Some Files Relevant To The Japanese Attack On Pearl Harbor,
December 7, 1941.
(Collected, formatted, and edited by Larry W. Jewell jewell@mace.cc.purdue.edu)
- United States Note To Japan November 26, 1941
- Message From The President To The Emperor Of Japan December 6
- Japanese Note To The United States December 7, 1941
(Generally Referred To As The "Fourteen Part Message.")
- Selected Dispatches
I: UNITED STATES NOTE TO JAPAN
NOVEMBER 26, 1941
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to
the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941, which consists of
two parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed
basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads
as follows:
Oral
"Strictly confidential
"November 26, 1941
The representatives of the Government of the United States and
of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past
several months informal and exploratory conversations for the
purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating
to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace,
law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles
include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity
and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference
in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality,
including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and
the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation
for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and
for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods
and processes.
It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been
made in reference to the general principles which constitute the
basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area.
Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese
Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed
toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement of the Pacific
area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable
to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary
modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations
looking to peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing.
On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary
of State proposals in regard to temporary measure to be taken
respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government
of the United States, which measures are understood to have been
designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.
The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to
contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability
in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance
of discussion with the Japanese Government directed toward working
out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area.
The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador
on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of
this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which
form a part of the general settlement under consideration and
to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The
Government of the United States believes that the adoption of
such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate
objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the
Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve
our divergences of view in regard to the practical application
of the fundamental principles already mentioned.
With this object in view the Government of the United States offers
for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad
but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one
practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages
as something to be worked out during our further conversations.
The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the
gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft
of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems
underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains
provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental
principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute
the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We
hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds
between our two Governments may be expedited." "Strictly
confidential, tentative and without commitment
November 26, 1941.
Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between
the United States and Japan
Section I "Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that
their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive
peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial
designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening
other countries or of using military force aggressively against
any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national
policies they will actively support and give practical application
to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations
with each other and with all other governments are based:
(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs
of other countries.
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial
opportunity and treatment.
(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and
conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies
and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods
and processes.
The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States
have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability,
preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis
for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the
following principles in their economic relations with each other
and with other nations and peoples:
(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial
relations.
(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition
of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations
to raw material supplies.
(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming
countries and populations as regards the operation of international
commodity agreements.
(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements
of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises
and the continuous development of all countries and may permit
payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare
of all countries.
Section II
Steps To Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by
the Government of Japan
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
propose to take steps as follows:
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among
the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet
Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American,
British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments
would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French
Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat
to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate
consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed
necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement
would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement
would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or
economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence
to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in
trade and commerce with French Indochina.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval,
air and police forces from China and from Indochina.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will not support - militarily, politically, economically - any
government or regime in China other than the National Government
of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
5. Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the
British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights
in China, including right in international settlements and in
concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United
States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most
favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both
countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind
raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan
will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese
funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization
of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate
for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the
United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either
has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted
by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose
of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace
throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments
to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political
and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
***
II: MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE EMPEROR OF JAPAN DECEMBER 6
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
The following message from the President to the Emperor of
Japan was dispatched Saturday afternoon, December 6, and public
announcement was made at that time that this message to the Emperor
had been sent by the President:
Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed
to the Emperor of Japan a message extending an offer of friendship
of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That
offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and
friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through
the virtues of their peoples and the wisdom of their rulers have
prospered and have substantially helped humanity.
Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries
need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I
feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching
emergency which appears to be in formation.
Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten
to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial
influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments
contain tragic possibilities.
The people of the United States, believing in peace and in the
right of nations to live and let live, have eagerly watched the
conversations between our two Governments during these past months.
We have hoped for a termination of the present conflict between
Japan and China. We have hoped that a peace of the Pacific could
be consummated in such a way that nationalities of many diverse
peoples could exist side by side without fear of invasion; that
unbearable burdens of armaments could be lifted for them all;
and that all peoples would resume commerce without discrimination
against or in favor of any nation.
I am certain that it will be clear to Your Majesty, as it is to
me, that in seeking these great objectives both Japan and the
United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat.
