Modern History Sourcebook:
Edmund Burke:
Reflections on The Revolution in France, 1791
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was not a reactionary. As a member
of Parliament, he had supported the American colonists in their
initial protests against the British government. He is most famous,
however, for his writings on the French Revolution. His Reflections,
written in the form of a long letter in 1791, in a sense marks
the origin of modern conservative thought.
Kings, in one sense, are undoubtedly the servants of the people:
because their power has no other rational end than that of the
genera] advantage; but it is not true that they are, in the ordinary
sense, (by our constitution at least), anything like servants;
the essence of whose situation is to obey the commands oi some
other, and to be removable al pleasure. But the king of Great
Britain obeys no other person; all other persons are individually,
and collectively too, under him, and owe to him a legal obedience.
The law which knows neither to Ratter no to insult, calls this
high magistrate not our servant, as this humble divine calls him,
but "our sovereign Lord the king"; and we, on
our parts have learned to speak only the primitive language of
the law, and not the confused jargon of their Babylonian pulpits.
As he is not to obey us, but as we are to obey the law in him,
OU1 constitution has made no sort of provision towards rendering
him, as a servant, in any degree responsible Our constitution
knows nothing of a magistrate like the Justicia of Aragon;
nor of any court legally appointed, nor of any process legally
settled, for submitting the king to the responsibility belonging
to all servants. In this he is not distinguished from the Commons
and the Lords; who, in their several public capacities, can never
be called to an account of their conduct; although the Revolution
Society chooses to assert in direct opposition to one ol the wisest
and most beautiful parts of our constitution, that "a king
is no more than the first servant of the public, created by it, and responsible to it."
Ill would our ancestors at the Revolution [of 1688-Ed.] have
deserved their fame for wisdom, if they had found no security
for their freedom, but in rendering their government feeble in
its operations and precarious in its tenure; if the had been able
to contrive no better remedy against arbitrary power than civil
confusion. Let these gentlemen state who that representative public is to whom they will affirm the king, as a servant,
to be responsible. It will be then time enough for me to produce
to them the positive statute law which affirms that he is not.
The ceremony of cashiering kings of which these gentlemen talk
so much at their ease, can rarely, if ever, be performed without
force It then becomes a case of war, and not of constitution.
Laws are commanded to hold their tongues amongst arms; and tribunals
fall to the ground with the peace they are no longer able to uphold.
The Revolution of 1688 was obtained by a just war, in the only
case in which any war, and much more a civil war, can be just.
"Justa bella quibus necessaria. " [Wars are just
to those to whom they are necessary."-Ed.] ' The question
of dethroning, or, if these gentlemen like the phrase better "cashiering
kings," will always be, as it has always been, an extraordinary
question of state, and wholly out of the law; a question (like
all other questions of state) of dispositions, and of means, and
of probable consequences, rather than of positive rights. As it
was not made for common abuses, so it is not to be agitated by
common minds. The speculative line of demarcation, where obedience
ought to end, and resistance must begin, is faint, obscure, and
not easily definable. It is not a single act, or a single event,
which determines it. Governments must be abused and deranged indeed,
before it can be thought of; and the prospect of the future must
be as bad as the experience of the past. When things are in that
lamentable condition, the nature of the disease is to indicate
the remedy to those whom nature has qualified to administer in
extremities this critical, ambiguous, bitter | potion to a distempered
state. Times, and occasions, and provocations, will teach their
own lessons. The wise will determine from the gravity of the case;
the irritable, from sensibility to oppression; the highminded,
from disdain and indignation at abusive power in unworthy hands;
the brave and bold, from the love of honourable danger in a generous
cause; but, with or without right, a revolution will be the very
last resource of the thinking and the good.
The third head of right, asserted by the pulpit of the Old Jewry,
namely, the "right to form a government for ourselves,"
has, at least, as little countenance from anything done at the
Revolution [of 1688- Ed.], either in precedent or principle,
as the two first of their claims. The Revolution was made to preserve
our ancient, indisputable laws and liberties, and that ancient constitution of government which is our only security
for law and liberty. If you are desirous of knowing the spirit
of our constitution, and the policy which predominated in that
great period which has secured it to this hour, pray look for
both in our histories, in our records, in our acts of parliament,
and journals of parliament, and not in the sermons of the Old
Jewry, and the afterdinner toasts of the Revolution Society.
