The Earl of Cromer's was the first British Viceroy of Egypt. This is his account of why the
British took over Egypt in 1882.
Egypt may now almost be said to form part of Europe. It is on the high road to the Far
East. It can never cease to be an object of interest to all the powers of Europe, and
especially to England. A numerous and intelligent body of Europeans and of non-Egyptian
orientals have made Egypt their home. European capital to a large extent has been sunk in
the country. The rights and privileges of Europeans are jealously guarded, and, moreover,
give rise to complicated questions, which it requires no small amount of ingenuity and
technical knowledge to solve. Exotic institutions have sprung up and have taken root in
the country. The capitulations impair those rights of internal sovereignty which are
enjoyed by the rulers or legislatures of most states. The population is heterogeneous and
cosmopolitan to a degree almost unknown elsewhere. Although the prevailing faith is that
of Islam, in no country in the world is a greater variety of religious creeds to be found
amongst important sections of the community.
In addition too these peculiarities, which are of a normal character, it has to be
borne in mind that in 1882 the [Egyptian] army was in a state of mutiny; the treasury was
bankrupt; every branch of the administration had been dislocated; the ancient and
arbitrary method, under which the country had for centuries been governed, had received a
severe blow, whilst, at the same time, no more orderly and law-abiding form of government
had been inaugurated to take its place.
Is it probable that a government composed of the
rude elements described above, and led by men of such poor ability as Arabi and his
coadjutators, would have been able to control a complicated machine of this nature? Were
the sheikhs of the El-Azhar mosque likely to succeed where Tewfik Pasha and his ministers,
who were men of comparative education and enlightenment, acting under the guidance and
inspiration of a first-class European power, only met with a modified success after years
of patient labor? There can be but one answer to these questions. Nor is it in the nature
of things that any similar movement should, under the present conditions of Egyptian
society, meet with any better success. The full and immediate execution of a policy of
"Egypt for the Egyptians," as it was conceived by the Arabists in 1882, was, and
still is, impossible.
History, indeed, records some very radical changes in the forms of government to which
a state has been subjected without its interests being absolutely and permanently
shipwrecked. But it may be doubted whether any instance can be quoted of a sudden transfer
of power in any civilized or semi-civilized community to a class so ignorant as the pure
Egyptians, such as they were in the year 1882. These latter have, for centuries past, been
a subject race. Persians, Greeks, Romans, Arabs from Arabia and Baghdad, Circassians, and
finally, Ottoman Turks, have successively ruled over Egypt, but we have to go back to the
doubtful and obscure precedents of Pharaonic times to find an epoch when, possibly, Egypt
was ruled by Egyptians. Neither, for the present, do they appear to possess the qualities
which would render it desirable, either in their own interests, or in those of the
civilized world in general, to raise them at a bound to the category of autonomous rulers
with full rights of internal sovereignty.
If, however, a foreign occupation was inevitable or nearly inevitable, it remains to be
considered whether a British occupation was preferable to any other. From the purely
Egyptian point of view, the answer to this question cannot be doubtful. The intervention
of any European power was preferable to that of Turkey. The intervention of one European
power was preferable to international intervention. The special aptitude shown by
Englishmen in the government of Oriental races pointed to England as the most effective
and beneficent instrument for the gradual introduction of European civilization into
Egypt. An Anglo-French, or an Anglo-Italian occupation, from both of which we narrowly and
also accidentally escaped, would have been detrimental to Egyptian interests and would
ultimately have caused friction, if not serious dissension, between England on the one
side and France or Italy on the other.
The only thing to be said in favor of Turkish
intervention is that it would have relieved England from the responsibility of
intervening. It has been shown in the course of this narrative that, in the
early stages of the proceedings, the policy of the
two Western Powers, which was guided by the
anti-Turkish sentiments prevalent in France, was
not of a nature to invite or . encourage Turkish
co-operation. At a later period, the shortsightedness
of the Sultan was such as to cause the Porte
to commit political suicide in so far as decisive
Turkish action was concerned. Perhaps it was
well that it did so, for it is highly probable that
armed Turkish intervention in Egypt, accompanied,
as it might well have been, by misgovemment,
paltry intrigue, corruption, and administrative and
financial confusion, would only have been the
prelude to further, and possibly more serious international
complications.
By the process of exhausting all other expedients, we arrive at the conclusion that
armed British intervention was, under the special circumstances of the case, the only
possible solution of the difficulties which existed in 1882. Probably also it was the best
solution. The arguments against British intervention, indeed, were sufficiently obvious.
It was easy to foresee that, with a British garrison in Egypt, it would be difficult that
the relations of England either with France or Turkey should be cordial. With France,
especially, there would be a danger that our relations might become seriously strained.
Moreover, we lost the advantages of our insular position. The occupation of Egypt
necessarily dragged England to a certain extent within the arena of Continental politics.
In the event of war, the presence of a British garrison in Egypt would possibly be a
source of weakness rather than of strength. Our position in Egypt placed us in a
disadvantageous diplomatic position, for any power, with whom we had a difference of
opinion about some non-Egyptian question, was at one time able to retaliate by opposing
our Egyptian policy. The complicated rights and privileges possessed by the various powers
of Europe in Egypt facilitated action of this nature.
There can be no doubt of the force of these arguments. The answer to them is that it
was impossible for Great Britain to allow the troops of any other power to occupy Egypt.
When it became apparent that some foreign occupation was necessary, that the Sultan would
not act save under conditions which were impossible of acceptance, and that neither French
nor Italian cooperation could be secured, the British government acted with promptitude
and vigor. A great nation cannot throw off the responsibilities which its past history and
its position in the world have imposed upon it. English history affords other examples of
the government and people of England drifting by accident into doing what was not only
right, but was also most in accordance with British interests. "And while we should always seek and do the right, we should at the same time take good care that what is right shall also be advantageous." (Demothenes, For the Megalopolitans 6 - text given in Greek by Lord Cromer)
Such was the advice Demosthenes gave to his
fellow-countrymen. In spite of some mistakes of
detail, it was on this sound principle that, broadly
speaking, the British Government acted in dealing
with Egyptian affairs in 1882.
Source:
From: The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 2 Vols., (New York: Macmillan, 1908),
Vol. I. 326-330..Scanned by: J. S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton.
Available online at the Internet Archive: https://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.54601/page/n1
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© Paul Halsall, July 1998, updated Jan 2020