This seemed essential to the attainment of the high objectives.
More than a year ago Your Majesty's Government concluded an agreement
with the Vichy Government by which five or six thousand Japanese
troops were permitted to enter into Northern French Indo-China
for the protection of Japanese troops which were operating against
China further north. And this Spring and Summer the Vichy Government
permitted further Japanese military forces to enter into Southern
French Indo-China for the common defense of French Indo-China.
I think I am correct in saying that no attack has been made upon
Indo-China, nor that any has been contemplated.
During the past few weeks it has become clear to the world that
Japanese military, naval and air forces have been sent to Southern
Indo-China in such large numbers as to create a reasonable doubt
on the part of other nations that this continuing concentration
in Indo-China is not defensive in its character.
Because these continuing concentrations in Indo-China have reached
such large proportions and because they extend now to the southeast
and the southwest corners of that Peninsula, it is only reasonable
that the people of the Philippines, of the hundreds of Islands
of the East Indies, of Malaya and of Thailand itself are asking
themselves whether these forces of Japan are preparing or intending
to make attack in one or more of these many directions.
I am sure that Your Majesty will understand that the fear of all
these peoples is a legitimate fear inasmuch as it involves their
peace and their national existence. I am sure that Your Majesty
will understand why the people of the United States in such large
numbers look askance at the establishment of military, naval and
air bases manned and equipped so greatly as to constitute armed
forces capable of measures of offense.
It is clear that a continuance of such a situation is unthinkable.
None of the peoples whom I have spoken of above can sit either
indefinitely or permanently on a keg of dynamite.
There is absolutely no thought on the part of the United States
of invading Indo-China if every Japanese soldier or sailor were
to be withdrawn therefrom.
I think that we can obtain the same assurance from the Governments
of the East Indies, the Governments of Malaya and the Government
of Thailand. I would even undertake to ask for the same assurance
on the part of the Government of China. Thus a withdrawal of the
Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance
of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area.
I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent
hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought in this
definite emergency to way of dispelling the dark clouds. I am
confident that both of us, for the sake of the peoples not only
of our own great countries but for the sake of humanity in neighboring
territories, have a sacred duty to restore traditional amity and
prevent further death and destruction in the world."
***
III: JAPANESE NOTE TO THE
UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
(Generally referred to as the "Fourteen Part Message.")
(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)
On November 26 the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese representatives
a document which stated the principles governing the policies
of the Government of the United States toward the situation in
the Far East and setting out suggestions for a comprehensive peaceful
settlement covering the entire Pacific area.
At 1 p.m. December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an appointment
for the Japanese representatives to see the Secretary of State.
The appointment was made for 1:45 p.m. The Japanese representatives
arrived at the office of the Secretary of State at 2:05 p.m. They
were received by the Secretary at 2:20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador
handed to the Secretary of State what was understood to be a reply
to the document handed to him the Secretary of State on November
26.
Secretary Hull carefully read the statement presented by the Japanese
representatives and immediately turned to the Japanese Ambassador
and with the greatest indignation said:
I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese
Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one
word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In
all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a document
that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions
- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that
I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet
was capable of uttering them."
The text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to
the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941, reads as
follows:
Memorandum
1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come
to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United
States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts
may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute
toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations
with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government
of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement
of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific
Area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views
concerning the claims the American Government has persistently
maintained as well as the measure the United States and Great
Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure
the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby
to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.
Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the
part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese
Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has
consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension
of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September
last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace with Germany and
Italy.
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted
to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as
to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan
and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward
the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands
East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted
to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity
in cooperation with these regimes. Furthermore, when Japan in
accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint
defense of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments,
willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions,
and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced
the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with
Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these
countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting
an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which
endangers the very existence of the Empire.
Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of
Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United
States for a discussion of important problems between the two
countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American
Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal,
insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement
of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.
3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted
a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government,
taking fully into consideration past American claims and also
incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no
avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet,
therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further
the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty
in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement.
But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original
assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit
of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.
Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost
for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted
on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at
an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions
which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following
points:
(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake not
to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French
Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific
area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing
the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods
and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial
relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required
quantity of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort
to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the
restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of
peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable
peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese
troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern
part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its
readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States
to act as 'introducer' of peace between Japan and China as was
previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of
the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration
of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
negotiations.
The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned
new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid
to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above,
withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called 'introducer'
of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet
ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose
upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently
maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring
Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese
Government.
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese
Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation,
and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all
possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As
for the China question which constitutes an important subject
of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory
attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international
commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government
expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout
the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of
this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour
to apply the same in the Pacific area including China, and made
it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic
activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore,
as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China,
the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above,
to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French
Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the
utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters
is fully appreciated by the American Government.
On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast
to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an
inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the negotiation.
It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government
and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the
American Government especially to the following points:
1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace
those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government
the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought
about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through
recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation
of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities
and impose (sic) one's selfish views upon others will scarcely
serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
Of the various principles put forward by the American Government
as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some
which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle,
but in view of the world's actual condition it seems only a utopian
ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force
their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression
pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet
Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after
the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the
realities of East Asia.
2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states
- 'Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either
has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted
by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose
of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace
throughout the Pacific area.' It is presumed that the above provision
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling
its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States
participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be
accepted by the Japanese Government.
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions,
may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While
it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the
Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great
Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense,
Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with
the many principles upon which the American Government proposes
to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.
3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly
upholds, objects to settle international issues through military
pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and
other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure
as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned
as it is at times more inhumane that military pressure.
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American
Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with
Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position in has hitherto
occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It
is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia have for
the past two hundred years or more have been compelled to observe
the status quo under the Anglo- American policy of imperialistic
exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of
the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation
of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper
place in the world.
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to
French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above- mentioned
American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the United States,
Great Britain, the Netherlands, China,, and Thailand, - excepting
France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial
integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of
treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing
that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of
those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal
totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to
the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but
be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system
similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief
factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government
regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional
application of the principle of non-discrimination in international
commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated
to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East
Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan
not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime
other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present
negotiations. This demand of the American Government falling,
as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease
from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention
of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East
Asia.
5. (sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable
items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion
of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions,
and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition
of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however,
the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four
years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself
and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its
entirety, the Japanese Government regrets it cannot accept the
proposal as a basis of negotiation.
6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion
of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion
of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed
with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal
was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American
Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result
of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands
and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the
Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded
that all these countries are at one with the United States in
ignoring Japan's position.
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to
conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's
effort toward the establishment of peace through the creation
of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American
rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention
has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation.
Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American
relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific
through cooperation with the American Government has finally been
lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government
it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement
through further negotiations.
December 7, 1941."
***
IV: SELECTED DISPATCHES
The following is a collection of dispatches relevant to the
topic. Care should be taken in noting that not all the information
enclosed was known to all parties and that some of the coded messages
were not decyphered until well after the commencement of hostilities.
LWJ
To: Tokyo Date: 16 Jan. 41
... 2. The number of vessels seen in the harbor on the morning
of the 16th was as follows: 5 battleships... 5 light cruisers...19
destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders...about six small submarines...and
three transports. " The Yorktown is not in port. " The
CinCUS shifted the flag from the New Mexico to the Pennsylvania
on 15 Jan. 41."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Honolulu To: Tokyo Date: 21 Feb. 41
1. The capital ships and others departed from Pearl Harbor on
the 13th and returned on the 19th. (It is said that they will
depart again on the coming Wednesday and return on the following
Wednesday). Judging from the statements by various sailors who
were on these vessels, the training was apparently held in the
vicinities of Kauai, Lahaina, and Hilo."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Naval Intelligence, Washington To: alcon
Date: 1 Apr. 1941
Personnel of your Naval Intelligence Service should be advised
that because of the fact that from past experience shows [sic]
the Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on
Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned
they should take steps on such days to see that proper watches
and precautions are in effect."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Japanese Foreign Ministry To: Washington
Date: 31 Jul. 1941
Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries,
led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so
horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently,
our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure
the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire must immediately
take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement
which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation
of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon
seemingly asleep. This is why we decided to obtain military bases
in French Indo- China and to have our troops occupy that territory..."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu Date: 21 Sep. 41
Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning
vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: [The message
divides Pearl Harbor waters into a number of areas which are delineated.]