In the former you will find other ideas and another language.
Such a claim is as illsuited to our temper and wishes as
it is unsupported by an appearance of authority. The very idea
of the fabrication of a new government is enough to fill us with
disgust and horror. We wished at the period of the Revolution,
and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an inheritance
from our forefathers. Upon that body and stock of inheritance
we have taken care not to inoculate any scion alien to the nature
of the original plant. All the reformations we have hitherto made
have proceeded upon the principle of reverence to antiquity: and
I hope, nay I am persuaded, that all those which possibly may
be made hereafter, will be carefully formed upon analogical precedent,
authority, and example.
Our oldest reformation is that of Magna Charta. You will see that
Sir Edward Coke, that great oracle of our law, and indeed all
the great men who follow him, to Blackstone, are industrious to
prove the pedigree of our liberties. They endeavour to prove,
that the ancient charter, the Magna Charta of King John, was connected
with another positive charter from Henry 1, and that both the
one and the other were nothing more than a reaffirmance of the
still more ancient standing law of the kingdom. In the matter
of fact, for the greater part, these authors appear to be in the
right; perhaps not always; but if the lawyers mistake in some
particulars, it proves my position still the more strongly; because
it demonstrates the powerful prepossession towards antiquity,
with which the minds of all our lawyers and legislators, and of
all the people whom they wish to influence, have been always filled;
and the stationary policy of this kingdom in considering their
most sacred rights and franchises as an inheritance.
In the famous law of the 3rd of Charles I, called the Petition
of Right, the parliament says to the king, "Your subjects
have inherited this freedom," claiming their franchises
not on abstract principles "as the rights of men," but
as the rights of Englishmen, and as a patrimony derived from their
forefathers. Selden, and the other profoundly learned men, who
drew this Petition of Right, were as well acquainted, at least,
with all the general theories concerning the "rights of men,"
as any of the discourses in our pulpits, or on your tribune, full
as well as Dr. Price, or as the Abbé Siéyès.
But, for reasons worthy of that practical wisdom which superseded
their theoretic science, they preferred this positive, recorded, hereditary title to all which can be dear to the man and
the citizen, to that vague speculative right, which exposed their
sure inheritance to be scrambled for and torn to pieces by every
wild, litigious spirit.
The same policy pervades all the laws which have since been made
for the preservation of our liberties. In the 1st of William and
Mary, in the famous statute, called the Declaration of Right,
the two Houses utter not a syllable of "a right to frame
a government for themselves." You will see, that their whole
care was to secure the religion, laws, and liberties that had
been long possessed, and had been lately endangered. "Taking
into their most serious consideration the best means for
making such an establishment, that their religion, laws, and liberties
might not be in danger of being again subverted," they auspicate
all their proceedings, by stating as some of those best means,
"in the first place" to do "as their ancestors
in like cases have usually done for vindicating their ancient rights and liberties, to declare";-and then they
pray the king and queen, "that it may be declared and
enacted, that all and singular the rights and liberties
asserted and declared, are the true ancient and indubitable
rights and liberties of the people of this kingdom.
You will observe that from Magna Charta to the Declaration of
Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim
and assert our liberties as an entailed inheritance derived
to us from our forefathers, and to be transmitted to our posterity;
as an estate specially belonging to the people of this kingdom,
without any reference whatever to any other more general or prior
right. By this means our constitution preserves a unity in so
great a diversity of its parts. We have an inheritable crown;
an inheritable peerage; and a House of Commons and a people inheriting
privileges, franchises, and liberties, from a long line of ancestors.
