanding
a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects
whatever he pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul those
who execute his pleasure7 and in whatsoever he cloth, whether led by reason, mistake or
passion, must be submitted to7 much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are
not bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in
his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any
men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since
all princes and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of
nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that
state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether they are, or are
not, in league with others: for it is not every compact that puts an end to the state of
nature between men, but only this one of agreeing together mutually to enter into one
community, and make one body politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with
another, and yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck,
&c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega, in
his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of America, are
binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one
another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of
society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of nature, I will
not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where
he says, The laws which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never
any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but forasmuch as we are
not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with competent store of things, needful
for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to
supply those defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was
the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies. But I moreover
affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till by their own
consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the
sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear.
CHAPTER VII: Of
Political of Civil Society
Sec. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good
for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and
inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and
language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave
beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and
servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and
make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper
to a family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall
see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sec. 78. Conjugal society is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and
tho' it consist chiefly in such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is
necessary to its chief end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and
assistance, and a communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care
and affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to be
nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for themselves.
Sec. 79. For the end of conjunction, between male and female, being not barely
procreation, but the continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female
ought to last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and
support of the young ones, who are to be sustained even after procreation, so long as is
necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are to be sustained by
those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide for themselves. This rule,
which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works of his hands, we find the inferior
creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous animals which feed on grass, the conjunction
between male and female lasts no longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat
of the dam being sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the
male only begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose sustenance he
can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction lasts longer: because the
dam not being able well to subsist herself, and nourish her numerous off-spring by her own
prey alone, a more laborious, as well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on
grass, the assistance of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family,
which cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care of
male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some domestic ones,
where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking care of the young brood)
whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen continue mates, till the young are
able to use their wing, and provide for themselves. Sec. 80. And herein I think lies the
chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied to a longer
conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is capable of conceiving, and de
facto is commonly with child again, and brings forth too a new birth, long before the
former is out of a dependency for support on his parents help, and able to shift for
himself, and has all the assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father,
who is bound to take care for those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in
conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young being able
to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns again, the conjugal bond
dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till Hymen at his usual anniversary season
summons them again to chuse new mates. Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the
great Creator, who having given to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future,
as well as to supply the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man
and wife should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that so
their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united, to make provision
and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain mixture, or easy and frequent
solutions of conjugal society would mightily disturb.
Sec. 81. But tho'these are ties upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm
and lasting in man, than the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to
enquire, why this compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance
taken care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or
upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there being no necessity
in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it should always be for life; I
mean, to such as are under no restraint of any positive law, which ordains all such
contracts to be perpetual.
Sec. 82. But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having
different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it
therefore being necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed
somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger. But this
reaching but to the things of their common interest and property, leaves the wife in the
full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right, and gives the husband
no more power over her life than she has over his; the power of the husband being so far
from that of an absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate
from him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be made
by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the country they live
in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father or mother's lot, as such
contract does determine.
Sec. 83. For all the ends of marriage being to be obtained under politic government, as
well as in the state of nature, the civil magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power
of either naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and
assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy that may arise
between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute sovereignty and
power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and were necessary to the
society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony in any of those countries where
the husband is allowed no such absolute authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no
such power in the husband, the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being
not at all necessary to that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends
without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance and
maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be varied and regulated
by that contract which unites man and wife in that society, as far as may consist with
procreation and the bringing up of children till they could shift for themselves; nothing
being necessary to any society, that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sec. 84. The society betwixt parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers
belonging respectively to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter,
that I shall not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far
different from a politic society.
Sec. 85. Master and servant are names as old as history, but given to those of far
different condition; for a freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for
a certain time, the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive:
and though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the ordinary
discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over him, and no greater
than what is contained in the contract between them. But there is another sort of
servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who being captives taken in a just war,
are by the right of nature subjected to the absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their
masters. These men having, as I say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties,
and lost their estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property,
cannot in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof is
the preservation of property.
