There are certain sects, which secretly form themselves in the learned
world, as well as factions in the political; and though sometimes they come not to an open
rupture, they give a different turn to the ways of thinking of those who have taken part
on either side. The most remarkable of this kind are the sects, founded on the different
sentiments with regard to the dignity of human nature; which is a point that seems
to have divided philosophers and poets, as well as divines, from the beginning of the
world to this day. Some exalt our species to the skies, and represent man as a kind of
human demigod, who derives his origin from heaven, and retains evident marks of his
lineage and descent. Others insist upon the blind sides of human nature, and can discover
nothing, except vanity, in which man surpasses the other animals, whom he affects so much
to despise. If an author possess the talent of rhetoric and declamation, he commonly takes
part with the former: If his turn lie towards irony and ridicule, he naturally throws
himself into the other extreme.
I am far from thinking, that all those, who have depreciated our species, have been
enemies to virtue, and have exposed the frailties of their fellow creatures with any bad
intention. On the contrary, I am sensible that a delicate sense of morals, especially when
attended with a splenetic temper, is apt to give a man a disgust of the world, and to make
him consider the common course of human affairs with too much indignation. I must,
however, be of opinion, that the sentiments of those, who are inclined to think favourably
of mankind, are more advantageous to virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a
mean opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a high notion of his rank and
character in the creation, he will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will scom to
do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below that figure which he makes in his
own imagination. Accordingly we find, that all our polite and fashionable moralists insist
upon this topic, and endeavour to represent vice as unworthy of man, as well as odious in
itself.
We find few disputes, that are not founded on some ambiguity in the expression; and 1
am persuaded, that the present dispute, concerning the dignity or meanness of human
nature, is not more exempt from it than any other. It may, therefore, be worth while to
consider, what is real, and what is only verbal, in this controversy.
That there is a natural difference between merit and demerit, virtue and vice, wisdom
and folly, no reasonable man will deny: Yet is it evident, that in affixing the term,
which denotes either our approbation or blame, we are commonly more influenced by
comparison than by any fixed unalterable standard in the nature of things. In like manner,
quantity, and extension, and bulk, are by every one acknowledged to be real things: But
when we call any animal great or little, we always form a secret comparison
between that animal and others of the same species; and it is that comparison which
regulates our judgment concerning its greatness. A dog and a horse may be of the very same
size, while the one is admired for the greatness of its bulk, and the other for the
smallness. When I am present, therefore, at any dispute, 1 always consider with myself,
whether it be a question of comparison or not that is the subject of the controversy; and
if it be, whether the disputants compare the same objects together, or talk of things that
are widely different.
In forming our notions of human nature, we are apt to make a comparison between men and
animals, the only creatures endowed with thought that fall under our senses. Certainly
this comparison is favourable to mankind. On the one hand, we see a creature, whose
thoughts are not limited by any narrow bounds, either of place or time; who carries his
researches into the most distant regions of this globe, and beyond this globe, to the
planets and heavenly bodies; looks backward to consider the first origin, at least, the
history of human race; casts his eye forward to see the influence of his actions upon
posterity, and the judgments which will be formed of his character a thousand years hence;
a creature, who traces causes and effects to a great length and intricacy; extracts
general principles from particular appearances; improves upon his discoveries; corrects
his mistakes; and makes his very errors profitable. On the other hand, we are presented
with a creature the very reverse of this; limited in its observations and reasonings to a
few sensible objects which surround it; without curiosity, without foresight; blindly
conducted by instinct, and attaining, in a short time, its utmost perfection, beyond which
it is never able to advance a single step. What a wide difference is there between these
creatures! And how exalted a notion must we entertain of the former, in comparison of the
latter!
There are two means commonly employed to destroy this conclusion: First, By
making an unfair representation of the case, and insisting only upon the weaknesses of
human nature. And secondly, By forming a new and secret comparison between man and
beings of the most perfect wisdom. Among the other excellencies of man, this is one, that
he can form an idea of perfections much beyond what he has experience of in himself; and
is not limited in his conception of wisdom and virtue. He can easily exalt his notions and
conceive a degree of knowledge, which, when compared to his own, will make the latter
appear very contemptible, and will cause the difference between that and the sagacity of
animals, in a manner, to disappear and vanish. Now this being a point, in which all the
world is agreed, that human understanding falls infinitely short of perfect wisdom; it is
proper we should know when this comparison takes place, that we may not dispute where
there is no real difference in our sentiments. Man falls much more short of perfect
wisdom, and even of his own ideas of perfect wisdom, than animals do of man; yet the
latter difference is so consider~ able, that nothing but a comparison with the former can
make it appear of little moment.