This policy appears to me to be the result of profound reflection;
or rather the happy effect of following nature, which is wisdom
without reflection, and above it. A spirit of innovation is generally
the result of a selfish temper, and confined views. People will
not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their
ancestors. Besides, the people of England well know, that the
idea of inheritance furnishes a sure principle of conservation,
and a sure principle of transmission; without at all excluding
a principle of improvement. It leaves acquisition free; but it
secures what it acquires. Whatever advantages are obtained by
a state proceeding on these maxims, are locked fast as in a sort
of family settlement; grasped as in a kind of mortmain for ever.
By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature,
we receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges,
in the same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property
alad our lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune,
the gifts of providence, are handed down to us, and from us, in
the same course and order. Our political system is placed in a
just correspondence and symmetry with the order of the world,
and with the mode of existence decreed to a permanent body composed
of transitory parts; wherein, by the disposition of a stupendous
wisdom, moulding together the great mysterious incorporation of
the human race, the whole, at one time, is never old, or middle-aged,
or young, but, in a condition of unchangeable constancy, moves
on through the varied tenor of perpetual decay, fall, renovation,
and progression. Thus, by preserving the method of nature in the
conduct of the state, in what we improve, we are never wholly
new; in what we retain, we are never wholly obsolete. By adhering
in this manner and on those principles to our forefathers, we
are guided not by the superstition of antiquarians, but by the
spirit of philosophic analogy. In this choice of inheritance we
have given to our frame of polity the image of a relation in blood;
binding up the constitution of our country with our dearest domestic
ties; adopting our fundamental laws into the bosom of our family
affections; keeping inseparable, and cherishing with the warmth
of all their combined and mutually reflected charities, our state,
our hearts, our sepulchres, and our altars.
Through the same plan of a conformity to nature in our artificial
institutions, and by calling in the aid of her unerring and powerful
instincts to fortify the fallible and feeble contrivances of our
reason, we have derived several others, and those no small benefits,
from considering our liberties in the light of an inheritance.
Always acting as if in the presence of canonized forefathers,
the spirit of freedom, leading in itself to misrule and excess,
is tempered with an awful gravity. This idea of a liberal descent
inspires us with a sense of habitual native dignity, which prevents
that upstart insolence almost inevitably adhering to and disgracing
those who are the first acquirers of any distinction. By this
means our liberty becomes a noble freedom. It carries an imposing
and majestic aspect. It has a pedigree and illustrating ancestors.
It has its bearings and its ensigns armorial. It has its gallery
of portraits; its monumental inscriptions; its records, evidences,
and titles. We procure reverence to our civil institutions on
the principle upon which nature teaches us to revere individual
men; on account of their age, and on account of those from whom
they are descended. All your sophisters cannot produce anything
better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom than the
course that we have pursued, who have chosen our nature, rather
than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions,
for the great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges.
You [in France-Ed.] might, if you pleased, have profited
of our example, and have given to your recovered freedom a correspondent
dignity. Your privileges, though discontinued, were not lost to
memory. Your constitution, it is true, whilst you were out of
possession, suffered waste and dilapidation; but you possessed
in some parts the walls, and, in all, the foundations, of a noble
and venerable castle. You might have repaired those walls;
you might have built on those old foundations. Your constitution
was suspended before it was perfected; but you had the elements
of a constitution very nearly as good as could be wished. In your
old states you possessed that variety of parts corresponding with
the various descriptions of which your community was happily composed;
you had all that combination, and all that opposition of interests,
you had that action and counteraction, which, in the natural and
in the political world, from the reciprocal struggle of discordant
powers, draws out the harmony of the universe. These opposed and
conflicting interests, which you considered as so great a blemish
in your old and in our present constitution, interpose a salutary
check to all precipitate resolutions. They render deliberation
a matter not of choice, but of necessity; they make all change
a subject of compromise, which naturally begets moderation;
they produce temperaments preventing the sore evil of harsh,
crude, unqualified reformations; and rendering all the headlong
exertions of arbitrary power, in the few or in the many, for ever
impracticable. Through that diversity of members and interests,
general liberty had as many securities as there were separate
views in the several orders; whilst by pressing down the whole
by the weight of a real monarchy, the separate parts would have
been prevented from warping, and starting from their allotted
places.