Sec. 86. Let us therefore consider a master of a family with all these subordinate
relations of wife, children, servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a
family; which, what resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too,
with a little common-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power and
end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the absolute monarch in
it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and short power, when it is plain, by
what has been said before, that the master of the family has a very distinct and
differently limited power, both as to time and extent, over those several persons that are
in it; for excepting the slave (and the family is as much a family, and his power as
paterfamilias as great, whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no
legislative power of life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of
a family may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the
whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But how a
family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political society,
we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself consists.
Sec. 87. Man being born, as has been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an
uncontrouled enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with
any other man, or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve
his property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and attempts of
other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in others, as he is
persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in crimes where the heinousness of
the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But because no political society can be, nor
subsist, without having in itself the power to preserve the property, and in order
thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that society; there, and there only is
political society, where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power,
resigned it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from
appealing for protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of
every particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled
standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having authority from
the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may
happen between any members of that society concerning any matter of right; and punishes
those offences which any member hath committed against the society, with such penalties as
the law has established: whereby it is easy to discern, who are, and who are not, in
political society together. Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies
between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who
have no such common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being,
where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I have before
shewed it, the perfect state of nature.
Sec. 88. And thus the common-wealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall
belong to the several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has the power
to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is not of it, (which is
the power of war and peace;) and all this for the preservation of the property of all the
members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man who has entered into
civil society, and is become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power
to punish offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private judgment,
yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the legislative in all cases,
where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a right to the common-wealth to employ
his force, for the execution of the judgments of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be
called to it; which indeed are his own judgments, they being made by himself, or his
representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of
civil society, which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished,
when committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional judgments
founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be
vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of all the members, when there shall
be need.
Sec. 89. Where-ever therefore any number of men are so united into one society, as to
quit every one his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public,
there and there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any
number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people, one body
politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins himself to, and
incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he authorizes the society, or
which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him, as the public good of the
society shall require; to the execution whereof, his own assistance (as to his own
decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth,
by setting up a judge on earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and
redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any number of men,
however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in
the state of nature.
Sec. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the
only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no
form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy
those inconveniencies of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's
being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that
society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which
every one of the* society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an
authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those
persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of
those who are under his dominion. (*The public power of all society is above every soul
contained in the same society; and the principal use of that power is, to give laws unto
all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason
shewed which may necessarily inforce, that the law of reason, or of God, doth enjoin the
contrary, Hook. Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 16.)
Sec. 91. For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive power in
himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies open to any one, who may
fairly, and indifferently, and with authority decide, and from whose decision relief and
redress may be expected of any injury or inconviency, that may be suffered from the
prince, or by his order: so that such a man, however intitled, Czar, or Grand Seignior, or
how you please, is as much in the state of nature, with all under his dominion, as he is
with therest of mankind: for where-ever any two men are, who have no standing rule, and
common judge to appeal to on earth, for the determination of controversies of right
betwixt them, there they are still in the state of* nature, and under all the
inconveniencies of it, with only this woful difference to the subject, or rather slave of
an absolute prince: that whereas, in the ordinary state of nature, he has a liberty to
judge of his right, and according to the best of his power, to maintain it; now, whenever
his property is invaded by the will and order of his monarch, he has not only no appeal,
as those in society ought to have, but as if he were degraded from the common state of
rational creatures, is denied a liberty to judge of, or to defend his right; and so is
exposed to all the misery and inconveniencies, that a man can fear from one, who being in
the unrestrained state of nature, is yet corrupted with flattery, and armed with power.
(*To take away all such mutual grievances, injuries and wrongs, i.e. such as attend men in
the state of nature, there was no way but only by growing into composition and agreement
amongst themselves, by ordaining some kind of govemment public, and by yielding themselves
subject thereunto, that unto whom they granted authority to rule and govem, by them the
peace, tranquillity and happy estate of the rest might be procured. Men always knew that
where force and injury was offered, they might be defenders of themselves; they knew that
however men may seek their own commodity, yet if this were done with injury unto others,
it was not to be suffered, but by all men, and all good means to be withstood. Finally,
they knew that no man might in reason take upon him to determine his own right, and
according to his own determination proceed in maintenance thereof, in as much as every man
is towards himself, and them whom he greatly affects, partial; and therefore that strifes
and troubles would be endless, except they gave their common consent, all to be ordered by
some, whom they should agree upon, without which consent there would be no reason that one
man should take upon him to be lord or judge over another, Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect.
