Modern History Sourcebook:
L. T. Hobhouse:
from Liberalism, 1911
L. T. Hobhouse's Liberalism, of 1911 was a pretty good
restatement of Classical Liberalism at the beginning of the 20th century. This text is interesting as, unlike some of the more
commonly cited formulation [J.S. Mill for instance], Hobhouset
directly addresses the proposals of Marxism.
GREAT changes are not caused by ideas alone; but they are not
effected without ideas. The passions of men must be aroused if
the frost of custom is to be broken or the chains of authority
burst; but passion of itself is blind and its world is chaotic.
To be effective men must act together, and to act together they
must have a common understanding and a common object. When it
comes to be a question of any far-reaching change, they must not
merely conceive their own immediate end with clearness. They must
convert others, they must communicate sympathy and win over the
unconvinced. Upon the whole, they must show that their object
is possible, that it is compatible with existing institutions,
or at any rate with some workable form of social life. They are,
in fact, driven on by the requirements of their position to the
elaboration of ideas, and in the end to some sort of social philosophy;
and the philosophies that have driving force behind them are those
which arise after this fashion out of the practical demands of
human feeling. Once formed, it reacts upon the minds of its adherents,
and gives direction and unity to their efforts. It becomes, in
its turn, a real historic force, and the degree of its coherence
and adequacy is matter, not merely of academic interest, but of
practical moment.
The modern State accordingly starts from the basis of an authoritarian
order, and the protest against that order, a protest religious,
political, economic, social, and ethical, is the historic beginning
of Liberalism. Thus Liberalism appears at first as a criticism,
sometimes even as a destructive and revolutionary criticism. Its
negative aspect is for centuries foremost. Its business seems
to be not so much to build up as to pull down, to remove obstacles
which block human progress...Is Liberalism at bottom a constructive
or only a destructive force? Is it of permanent significance?
Does it express some vital truth of social life as such, or is
it a temporary phenomenon called forth by the special circumstances
of Western Europe? I would call attention only to the main points
at which Liberalism assailed the old order, and to the fundamental
ideas directing its advance:
Civil Liberty: Both logically and historically the first
point of attack is arbitrary government, and the first liberty
to be secured is the right to be dealt with in accordance with
law. A man who has no legal rights against another, but stands
entirely at his disposal, to be treated according to his caprice,
is a slave to that other. He is " rightless," devoid
of rights....If there is one law for the Government and another
for its subjects, one for noble and another for commoner, one
for rich and another for poor, the law does not guarantee liberty
for all. Liberty in this respect implies equality. Hence the demand
of Liberalism for such a procedure as will ensure the impartial
application of law. Hence the demand for the independence of the
Judiciary to secure equality as between the Government and its
subjects. Hence the demand for cheap procedure and accessible
courts.
Fiscal Liberty: Closely connected with juristic liberty,
and more widely felt in everyday life, is the question of fiscal
liberty. The liberty of the subject in fiscal matters means the
restraint of the Executive, thus, responsible government, and
that is why we have more often heard the cry, "No taxation
without representation."
Personal Liberty: A man is not free when he is controlled
by other men, but only when he is controlled by principles and
rules which all society must obey. At the basis lies liberty of
thought-but liberty of thought is of very little avail without
liberty to exchange thoughts---since thought is mainly a social
product; and so with liberty of thought goes liberty of speech
and liberty of writing, printing, and peaceable discussion. But
personal liberty may infringe upon the personal liberty of others,
and the possibilities of conflict are not less in relation to
the connected right of liberty in religion. That this liberty
is absolute cannot be contended, for no modern state would tolerate
a form of religious worship which should include cannibalism,
human sacrifice, or the burning of witches. I take religious
liberty to include the liberties of thought and expression, and
to add to these the right of worship in any form which does not
inflict injury on others or involve a breach of public order.
This limitation appears to carry with it a certain decency and
restraint in expression which avoids unnecessary insult to the
feelings of others....It is open to a man to preach the principles
of Torquemada or the religion of Mahomet. It is not open to men
to practice such of their precepts as would violate the rights
of others or cause a breach of the peace. Expression is free,
and worship is free as far as it is the expression of personal
devotion.
Social Liberty: Liberalism has had to deal with those restraints
on the individual which flow from the hierarchic organization
of society, and reserve certain offices, certain forms of occupation,
and perhaps the right or at least the opportunity of education
generally, to people of a certain rank or class. In its more extreme
form this is a caste system. Freedom to choose and follow an occupation,
if it is to become fully effective, means equality with others
in the opportunities for following such occupation....It is clearly
a matter of Liberal principle that membership of an organization
should not depend on any hereditary qualification, nor be set
about with any artificial difficulty of entry designed for purposes
of exclusiveness. It has only to be added here that restrictions
of sex are in every respect parallel.