You had all these advantages in your ancient states; but you chose
to act as if you had never been moulded into civil society, and
had everything to begin anew. You began ill, because you began
by despising everything that belonged to you. You set up your
trade without a capital. If the last generations of your country
appeared without much lustre in your eyes, you might have passed
them by, and derived your claims from a more early race of ancestors.
Under a pious predilection for those ancestors your imaginations
would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom, beyond
the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen with
the example to whose imitation you aspired. Respecting your forefathers,
you would have been taught to respect yourselves You would not
have chosen to consider the French as a people of yesterday, as
a nation of lowborn servile wretches until the emancipating
year of 1789. In order to furnish, at the expense of your honour,
an excuse to your apologists here for several enormities of yours,
you would not have been content to be represented as a gang of
Maroon slaves, suddenly broke loose from the house of bondage,
and therefore to be pardoned for your abuse of the liberty to
which you were not accustomed, and ill fitted. Would it not, my
worthy friend, have been wiser to have you thought, what I, for
one, always thought you, a generous and gallant nation, long misled
to your disadvantage by your high and romantic sentiments of fidelity,
honour, and loyalty; that events had been unfavourable to you,
but that you were not enslaved through any illiberal or servile
disposition; in your most devoted submission, you were actuated
by a principle of public spirit, and that it was your Country
you worshipped, in the person of your king? Had you made it to
be understood, that in the delusion of this amiable error you
had gone further than your wise ancestors; that you were resolved
to resume your ancient privileges, whilst you preserved the spirit
of your ancient and your recent loyalty and honour; or if, diffident
of yourselves, and not clearly discerning the almost obliterated
constitution of your ancestors, you had looked to your neighbours
in this land, who had kept alive the ancient principles and models
of the old common law of Europe meliorated and adapted to its
present state-by following wise examples you would have given
new examples of wisdom to the world. You would have rendered the
cause of liberty venerable in the eyes of every worthy mind in
every nation. You would have shamed despotism from the earth,
by showing that freedom was not only reconcilable, but, as when
well disciplined it is, auxiliary to law. You would have an unoppressive
but a productive revenue. You would have had a flourishing commerce
to feed it. You would have had a free constitution; a potent monarchy;
a disciplined army; a reformed and venerated clergy; a mitigated
but spirited nobility, to lead your virtue, not to overlay it;
you would have had a liberal order of commons, to emulate and
to recruit that nobility; you would have had a protected, satisfied,
laborious, and obedient people, taught to seek and to recognise
the happiness that is to be found by virtue in all conditions;
in which consists the true moral equality of mankind, and not
in that monstrous fiction, which, by inspiring false ideas and
vain expectations into men destined to travel in the obscure walk
of laborious life, serves only to aggravate and embitter that
real inequality, which it never can remove; and which the order
of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of those whom
it must leave in an humble state, as those whom it is able to
exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy. You had
a smooth and easy career of felicity and glory laid open to you
beyond anything recorded in the history of the world; but you
have shown that difficulty is good for men.
Compute your gains: see what is got by those extravagant and presumptuous
speculations which have taught your leaders to despise all their
predecessors, and all their contemporaries, and even to despise
themselves, until the moment in which they became truly despicable.
By following those false lights, France has bought undisguised
calamities at a higher price than any nation has purchased the
most unequivocal blessings! France has bought poverty by crime!
France has not sacrificed her virtue to her interest, but she
has abandoned her interest, that she might prostitute her virtue.
All other nations have begun the fabric of a new government, or
the reformation of an old, by establishing originally, or by enforcing
with greater exactness some rites or other of religion. All other
people have laid the foundations of civil freedom in severer manners,
and a system of a more austere and masculine morality. France,
when she let loose the reins of regal authority, doubled the license
of a ferocious dissoluteness in manners, and of an insolent irreligion
in opinions and practices; and has extended through all ranks
of life, as if she were communicating some privilege, or laying
open some secluded benefit, all the unhappy corruptions that usually
were the disease of wealth and power. This is one of the new principles
of equality in France.