10.)
Sec. 92. For he that thinks absolute power purifies men's blood, and corrects the
baseness of human nature, need read but the history of this, or any other age, to be
convinced of the contrary. He that would have been insolent and injurious in the woods of
America, would not probably be much better in a throne; where perhaps learning and
religion shall be found out to justify all that he shall do to his subjects, and the sword
presently silence all those that dare question it: for what the protection of absolute
monarchy is, what kind of fathers of their countries it makes princes to be and to what a
degree of happiness and security it carries civil society, where this sort of government
is grown to perfection, he that will look into the late relation of Ceylon, may easily
see.
Sec. 93. In absolute monarchies indeed, as well as other governments of the world, the
subjects have an appeal to the law, and judges to decide any controversies, and restrain
any violence that may happen betwixt the subjects themselves, one amongst another. This
every one thinks necessary, and believes he deserves to be thought a declared enemy to
society and mankind, who should go about to take it away. But whether this be from a true
love of mankind and society, and such a charity as we owe all one to another, there is
reason to doubt: for this is no more than what every man, who loves his own power, profit,
or greatness, may and naturally must do, keep those animals from hurting, or destroying
one another, who labour and drudge only for his pleasure and advantage; and so are taken
care of, not out of any love the master has for them, but love of himself, and the profit
they bring him: for if it be asked, what security, what fence is there, in such a state,
against the violence and oppression of this absolute ruler? the very question can scarce
be borne. They are ready to tell you, that it deserves death only to ask after safety.
Betwixt subject and subject, they will grant, there must be measures, laws and judges, for
their mutual peace and security: but as for the ruler, he ought to be absolute, and is
above all such circumstances; because he has power to do more hurt and wrong, it is right
when he does it. To ask how you may be guarded from harm, or injury, on that side where
the strongest hand is to do it, is presently the voice of faction and rebellion: as if
when men quitting the state of nature entered into society, they agreed that all of them
but one, should be under the restraint of laws, but that he should still retain all the
liberty of the state of nature, increased with power, and made licentious by impunity.
This is to think, that men are so foolish, that they take care to avoid what mischiefs may
be done them by pole-cats, or foxes; but are content, nay, think it safety, to be devoured
by lions.
Sec. 94. But whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it hinders
not men from feeling; and when they perceive, that any man, in what station soever, is out
of the bounds of the civil society which they are of, and that they have no appeal on
earth against any harm, they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the
state of nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as
they can, to have that safety and security in civil society, for which it was first
instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at
first , (as shall be shewed more at large hereafter in the following part of this
discourse) some one good and excellent man having got a pre -eminency amongst the rest,
had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority,
that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved
into his hands, without any other caution, but the assurance they had of his uprightness
and wisdom; yet when time, giving authority, and (as some men would persuade us)
sacredness of customs, which the negligent, and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages
began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not
secure under the government, as then it was, (whereas government has no other end but the
preservation of * property) could never be safe nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil
society, till the legislature was placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate,
parliament, or what you please. By which means every single person became subject, equally
with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative,
had established; nor could any one, by his own authority; avoid the force of the law, when
once made; nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own,
or the miscarriages of any of his dependents.** No man in civil society can be exempted
from the laws of it: for if any man may do what he thinks fit, and there be no appeal on
earth, for redress or security against any harm he shall do; I ask, whether he be not
perfectly still in the state of nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil
society; unless any one will say, the state of nature and civil society are one and the
same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to
affirm. (*At the first, when some certain kind of regiment was once appointed, it may be
that nothing was then farther thought upon for the manner of goveming, but all permitted
unto their wisdom and discretion, which were to rule, till by experience they found this
for all parts very inconvenient, so as the thing which they had devised for a remedy, did
indeed but increase the sore, which it should have cured. They saw, that to live by one
man's will, became the cause of all men's misery. This constrained them to come unto laws,
wherein all men might see their duty beforehand, and know the penalties of transgressing
them. Hooker's Eccl. Pol. l. i. sect. 10.) (**Civil law being the act of the whole body
politic, cloth therefore over-rule each several part of the same body. Hooker, ibid.)