Economic Liberty: Apart from monopolies, industry was shackled
in the earlier part of the modern period by restrictive legislation
in various forms, by navigation laws, and by tariffs. Here, again,
the Liberal movement is at once an attack on an obstruction and
on an inequality. It is otherwise with organized restrictions
upon industry. The conditions produced by the new factory system
shocked the public conscience; and as early as 1802 we find the
first of a long series of laws, out of which has grown an industrial
code that year by year follows the life of the operative, in his
relations with his employer, into more minute detail....The emancipation
of trade unions, however, was in the main a liberating movement,
because combination was necessary to place the workman on something
approaching terms of equality with the employer.
Domestic Liberty: Of all associations within the State,
the miniature community of the Family is the most universal and
of the strongest independent vitality. The movement of liberation
consists (1) in rendering the wife a fully responsible individual,
capable of holding property, suing and being sued, conducting
business on her own account, and enjoying full personal protection
against her husband; (2) in establishing marriage as far as the
law is concerned on a purely contractual basis, and leaving the
sacramental aspect of marriage to the ordinances of the religion
professed by the parties; (8) in securing the physical, mental,
and moral care of the children, partly by imposing definite responsibilities
on the parents and punishing them for neglect, partly by elaborating
a public system of education and of hygiene. I would, however,
strongly maintain that the general conception of the State as
Over-parent is quite as truly Liberal as Socialistic. It is the
basis of the rights of the child, of his protection against parental
neglect, of the equality of opportunity which he may claim as
a future citizen, of his training to fill his place as a grown-up
person in the social system.
Local, Racial and National Liberty: A great part of the
liberating movement is occupied with the struggle of entire nations
against alien rule....Many of these struggles present the problem
of liberty in its simplest form. But at the back of national movements
very difficult questions do arise. What is a nation as distinct
from a state? What sort of unity does it constitute, and what
are its rights? If Ireland is a nation, is Ulster one? And if
Ulster is a British and Protestant nation, what of the Catholic
half of Ulster? There is no doubt that the general tendency of
Liberalism is to favor autonomy, but these lines of autonomy must
rest on history and practical statesmanship. Similar questions
arise about race, which many people wrongly confuse with nationality.
International Liberty: If non-interference is the best
thing for the barbarian many Liberals have thought it to be the
supreme wisdom in international affairs generally. It is of the
essence of Liberalism to oppose the use of force, the basis of
all tyranny. It is one of its practical necessities to withstand
the tyranny of militarism, which eats into free institutions and
absorbs the public resources which might go to the advancement
of civilization. In proportion as the world becomes free, the
use of force becomes meaningless.
We have now passed the main phases of the Liberal movement in
very summary review, and we have noted, first, that it is co-extensive
with life. It is concerned with the individual, the family, the
State. It touches industry, law, religion, ethics. It would not
be difficult, if space allowed, to illustrate its influence in
literature and art, to describe the war with convention, insincerity,
and patronage, and the struggle for free self-expression, for
reality, for the artist's soul. Liberalism is an all-penetrating
element of the life-structure of the modern world. Secondly, it
is an effective historical force. We have recognized Liberalism
in every department as a movement of liberation, a clearance of
obstructions, an opening of channels for the flow of spontaneous
vital activity. . . .
We have seen that the theory of laissez-faire assumed that the
State would hold the ring. That is to say, it would suppress force
and fraud, keep property safe, and aid men in enforcing contracts.
But why, it might be asked, on these conditions, just these and
no others? Why should the State ensure protection of person and
property? Why should the State intervene to do for a man that
which his ancestor did for himself ? Would not a really consistent
individualism abolish this machinery? May we not say that any
intentional injury to another may be legitimately punished by
a public authority, and may we not say that to impose twelve hours'
daily labor on a child was to inflict a greater injury than the
theft of a purse for which a century ago a man might be hanged
? On what principle, then, is the line drawn, so as to specify
certain injuries which the State may prohibit and to mark off
others which it must leave untouched? True consent is free consent,
and full freedom of consent implies equality on the part of both
parties to the bargain. Just as government first secured the elements
of freedom for all when it prevented the physically stronger man
from slaying, beating, despoiling his neighbors, so it secures
a larger measure of freedom for all by every restriction which
it imposes with a view to preventing one man from making use of
any of his advantages to the disadvantage of others. . . .