France, by the perfidy of her leaders has utterly disgraced the
tone of lenient council in the cabinets of princes, and disarmed
it of its most potent topics. She has sanctified the dark, suspicious
maxims of tyrannous distrust; and taught kings to tremble at (what
will hereafter be called) the delusive plausibilities of moral
politicians. Sovereigns will consider those, who advise them to
place an unlimited confidence in their people, as subverters of
their throne; as traitors who aim at their destruction, by leading
their easy good nature, under specious pretences, to admit combinations
of bold and faithless men into a participation of their power.
This alone (if there were nothing else) is an irreparable calamity
to you and to mankind. Remember that your parliament of Paris
told your king, that, in calling the states together, he had nothing
to fear but the prodigal excess of their zeal in providing for
the support of the throne. It is right that these men should hide
their heads. It is right that they should bear their part in the
ruin which their counsel has brought on their sovereign and their
country. Such sanguine declarations tend to lull authority asleep;
to encourage it rashly to engage in perilous adventures of untried
policy; to neglect those provisions, preparations, and precautions,
which distinguish benevolence from imbecility; and without which
no man can answer for the salutary effect of any abstract plan
of government or of freedom. For want of these, they have seen
the medicine of the state corrupted into its poison. They have
seen the French rebel against a mild and lawful monarch, with
more fury, outrage, and insult, than ever any people has been
known to rise against the most illegal usurper, or the most sanguinary
tyrant. Their I resistance was made to concession; | their revolt
was from protection; their blow was aimed at a hand holding out
graces, favours, and immunities.
This was unnatural. The rest is in order. They have found their
punishment in their success. Laws overturned; tribunals subverted;
industry without vigor; commerce expiring, the revenue unpaid,
yet the people impoverished; a church pillaged, and a state not
relieved; civil and military anarchy made the constitution of
the kingdom; everything human and divine sacrificed to the idol
of public credit, and national bankruptcy the consequence; and,
to crown all, the paper securities or new, precarious, tottering
power, the discredited paper securities of impoverished fraud
and beggared rapine, held out as a currency for the support of
an empire, in lieu of the two great recognised species that represent
the lasting, conventional credit of mankind, which disappeared
and hid themselves in the earth from whence they came, when the
principle of property, whose creatures j and representatives they
are, was systematically subverted.
Were all those dreadful things necessary? Were they the inevitable
results of the desperate struggle of determined patriots, compelled
to wade through blood and tumult, to the quiet shore of a tranquil
and prosperous liberty? No! nothing like it. The fresh ruins of
France, which shock our feelings wherever we can turn our eyes,
are not the devastation of civil war; they are the sad but instructive
monuments of rash and ignorant counsel in time of profound peace.
They are the display of inconsiderate and presumptuous, because
unresisted and irresistible, authority. The persons who have thus
squandered away the precious treasure of their crimes, the persons
who have made this prodigal and wild waste of public evils, (the
last stage reserved for the ultimate ransom of the state), have
met in their progress with little, or rather with no opposition
at all. Their whole march was more like a triumphal procession,
than the progress of a war. Their pioneers have gone before them,
and demolished and laid everything level at their feet. Not one
drop of their blood have they shed in the cause of the
country they have ruined. They have made no sacrifices to their
projects of greater consequence than their shoebuckles,
whilst they were imprisoning their king, murdering their fellow
citizens, and bathing in tears, and plunging in poverty and distress,
thousands of worthy men and worthy families. Their cruelty has
not even been the base result of fear. It has been the effect
of their sense of perfect safety, in authorizing treasons, robberies,
rapes, assassinations, slaughters, and burnings, throughout their
harassed land. But the cause of all was plain from the beginning.
