The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine, 1843
This is a
"University Sermon" (the last of his Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the
University of Oxford), not the more extended monograph of 1845. Although delivered
from the pulpit, the "University Sermons" were public lectures rather than
religious homelies.
A University Sermon Preached on the Purification,
1843.
LUKE ii. 19.
"But Mary kept A these things, and pondered them in her heart.
"
Little is told us in Scripture concerning the Blessed Virgin, but
there is one grace of which the Evangelists make her the pattern, in a few simple
sentences-of Faith. Zacharias questioned the Angel's message, but "Mary said, Behold
the handmaid of the Lord; be it unto me according to thy word." Accordingly
Elisabeth, speaking with an apparent allusion to the contrast thus exhibited between her
own highlyfavoured husband, righteous Zacharias, and the still more highlyfavoured Mary,
said, on receiving her salutation, "Blessed art thou among women, and blessed is the
fruit of thy womb; Blessed is she that believed for there shall be a performance of those
things which were told her from the Lord."
2. But Mary's faith did not end in a mere acquiescence in Divine
providences and revelations: as the text informs us, she "pondered" them. When
the shepherds came, and told of the vision of Angels which they had seen at the time of
the Nativity, and how one of them announced that the Infant in her arms was "the
Saviour, which is Christ the Lord," while others did but wonder, "Mary kept all
these things, and pondered them in her heart." Again, when her Son and Saviour had
come to the age of twelve years, and had left her for awhile for His Father's service, and
had been found, to her surprise, in the Temple, amid the doctors, both hearing them and
asking them questions, and had, on her addressing Him, vouchsafed to justify His conduct,
we are told, "His mother kept all these sayings in her heart." And accordingly,
at the marriage-feast in Cana, her faith anticipated His first miracle, and she said to
the servants, "Whatsoever He saith unto you, do it."
3. Thus St. Mary is our pattern of Faith, both in
the reception and in the study of Divine Truth. She
does not think it enough to accept, she dwells upon it; not enough to possess, she uses
it; not enough to assent, she developes it; not enough to submit the Reason, she reasons
upon it; not indeed reasoning first, and believing afterwards, with Zacharias, yet first
believing without reasoning, next from love and reverence, reasoning after believing. And
thus she symbolizes to us, not only the faith of the unlearned, but of the doctors of the
Church also, who have to investigate, and weigh, and define, as well as to profess the
Gospel; to draw the line between truth and heresy; to anticipate or remedy the various
aberrations of wrong reason; to combat pride and recklessness with their own arms; and
thus to triumph over the sophist and the innovator.
4. If, then, on a Day dedicated to such high contemplations as
the Feast which we are now celebrating, it is allowable to occupy the thoughts with a
subject not of a devotional or practical nature, it will be some relief of the omission to
select one in which St. Mary at least will be our example,-the use of Reason in
investigating the doctrines of Faith; a subject, indeed, far fitter for a volume than for
the most extended notice which can here be given to it; but one which cannot be passed
over altogether in silence, in any attempt at determining the relation of Faith to Reason.
5. The overthrow of the wisdom of the world was one of the earliest, is
well as the noblest of the triumphs of the Church; after the pattern of her Divine Master,
who took His place among the doctors before He preached His new Kingdom, or opposed
Himself to the world's power. St. Paul, the learned Pharisee, was the first fruits of that
gifted company, in whom the pride of science is seen prostrated before the foolishness of
preaching. From his day to this the Cross has enlisted under its banner all those great
endowments of mind, which in former times had been expended on vanities, or dissipated in
doubt and speculation. Nor was it long before the schools of heathenism took the alarm,
and manifested an unavailing jealousy of the new doctrine, which was robbing them of their
most hopeful disciples. They had hitherto taken for granted that the natural home of the
Intellect was the Garden or the Porch; and it reversed their very first principles to be
called on to confess, what yet they could not deny, that a Superstition, as they
considered it, was attracting to itself all the energy, the keenness, the originality, and
the eloquence of the age. But these aggressions upon heathenism were only the beginning of
the Church's conquests; in the course of time the whole mind of the world, as I may say,
was absorbed into the philosophy of the Cross, as the element in which it
lived, and the form upon which it was moulded. And how many centuries did this endure, and
what vast ruins still remain of its dominion! In the capitals of Christendom the high
cathedral and the perpetual choir still witness to the victory of Faith over the world's
power. To see its triumph over the world's wisdom, we must enter those solemn cemeteries
in which are stored the relics and the monuments of ancient Faith-our libraries. Look
along their shelves, and every name you read there is, in one sense or other, a trophy set
up in record of the victories of Faith. How many long lives, what high aims, what
single-minded devotion, what intense contemplation, what fervent prayer, what deep
erudition, what untiring diligence, what toilsome conflicts has it taken to establish its
supremacy! This has been the object which has given meaning to the life of Saints, and
which is the subject-matter of their history. For this they have given up the comforts of
earth and the charities of home, and surrendered themselves to an austere rule, nay, even
to confessorship and persecution, if so be they could make some small offering, or do some
casual service, or provide some additional safeguard towards the great work which was in
progress. This has been the origin of controversies, long and various, yes, and the
occasion of much infirmity, the test of much hidden perverseness, and the subject of much
bitterness and tumult. The world has been moved in consequence of it, populations excited,
leagues and alliances formed, kingdoms lost and won: and even zeal, when excessive,
evinced a sense of its preciousness; nay, even rebellions in some sort did homage to it,
as insurgents imply the actual sovereignty of the power which they are assailing.