" 2. With regard to war ships and aircraft carriers, we would
like to have you report on those at anchor...tied up to wharves,
buoys, and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If
possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when
there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Navy Department To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 16 Oct. 41
The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet had created a grave situation.
If a new Cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic
and anti-American. If the Konoye Cabinet remains the effect will
be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include
rapprochement with the U.S. In either case hostilities between
Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the U.S. and
Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate
situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these
two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions
including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic
intentions nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Japanese Naval General Staff To: alcon Date
5 Nov. 1951
Navy Order No. 1 " By Imperial Order, the Chief of the Naval
General Staff orders Yamamoto Commander-in-Chief of the Combined
Fleets as follows: " 1. Expecting to go to war with the United
States, Britain and the Netherlands early in December for self-preservation
and self-defense, the Empire has decided to complete war preparation.
" 2. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will carry
out the necessary operational preparations. " 3. Its details
will be directed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu Date: 15 Nov. 41
As relations between Japan and the United States are more critical,
make your 'ships in harbor report' irregular, but at a rate of
twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please
take extra care to maintain secrecy."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Tokyo To: Washington date: 19 NOV 1941
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
" In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic
relations), and the cutting off of international communications,
the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily
Japanese language short-wave news broadcast: " 1) In case
of Japan-U.S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZE AME ("east
wind rain") " 2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITA NO KAZE
KUMORI ("north wind cloudy") " 3) Japan-British
relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE ("west wind clear") "
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather
forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is
heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be
a completely secret arrangement. " Forward as urgent intelligence."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Tokyo To: Washington Date: 20 Nov. 1941
There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted
to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within
the next three or four days you can finish your conversations
with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th
(let me write it out for you-twenty- ninth); if the pertinent
notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great
Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be
finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we
mean it, the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that
things are automatically going to happen."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Navy Department To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 24 Nov. 41
Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very
doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government
and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our
opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including
attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff
has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action addressees
to inform senior Army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary
in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate
Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: War Department, Washington To: Army Hq.
Hawaii Date: 27 Nov. 1941
War Department Msg No. 472 " Negotiations with Japan appear
to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest
possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile
action possible at nay moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot
be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first
overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as
restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your
defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to
undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary
but these measures shout be carried out so as not, repeat not,
to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures
taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned
in Rainbow Five [the Army's basic war plan] so far as they pertain
to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information
to minimum essential officers.
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Navy Department To: CinCUS, Pearl Harbor
Date: 27 Nov. 41
This despatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations
with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific
have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within
the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops
and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious
expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula
or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment
preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform
district and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent
by the War Department. SPENAVO inform British. Continental districts
Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: War Department, Washington To: Army Hq.
Hawaii Date: 28 Nov. 1941
War Department Message 482 " Critical situation demands
that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities...Also
desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary
to provide for protection of you establishments, property, and
equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against
subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against
espionage. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures
are authorized. Protective measures should be confined to those
essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm.
To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being
sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect you
responsibility under existing instructions."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu Date: 29 Nov. 41
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movement, but
in future will you also report even when there are no movements."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Director of Naval Intelligence To: CinCUS,
Pearl Harbor, alcon Date: 1 Dec. 41
Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly
that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the
same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually
down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently
for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements tot
he south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but
the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated,
will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date
this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second
Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one
gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other
in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy
and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer
and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships
also may be assigned the major capital ship strength remains in
home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
" The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment,
including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the
Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements
of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material
with yard workmen, engineers, etc."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Tokyo To: Washington Date: 2 Dec. 1941
Take great pains that this does not leak out. " You are
to take the following measures immediately: " 1. With the
exception of one copy each of the O[pa-k2] and the L[LA] codes,
you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the codebooks
for communication between the three departments [HATO] and those
for use by the Navy). " 2. As soon as you have completed
this operation wire the one word HARUNA. " 3. Burn all secret
records of incoming and outgoing telegrams. " 4. Taking care
not to arouse outside suspicion, dispose of all secret documents
in the same way. " Since these measures are in preparation
for an emergency, keep this within your consulate and carry out
your duties with calmness and care."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu Date: 2 Dec. 41
In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships,
airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter,
to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me
in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons
above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will
be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided
with anti-mine nets."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Adm. Nagumo To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 2 Dec. 1941
This force is already in the anticipated scouting areas from
Kiska and Midway Islands. Tonight we will pass the 180 degree
line and near the enemy zone. More strict air alert and strict
lookout against enemy ships suspected of tracking us will be maintained.