It is also usual to compare one man with another; and finding very few whom we
can call wise or virtuous, we are apt to entertain a contemptible notion of
our species in general. That we may be sensible of the fallacy of this way of reasoning,
we may observe, that the honourable appellations of wise and virtuous, are not annexed to
any particular degree of those qualities of wisdom and virtue; but arise
altogether from the comparison we make between one man and another. When we find a man,
who arrives at such a pitch of wisdom as is very uncommon, we pronounce him a wise man: So
that to say, there are few wise men in the world, is really to say nothing; since it is
only by their scarcity, that they merit that appellation. Were the lowest of our species
as wise as TULLY [i.e. Cicero] , or lord BACON [ie. Francis Bacon] we should still have reason to say, that there are few wise men. For in that case we should exalt our
notions of wisdom, and should not pay a singular honour to any one, who was not singularly
distinguished by his talents. In like manner, I have heard it observed by thoughtless
people, that there are few women possessed of beauty, in comparison of those who want it;
not considering, that we bestow the epithet of beautiful only
on such as possess a degree of beauty, that is common to them with a few. The same degree
of beauty in a woman is called deformity, which is treated as real beauty in one of our
sex.
As it is usual, in forming a notion of our species, to compare it with the other
species above or below it, or to compare the individuals of the species among themselves;
so we often compare together the different motives or actuating principles of human
nature, in order to regulate our judgment concerning it. And, indeed, this is the only
kind of comparison, which is worth our attention, or decides any thing in the present
question. Were our selfish and vicious principles so much predominant above Our social and
virtuous, as is asserted by some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a
contemptible notion of human nature. 2
There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man denies the
sincerity of all public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss
what to think of him. Perhaps he never felt this passion in so clear and distinct a manner
as to remove all his doubts concerning its force and reality. But when he proceeds
afterwards to reject all private friendship, if no interest or self-love intermix itself;
I am then confident that he abuses terms, and confounds the ideas of things; since it is
impossible for any one to be so selfish, or rather so stupid, as to make no difference
between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities, which engage his
approbation and esteem. Is he also, say 1, as insensible to anger as he pretends to be to
friendship? And does injury and wrong no more affect him than kindness or benefits?
Impossible: He does not know himself: He has forgotten the movements of his heart; or
rather he makes use of a different language from the rest of his countrymen, and calls not
things by their proper names. What say you of natural affection? (I subjoin) Is that also
a species of self-love? Yes: All is self-love. Your children are loved only because they
are yours: Your friend for a like reason: And your country engages you only so far as it
has a connexion with yourself.- Were the idea of self removed, nothing would affect you:
You would be altogether unactive and insensible: Or, if you ever gave yourself any
movement, it would only be from vanity, and a desire of fame and reputation to this same
self. I am willing, reply 1, to receive your interpretation of human actions, provided you
admit the facts. That species of self-love, which displays itself in kindness to others,
you must allow to have great influence over human actions, and even greater, on many
occasions, than that which remains in its original shape and form. For how few are there,
who, having a family, children, and relations, do not spend more on the maintenance and
education of these than on their own pleasures? This, indeed, you justly observe, may
proceed from their self-love, since the prosperity of their family and friends is one, or
the chief of their pleasures, as well as their chief honour. Be you also one of these
selfish men, and you are sure of every one's good opinion and good will; or not to shock
your ears with these expressions, the self-love of every one, and mine among the rest,
will then incline us to serve you, and speak well of you.
In my opinion, there are two things which have led astray those philosophers, that have
insisted so much on the selfishness of man. In the first place, they found, that every act
of virtue or friendship was attended with a secret pleasure; whence they concluded, that
friendship and virtue could not be disinterested. But the fallacy of this is obvious. The
virtuous sentiment or passion produces the pleasure, and does not arise from it. I feel a
pleasure in doing good to my friend, because I love him; but do not love him for the sake
of that pleasure.
In the second place, it has always been found, that the virtuous are far from
being indifferent to praise; and therefore they have been represented as a set of
vainglorious men, who had nothing in view but the applauses of others. But this also is a
fallacy. It is very unjust in the world, when they find any tincture of vanity in a
laudable action, to depreciate it upon that account, or ascribe it entirely to that
motive. The case is not the same with vanity, as with other passions. Where avarice or
revenge enters into any seemingly virtuous action, it is difficult for us to determine how
far it enters, and it is natural to suppose it the sole actuating principle. But vanity is
so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable actions approaches so near
the love of laudable actions for their own sake, that these passions are more capable of
mixture, than any other kinds of affection; and it is almost impossible to have the latter
without some degree of the former. Accordingly, we find, that this passion for glory is
always warped and varied according to the particular taste or disposition of the mind on
which it falls. NERO had the same vanity in driving a chariot, that TRAJAN had in
governing the empire with justice and ability. To love the glory of virtuous deeds is a
sure proof of the love of virtue.