Meanwhile the work went on, and at length a large fabric of divinity was reared, irregular
in its structure, and diverse in its style, as beseemed the slow growth of centuries; nay,
anomalous in its details, from the peculiarities of individuals, or the interference of
strangers, but still, on the whole, the development of an idea, and like itself, and
unlike anything else, its most widely-separated parts having relations with each other,
and betokening a common origin.
6. Let us quit this survey of the general system,
and descend to the history of the formation of any Catholic dogma. What a remarkable sight
it is, as almost all unprejudiced persons will admit, to trace the course of the
controversy, from its first disorders to its exact and determinate issue. Full of deep
interest, to see how the great idea takes hold of a thousand minds by its living force,
and will not be ruled or stinted, but is "like a burning fire," as the Prophet
speaks, "shut up" within them, till they are "weary of forbearing, and
cannot stay," and grows in them, and at length is born through them, perhaps in a
long course of years, and even successive generations; so that the doctrine may rather be
said to use the , minds of Christians, than to be used by them. Wonderful it is to see
with what effort, hesitation, suspense, interruption,-with how many swayings to the right
and to the left-with how many reverses, yet with what certainty of advance, with what
precision in its march, and with what ultimate completeness, it has been evolved; till the
whole truth "self-balanced on its centre hung," part answering to part, one,
absolute, integral, indissoluable, while the world lasts! Wonderful, to see how heresy has
but thrown that idea into fresh forms, and drawn out from if farther developments, with an
exuberance which exceeded all questioning, and a harmony which baffled all criticism, like
Him, its Divine Author, who, when put on trial by the Evil One, was but fortified by the
assault, and is ever justified in His sayings, and overcomes when He is judged.
7. And this world of thought is the expansion of a few words, uttered,
as if casually, by the fishermen of Galilee. Here is another topic which belongs more
especially to that part of the subject to which I propose to confine myself. Reason has
not only submitted, it has ministered to Faith; it has illustrated its documents; it has
raised illiterate peasants into philosophers and divines; it has elicited a meaning from
their words which their immediate hearers little suspected. Stranger surely is it that St.
John should be a theologian, than that St. Peter should be a prince. This is a phenomenon
proper to the Gospel, and a note of divinity. Its half sentences, its overflowings of
language, admit of development [Vide Butler's Analogy, part
ii. ch. iii.]; they have a life in them which shows itself in progress; a truth, which has
the token of consistency; a reality, which is fruitful in resources; a depth, which
extends into mystery: for they are representations of what is actual, and has a definite
location and necessary bearings and a meaning in the great system of things, and a harmony
in what it is, and a compatibility in what it involves. What form of Paganism can furnish
a parallel? What philosopher has left his words to posterity as a talent which could be
put to usury, as a mine which could be wrought? Here, too, is the badge of heresy; its
dogmas are unfruitful; it has no theology; so far forth as it is heresy, it has none.