This unforced choice, this fond election of evil, would appear
perfectly unaccountable, if we did not consider the composition
of the National Assembly: I do not mean its formal constitution,
which, as it now stands, is exceptional enough, but the materials
of which, in a great measure, it is composed, which is of ten
thousand times greater consequence than all the formalities in
the world. If we were to know nothing of this assembly but by
its title and function, no colours could paint to the imagination
anything more venerable. In that light the mind of an inquirer,
subdued by such an awful image as that of the virtue and wisdom
of a whole people collected into a focus, would pause and hesitate
in condemning things even of the very worst aspect. Instead of
blameable, they would appear only mysterious. But no name, no
power, no function, no artificial institution whatsoever, can
make the men of whom any system of authority is composed, any
other than God, and nature, and education, and their habits of
life have made them. Capacities beyond these the people have not
to give. Virtue and wisdom may be the objects of their choice;
but their choice confers neither the one nor the other on those
upon whom they lay their ordaining hands. They have not the engagement
of nature, they have not the promise of revelation, for any such
powers.
After I have read over the list of the persons and descriptions
elected into the Tiers Etat, nothing which they afterwards
did could appear astonishing. Among them, indeed, I saw some of
known rank; some of shining talents; but of any practical experience
in the state, not one man was to be found. The best were only
men of theory. But whatever the distinguished few may have been,
it is the substance, the mass of the body which constitutes its
character, and must finally determine its direction. In all bodies,
those who will lead, must also, in a considerable degree, follow.
They must conform their propositions to the taste, talent, and
disposition, of those whom they wish to conduct: therefore, ii`
an assembly is viciously or feebly composed in a very great part
of it, nothing but such a supreme degree of virtue as very rarely
appears in the world, and for that reason cannot enter into calculation,
will prevent the men of talent disseminated through it from becoming
only the expert instruments of absurd projects! If, what is the
more likely event, instead of that unusual degree of virtue, they
should be actuated by sinister ambition, and a lust of meretricious
glory, then the feeble part of the assembly, to whom at first
they conform, becomes in its turn the dupe and instrument of their
designs. In this political traffic, the leaders will be obliged
to bow to the ignorance of their followers, and the followers
to become subservient to the worst designs of their leaders.
To secure any degree of sobriety in the propositions made by the
leaders in any public assembly, they ought to respect, in some
degree perhaps to fear, those whom they conduct. To be led any
otherwise than blindly, the followers must be qualified, if not
for actors, at least for judges; they must also be judges of natural
weight and authority. Nothing can secure a steady and moderate
conduct in such assemblies, but that the body of them should be
respectably composed, in point of condition in life, of permanent
property, of education, and of such habits as enlarge and liberalize
the understanding.
In the calling of the Estates-General of France, the first thing
that struck me, was a great departure from the ancient course.
I found the representation for the third estate composed of six
hundred persons. They were equal in number to the representatives
of both the other orders. If the orders were to act separately,
the number would not, beyond the consideration of the expense,
be of much moment. But when it became apparent that the three
orders were to be melted down into one, the policy and necessary
effect of this numerous representation became obvious. A very
small desertion from either of the other two orders must throw
the power of both into the hands of the third. In fact, the whole
power of the state was soon resolved into that body. Its due composition
became therefore of infinitely the greater importance.
Judge, Sir, of my surprise, when I found that a very great proportion
of the assembly (a majority, I believe, of the members who attended)
was composed of practitioners in the law. It was composed, not
of distinguished magistrates, who had given pledges to their country
of their science, prudence, and integrity; not of leading advocates,
the glory of the bar; not of renowned professors in univerSitieS-but
for the far greater part, as it must in such a number, of the
inferior, unlearned, mechanical, merely instrumental members of
the profession. There were distinguished exceptions, but the general
composition was of obscure provincial advocates, of stewards of
petty local jurisdictions, country attorneys, notaries, and the
whole train of the ministers of municipal litigation, the fomenters
and conductors of the petty war of village vexation. From the
moment I read the list, I saw distinctly, and very nearly as it
has happened, all that was to follow.
The degree of estimation in which any profession is held becomes
the standard of the estimation in which the professors hold themselves.