Individualism, as ordinarily understood, not only takes the policeman
and the law court for granted. It also takes the rights of property
for granted. The State it is admitted, can take a part of a man's
property by taxation. For the State is a necessity, and men must
pay a price for security, but in all taxation the State on this
view is taking something from a man which is "his,"
and in so doing is justified only by necessity. It has no "right"
to deprive the individual of anything that is his in order to
promote objects of its own which are not necessary to the common
order. To do so is to infringe individual rights and make a man
contribute by force to objects which he may view with indifference
or even with dislike. . . .
Liberalism conceives the ideal society as a whole which lives
and flourishes by the harmonious growth of its parts, each of
which in developing on its own lines and in accordance with its
own nature tends on the whole to further the development of others.
There are many possibilities, and the course that will in the
end make for social harmony is only one among them, while the
possibilities of disharmony and conflict are many. The progress
of society like that of the individual depends, then, ultimately
on choice. The heart of Liberalism is the understanding that progress
is not a matter of mechanical contrivance, but of the liberation
of living spiritual energy. Good mechanism is that which provides
the channels wherein such energy can flow unimpeded. . .
We have seen that social liberty rests on restraint. A man can
be free to direct his own life only insofar as others are prevented
from molesting and interfering with him. The common good includes
the good of every member of the community, and the injury which
a man inflicts upon himself is matter of common concern, even
apart from any ulterior effect upon others....We may not only
restrain one man from obstructing another---and the extent to
which we do this is the measure of the freedom that we maintain---but
we may also restrain him from obstructing the general will; and
this we have to do whenever uniformity is necessary to the end
which the general will has in view. The majority of employers
in a trade we may suppose would be willing to adopt certain precautions
for the health or safety of their workers, to lower hours or to
raise the rate of wages. They are unable to do so, however, as
long as a minority, perhaps as long as a single employer, stands
out. He would beat them in competition if they were voluntarily
to undertake expenses from which he is free. In this case, the
will of a minority, possibly the will of one man, thwarts that
of the remainder.
We said above that it was the function of the State to secure
the conditions upon which mind and character may develop themselves.
Similarly we may say now that the function of the State is to
secure conditions upon which its citizens are able to win by their
own efforts all that is necessary to a full civic efficiency.
It is not for the State to feed, house, or clothe them. It is
for the State to take care that the economic conditions are such
that the normal man who is not defective in mind or body or will
can by useful labor feed, house, and clothe himself and his family.
The "right to work" and the right to a "living
wage" are just as valid as the rights of person or property.
That is to say, they are integral conditions of a good social
order....The opportunities of work and the remuneration for work
are determined by a complex mass of social forces which no individual,
certainly no individual workman, can shape. They can be controlled,
if at all, by the organized action of the community, and therefore,
by a just apportionment of responsibility, it is for the community
to deal with them. But this, it will be said, is not Liberalism
but Socialism. Pursuing the economic rights of the individual
we have been led to contemplate a Socialistic organization of
industry. But a word like Socialism has many meanings, and it
is possible that there should be a Liberal Socialism, as opposed
to mechanical or Marxist Socialism. The latter supposes a class
war, resting on a clear-cut distinction of classes which does
not exist. But modern society exhibits a more and more complex
interweaving of interests. Marxist Socialism conceives a logically
developed system of the control of the economy by government.
But the construction of Utopias is not a sound method of social
science. Beginning with a contempt for ideals of liberty based
on a confusion between liberty and competition, it proceeds to
a measure of contempt for average humanity in general.
The central point of Liberal Socialism is the equation of social
service and reward, that every function of social value requires
such remuneration as serves to stimulate and maintain its effective
performance; that every one who performs such a function has the
right, in the strict ethical sense of that term, to such remuneration
and no more; that the residue of existing wealth should be at
the disposal of the community for social purposes.
Source:
L. T. Hobhouse, Liberalism (London: Williams and Norgate,
1911).
Scanned by Jerome S. Arkenberg, Dept. of History, Cal. State Fullerton
This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook.
The Sourcebook is a collection of public domain and copy-permitted
texts for introductory level classes in modern European and World
history.
Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the
document is copyright. Permission is granted for electronic copying,
distribution in print form for educational purposes and personal
use. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate the source.
No permission is granted for commercial use of the Sourcebook.
©Paul Halsall May1998
The Internet History Sourcebooks Project is located at the History Department of Fordham University, New York. The Internet
Medieval Sourcebook, and other medieval components of the project, are located at
the Fordham University Center
for Medieval Studies.The IHSP recognizes the contribution of Fordham University, the
Fordham University History Department, and the Fordham Center for Medieval Studies in
providing web space and server support for the project. The IHSP is a project independent of Fordham University. Although the IHSP seeks to follow all applicable copyright law, Fordham University is not
the institutional owner, and is not liable as the result of any legal action.
© Site Concept and Design: Paul Halsall created 26 Jan 1996: latest revision 15 November 2024 [CV]
|