Deduct its remnant of Catholic theology, and what remains? Polemics, explanations,
protests. It turns to Biblical Criticism, or to the Evidences of Religion, for want of a
province. Its formulae end in themselves, without development, because they are
words; they are barren, because they are dead. If they had life, they would
increase and multiply; or, if they do live and bear fruit, it is but as "sin, when it
is finished, bringeth forth death." It developes into dissolution; but it creates
nothing, it tends to no system, its resultant dogma is but the denial of all dogmas, any
theology, under the Gospel. No wonder it denies what it cannot attain.
8. Heresy denies to the Church what is wanting in itself. Here, then,
we are brought to the subject to which I wish to give attention. It need not surely
formally be proved that this disparagement of doctrinal statements, and in particular of
those relating to the Holy Trinity and Incarnation, is especially prevalent in our times.
There is a suspicion widely abroad,-felt, too, perhaps, by many who are unwilling to
confess it,-that the development of ideas and formation of dogmas is a mere abuse of
Reason, which, when it attempted such sacred subjects, went beyond its powers, and could
do nothing more than multiply words without meaning, and deductions which come to nothing.
The conclusion follows, that such an attempt does but lead to mischievous controversy,
from that discordance of doctrinal opinions, which is its immediate consequence; that
there is, in truth, no necessary or proper connexion between inward religious belief and
scientific expositions; and that charity, as well as good sense, is best consulted by
reducing creeds to the number of private opinions, which, if individuals will hold for
themselves, at least they have no right to impose upon others.
9. It is my purpose, then, in what follows, to investigate the
connexion between Faith and Dogmatic Confession, as far as relates to the sacred doctrines
which were just now mentioned, and to show the office of the Reason in reference to it;
and, in doing so, I shall make as little allusion as may be to erroneous views on the
subject, which have been mentioned only for the sake of perspicuity; following rather the
course which the discussion may take, and pursuing those issues on which it naturally
opens. Nor am I here in any way concerned with the question, who is the legitimate framer
and judge of these dogmatic inferences under the Gospel, or if there be any. Whether the
Church is infallible, or the individual, or the first ages, or none of these, is not the
point here, but the theory of developments itself.
10. Theological dogmas are propositions expressive of the judgments
which the mind forms, or the impressions which it receives, of Revealed Truth. Revelation
sets before it certain supernatural facts and actions, beings and principles; these make a
certain impression or image upon it; and this impression spontaneously, or even
necessarily, becomes the subject of reflection on the part of the mind itself, which
proceeds to investigate it, and to draw it forth in successive and distinct sentences.
Thus the Catholic doctrine of Original Sin, or of Sin after Baptism, or of the Eucharist,
or of justification, is but the expression of the inward belief of Catholics on these
several points, formed upon an analysis of that belief*. Such, too, are the high doctrines
with which I am especially concerned.
[*
The controversy between the English Church and the Church of Rome lies, it is presumed, in the matter of fact, whether such and such developments are true, (e.g.
Purgatory a true development of the doctrine of sin after bap. tism,) not in the principle of development itself.]
11. Now, here I observe, first of all, that, naturally as the inward
idea of divine truth, such as has been described, passes into explicit form by the
activity of our reflective powers, still such an actual delineation is not essential to
its genuineness and perfection. A peasant may have such a true impression, yet be unable
to give any intelligible account of it, as will easily be understood. But what is
remarkable at first sight is this, that there is good reason for saying that the
impression made upon the mind need not even be recognized by the parties possessing it. It
is no proof that persons are not possessed, because they are not conscious, of an idea.
Nothing is of more frequent occurrence, whether in things sensible or intellectual, than
the existence of such unperceived impressions. What do we mean when we say, that certain
persons do not know themselves, but that they are ruled by views, feelings, prejudices,
objects which they do not recognize? How common is it to be exhilarated or depressed, we
do not recollect why, though we are aware that something has been told us, or has
happened, good or bad, which accounts for our feeling, could we recall it! What is memory
itself, but a vast magazine of such dormant, but present and excitable ideas? Or consider,
when persons would trace the history of their own opinions in past years, how baffled they
are in the attempt to fix the date of this or that conviction, their system of thought
having been all the while in continual, gradual, tranquil expansion; so that it were as
easy to follow the growth of the fruit of the earth, "first the blade, then the ear,
after that the full corn in the ear," as to chronicle changes, which involved no
abrupt revolution, or reaction, or fickleness of mind, but have been the birth of an idea,
the development, in explicit form, of what was already latent within it. Or, again,
critical disquisitions are often written about the idea which this or that poet might have
in his mind in certain of his compositions and characters; and we call such analysis the
philosophy of poetry, not implying thereby of necessity that the author wrote upon a
theory in his actual delineation, or knew what he was doing; but that, in matter of fact,
he was possessed, ruled, guided by an unconscious idea. Moreover, it is a question whether
that strange and painful feeling of unreality, which religious men experience from time to
time, when nothing seems true, or good, or right, or profitable, when Faith seems a name,
and duty a mockery, and all endeavours to do right, absurd and hopeless, and all things
forlorn and dreary, as if religion were wiped out from the world, may not be the direct
effect of the temporary obscuration of some master vision, which unconsciously supplies
the mind with spiritual life and peace.