Whatever the personal merits of many individual lawyers might
have been, and in many it was undoubtedly very considerable, in
that military kingdom no part of the profession had been much
regarded, except the highest of all, who often united to their
professional offices great family splendour, and were invested
with great power and authority. These certainly were highly respected,
and even with no small degree of awe. The next rank was not much
esteemed; the mechanical part was in a very low degree of repute.
Whenever the supreme authority is vested in a body so composed,
it must evidently produce the consequences of supreme authority
placed in the hands of men not taught habitually to respect themselves;
who had no previous fortune in character at stake; who could not
be expected to bear with moderation, or to conduct with discretion,
a power, which they themselves, more than any others, must be
surprised to find in their hands. Who could flatter himself that
these men, suddenly, and, as it were, by enchantment, snatched
from the humblest rank of subordination, would not be intoxicated
with their unprepared greatness? Who could conceive that men,
who are habitually meddling, daring, subtle, active, of litigious
dispositions and unquiet minds would easily fall back into their
old condition of obscure contention, and laborious, low, and unprofitable
chicane? Who could doubt but that, at any expense to the state,
of which they understood nothing, they must pursue their private
interests which they understood but too well? It was not an event
depending on chance, or contingency. It was inevitable; it was
necessary; it was planted in the nature of things. They must join (if their capacity did not permit them to lead) in
any project which could procure them those innumerable lucrative
jobs, which follow in the train of all great convulsions and revolutions
in the state, and particularly in all great and violent permutations
of property. Was it to be expected that they would attend to the
stability of property, whose existence had always depended upon
whatever rendered property questionable, ambiguous, and insecure?
Their objects would be enlarged with their elevation, but their
disposition and habits, and mode of accomplishing their de signs,
must remain the same.
Well! but these men were to be tempered and restrained b other
descriptions, of more sobe and more enlarged understandings Were
they then to be awed by the supereminent authority and awful dignity
of a handful of country clowns, who have seats in that assembly,
some of whom are said not to be able to read and write? and by
not a great number of traders who, though somewhat more instructed,
and more conspicuous ir the order of society, had never known
anything beyond their countinghouse . No ! both these descriptions
were more formed to be overborne and swayed by the intrigues and
artifices of lawyers, than to become their counterpoise. With
such a dangerous disproportion, the whole must needs be governed
by them. To the faculty of law was joined a pretty considerable
proportion of the faculty of medicine. This faculty had not, any
more than that of the law, possessed in France its just estimation.
Its professors, therefore, must have the qualities of men not
habituated to sentiments of dignity. But supposing they had ranked
as they ought to do, and as with us they do actually, the sides
of sick beds are not the academies for forming statemen and legislators.
Then came the dealers in stock and funds, who must be eager, at
any expense, to change their ideal paper wealth for the more solid
substance of land. To these were joined men of other descriptions,
from whom as little knowledge of, or attention to, the interests
of a great state was to be expected, and as little regard to the
stability of any institution; men formed to be instruments, not
controls. Such in general was the composition of the Tiers
Etat in the National Assembly; in which was scarcely to be
perceived the slightest traces of what we call the natural landed
interest of the country.
We know that the British House of Commons, without shutting its
doors to any merit in any class, is, by the sure operation of
adequate causes, filled with everything illustrious in rank, in
descent, in hereditary and in acquired opulence, in cultivated
talents, in military, civil, naval, and political distinction,
that the country can afford. But supposing, what hardly can be
supposed, as a case, that the House of Commons should be composed
in the same manner with the Tiers Etat in France, would
this dominion of chicane be borne with patience, or even conceived
without horror? God forbid I should insinuate anything derogatory
to that profession, which is another priesthood, administering
the rights of sacred justice. But whilst I revere men in the functions
which belong to them, and would do as much as one man can do to
prevent their exclusion from any, I cannot, to flatter them, give
the lie to nature. They are good and useful in the composition;
they must be mischievous if they preponderate so as virtually
to become the whole. Their very excellence in their peculiar functions
may be far from a qualification for others. It cannot escape observation,
that when men are too much confined to professional and faculty
habits, and as it were inveterate in the recurrent employment
of that narrow circle, they are rather disabled than qualified
for whatever depends on the knowledge of mankind, on experience
in mixed affairs, on a comprehensive, connected view of the various
complicated, external and internal interests, which go to the
formation of that multifarious thing called a state.