Particular attention will be paid not to reveal any light at night
and to limit blinker signals as much as possible.
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Tokyo To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force Date:
2 DEC 1941
Climb Mount Niitaka."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Adm. Nagumo To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 3 Dec. 1941
1. It has already been ordered to go to war on 8 December, but
so critical has become the situation in the Far East that one
can hardly predict was would not explode by that time. So far
no new information on Hawaii area received and also no indications
of our Task Force being detected. But since the enemy intention
is naturally far beyond prediction, strict attention will directed
to meet any unexpected encounter with an enemy. " 2. It is
intended that this force will operate as scheduled even if war
breaks out before 8 December.."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Honolulu To: Tokyo Date: 4 Dec. 41
On the afternoon of the 3rd one British gunboat entered Honolulu
harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th... "
Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port a sailor
took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some
mail in return."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Honolulu To: Tokyo Date: 5 Dec. 41
1. During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned
in my message [previously] arrived here. They had been at sea
for eight days. " 2. The Lexington and five heavy cruisers
left port on the same day. " 3. The following ships were
in port on the afternoon of the 5th: 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers,
16 destroyers."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Tokyo To: Honolulu Date: 6 Dec. 41
Please wire immediately movements of the fleet subsequent to
the fourth."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Honolulu To: Tokyo Date: 6 Dec. 41
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training
barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only
have they ordered four of five hundred balloons, but it is understood
that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense
of Hawaii and Panama. In so far as Hawaii is concerned, though
investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor,
they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected
the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that
any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken.
At present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment.
In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually
any. However, even though they have actually made preparations,
because they must control the air over the water and land runways
of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickham, Ford,
and Ewa, there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor.
I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity
left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.
" 2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets..."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Honolulu To: Tokyo Date: 6 Dec. 41
The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th: 9 battleships,
3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition
there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the
heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left). " 2.
It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the
fleet air arm."
From: PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal,
Vice Admiral Homner N. Wallin USN(Ret), Naval History Division,
Washington, 1968
From: Tokyo To: Washington Date: 7 Dec. 1941
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government
(if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United
States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: Gen. Marshall To: alcon Date: 7 Dec. 1941
Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard Time today
what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy
their code machine immediately Stop Just what significance the
hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop."
From: THE CODEBREAKERS; The Story of Secret Writing, David
Kahn, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,1967
From: USS WARD To: Commandant 14th Naval District
Date: 7DEC41 0654 local
We have attacked, fired upon and dropped depth charges on a submarine
operating in the defensive sea area."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Radio Communication Station, Hawaii To:
alcon Date: 7 Dec. 1942
Air raid. Pearl harbor. This is not drill."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
From: Adm. Nagumo To: Pearl Harbor Attack Force
Date: 7 Dec. 1941
Brilliant success was achieved for our country through the splendid
efforts of you men. But we still have a great way to go. After
this victory we must tighten the straps of our helmets and go
onward, determined to continue our fight until the final goal
has been won."
From: AT DAWN WE SLEPT; The Untold Story of Pearl Harbor.
Gordon W. Prange, Penguin Books, 1982
This text is part of the Internet Modern History Sourcebook.
The Sourcebook is a collection of public domain and copy-permitted
texts for introductory level classes in modern European and World
history.
Unless otherwise indicated the specific electronic form of the
document is copyright. Permission is granted for electronic copying,
distribution in print form for educational purposes and personal
use. If you do reduplicate the document, indicate the source.
No permission is granted for commercial use of the Sourcebook.
(c)Paul Halsall Aug 1997