12. Or, to take another class of instances which
are to the point so far as this, that at least they are real impressions, even though they
be not influential. How common is what is called vacant vision, when objects meet the eye,
without any effort of the judgment to measure or locate them; and that absence of mind,
which recollects minutes afterwards the occurrence of some sound, the striking of the
hour, or the question of a companion, which passed unheeded at the time it took place!
How, again, happens it in dreams, that we suddenly pass from one state of feeling, or one
assemblage of circumstances to another, without any surprise at the incongruity, except
that, while we are impressed first in this way, then in that, we take no active cognizance
of the impression? And this, perhaps, is the life of inferior animals, a sort of
continuous dream, impressions without reflections; such, too, seems to be the first life
of infants; nay, in heaven itself, such may be the high existence of some exalted orders
of blessed spirits, as the Seraphim, who are said to be, not Knowledge, but all Love.
13. Now, it is important to insist on this circumstance, because it
suggests the reality and permanence of inward knowledge, as distinct from explicit
confession. The absence, or partial absence, or incompleteness of dogmatic statements is
no proof of the absence of impressions or implicit judgments, in the mind of the Church.
Even centuries might pass without the formal expression of a truth, which had been all
along the secret life of millions of faithful souls. Thus, not till the thirteenth century
was there any direct and distinct avowal, on the part of the Church, of the numerical
Unity of the Divine Nature, which the language of some of the principal Greek fathers,
prima facie, though not really, denies. Again, the doctrine of the Double Procession was
no Catholic dogma in the first ages, though it was more or less clearly stated by
individual Fathers; yet, if it is now to be received, as surely it must be, as part of the
Creed, it was really held every where from the beginning, and therefore, in a measure,
held as a mere religious impression, and perhaps an unconscious one.
14. But, further, if the ideas may be latent in the Christian mind, by
which it is animated and formed, it is less wonderful that they should be difficult to
elicit and define; and of this difficulty we have abundant proof in the history whether of
the Church, or of individuals. Surely it is not at all wonderful, that, when individuals
attempt to analyze their own belief, they should find the task arduous in the extreme, if
not altogether beyond them; or, again, a work of many years; or, again, that they should
shrink from the true developments, if offered to them, as foreign to their thoughts. This
may be illustrated in a variety of ways.
15. It will often happen, perhaps from the nature of things, that it is
impossible to master and express an idea in a short space of time. As to individuals,
sometimes they find they cannot do so at all; at length, perhaps, they recognize, in some
writer they meet, with the very account of their own thoughts, which they desiderate; and
then they say, that "here is what they have felt all along, and wanted to say, but
could not," or "what they have ever maintained, only better expressed."
Again, how many men are burdened with an idea, which haunts them through a great part of
their lives, and of which only at length, with much trouble, do they dispossess
themselves? I suppose most of us have felt at times the irritation, and that for a long
period, of thoughts and views which we felt, and felt to be true, only dimly showing
themselves, or flitting before us; which at length we understood must not be forced, but
must have their way, and would, if it were so ordered, come to light in their own time.
The life of some men, and those not the least eminent among divines and philosophers, has
centred in the development of one idea; nay, perhaps has been too short for the process.
Again, how frequently it happens, that, on first hearing a doctrine propounded, a man
hesitates, first acknowledges, then disowns it; then says that he has always held it, but
finds fault with the mode in which it is presented to him, accusing it of paradox or
over-refinement; that is, he cannot at the moment analyze his own opinions, and does not
know whether he holds the doctrine or not, from the difficulty of mastering his thoughts.