After all, if the House of Commons were to have a wholly professional
and faculty composition, what is the power of the House of Commons,
circumscribed and shut in by the immoveable barriers of laws,
usages, positive rules of doctrine and practice, counterpoised
by the House of Lords, and every moment of its existence at the
discretion of the crown to continue, prorogue, or dissolve us?
The power of the House of Commons, direct or indirect, is indeed
great; and long may it be able to preserve its greatness, and
the spirit belonging to true greatness, at the full; and it will
do so, as long as it can keep the breakers of law in India from
becoming the makers of law for England. The power, however, of
the House of Commons, when least diminished, is as a drop of water
in the ocean, compared to that residing in a settled majority
of your National Assembly. That assembly, since the destruction
of the orders, has no fundamental law, no strict convention, no
respected usage to restrain it. Instead of finding themselves
obliged to conform to a fixed constitution, they have a power
to make a constitution which shall conform to their designs. Nothing
in heaven or upon earth can serve as a control on them. What ought
to be the heads, the hearts, the dispositions, that are qualified,
or that dare, not only to make laws under a fixed constitution,
but at one heat to strike out a totally new constitution for a
great kingdom, and in every part of it, from the monarch on the
throne to the vestry of a parish? But-"fools rush in where
angels fear to tread." In such a state of unbounded power
for undefined and undefinable purposes, the evil of a moral and
almost physical inaptitude of the man to the function must be
the greatest we can conceive to happen in the management of human
affairs.
Having considered the composition of the Third Estate as it stood
in its original frame, I took a view of the representatives of
the clergy. There too it appeared, that full as little regard
was had to the general security of property, or to the aptitude
of the deputies for their public purposes, in the principles of
their election. That election was so contrived, as to send a very
large proportion of mere country curates to the great and arduous
work of newmodelling a state; men who never had seen the
state so much as in a picture; men who knew nothing of the world
beyond the bounds of an obscure village; who, immersed in hopeless
poverty, could regard all property, whether secular or ecclesiastical,
with no other eye than that of envy; among whom must be many who,
for the smallest hope of the meanest dividend in plunder, would
readily join in any attempts upon a body of wealth, in which they
could hardly look to have any share, except in a general scramble.
Instead of balancing the power of the active chicaners in the
other assembly, these curates must necessarily become the active
coadjutors, or at best the passive instruments, of those by whom
they had been habitually guided in their petty village concerns.
They too could hardly be the most conscientious of their kind,
who presuming upon their incompetent understanding, could intrigue
for a trust which led them from their natural relation to their
flocks, and their natural spheres of action, to undertake the
regeneration of kingdoms. This preponderating weight, being added
to the force of the body of chicane in the Tiers Etat, completed
that momentum of ignorance, rashness, presumption, and lust of
plunder, which nothing has been able to resist.
To observing men it must have appeared from the beginning, that
the majority of the Third Estate, in conjunction with such a deputation
from the clergy as I have described whilst it pursued the destruction
of the nobility, would inevitably become subservient to the worst
de signs of individuals in that class. In the spoil and humiliation
of their own order these individuals would possess a sure fund
for the pay of their new followers. To squander away the objects
which made the happiness of their fellows, would be to them no
sacrifice at all. Turbulent, discontented men of quality, in proportion
as they are puffed up with personal pride and arrogance, generally
despise their own order. One of the first symptoms they discover
of a selfish and mischievous ambition, is a profligate disregard
of a dignity which they partake with others. To be attached to
the subdivision, to love the platoon we belong to in society is
the first principle (the germ as it were) of public affections.
It is the first link in the series by which we proceed towards
a love to our country, and to mankind. The interest of that portion
of social arrangement is a trust in the hands of all those who
compose it; and as none but bad men would justify it in abuse,
none but traitors would barter it away for their own personal
advantage.
Source: Edmund Burke, Works, (London: 1867)
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