16. Another characteristic, as I have said, of dogmatic statements, is
the difficulty of recognizing them, even when attained, as the true representation of our
meaning. This happens for many reasons; some-times, from the faint hold we have of the
impression itself, whether its nature be good or bad, so that we shrink from principles in
substance, which we acknowledge in influence. Many a man, for instance, is acting on
utilitarian principles, who is shocked at them in set treatises, and disowns them. Again,
in sacred subjects, the very circumstance that a dogma professes to be a direct
contemplation, and, if so be, a definition of what is infinite and eternal, is painful to
serious minds. Moreover, from the hypothesis, it is the representation of an idea in a
medium not native to it, not as originally conceived, but, as it were, in projection; no
wonder, then, that, though there be an intimate correspondence, part by part, between the
impression and the dogma, yet there should be an harshness in the outline of the latter;
as, for instance, a want of harmonious proportion; and yet this is unavoidable, from the
infirmities of our intellectual powers.
17. Again, another similar peculiarity in developments in general, is
the great remoteness of the separate results of a common idea, or rather at first sight
the absence of any connexion. Thus it often happens that party spirit is imputed to
persons, merely because they agree with one another in certain points of opinion and
conduct, which are thought too minute, distant, and various, in the large field of
religious doctrine and discipline, to proceed from any but an external influence and a
positive rule; whereas an insight into the wonderfully expansive power and penetrating
virtue of theological or philosophical ideas would have shown, that what is apparently
arbitrary in rival or kindred schools of thought, is after all rigidly determined by the
original hypothesis. The remark has been made, for instance, that rarely have persons
maintained the sleep of the soul before the Resurrection, without falling into more
grievous errors; again, those who deny the Lutheran doctrine of justification, commonly
have tendencies towards a ceremonial religion; again, it is a serious fact that
Protestantism has at various times unexpectedly developed into an allowance or vindication
of polygamy; and heretics in general, however opposed in tenets, are found to have an
inexplicable sympathy for each other, and never wake up from their ordinary torpor, but to
exchange courtesies and meditate coalitions. One other remark is in point here, and
relates to the length to which statements run, though, before we attempted them, we
fancied our idea could be expressed in one or two sentences. Explanations grow under our
hands, in spite of our effort at compression. Such, too, is the contrast between
conversation and epistolary correspondence. We speak our meaning with little trouble; our
voice, manner, and half words completing it for us; but in writing, when details must be
drawn out, and misapprehensions anticipated, we seem never to be rid of the responsibility
of our task. This being the case, it is surprising that the Creeds are so short, nor
surprising that they need a comment.
18. The difficulty, then, and hazard of developing doctrines implicitly
received, must be fully allowed; and this is often made a ground for inferring that they
have no proper developments at all; that there is no natural connexion between certain
dogmas and certain impressions; and that theological science is a matter of time, and
place, and accident, though inward belief is ever and every where one and the same. But
surely the instinct of every Christian revolts from such a position; for the very first
impulse of his faith is to try to express itself about the "great sight" which
is vouchsafed to it; and this seems to argue that a science there is, whether the mind is
equal to its discovery or no. And, indeed, what science is open to every chance inquirer?
which is not recondite in its principles? which requires not special gifts of mind for its
just formation? All subject-matters admit of true theories and false, and the false are no
prejudice to the true. Why should this class of ideas be different from all other?
Principles of philosophy, physics, ethics, politics, taste, admit both of implicit
reception and explicit statement; why should not the ideas, which are the secret life of
the Christian, be recognized also as fixed and definite in themselves, and as capable of
scientific analysis? Why should not there be that real connexion between science and its
subject-matter in religion, which exists in other departments of thought? No one would
deny that the philosophy of Zeno or Pythagoras was the exponent of a certain mode of
viewing things; or would affirm that Platonist and Epicurean acted on one and the same
idea of nature, life, and duty, and meant the same thing, though they verbally differed,
merely because a Plato or an Epicurus was needed to detect the abstruse elements of
thought, out of which each philosophy was eventually constructed. A man surely may be a
Peripatetic or an Academic in his feelings, views, aims, and acts, who never heard the
names. Granting, then, extreme cases, when individuals who would analyze their views of
religion are thrown entirely upon their own reason, and find that reason unequal to the
task, this will be no argument against a general, natural, and ordinary correspondence
between the dogma and the inward idea. Surely, if Almighty God is ever one and the same,
and is revealed to us as one and the same, the true inward impression of Him, made on the
recipient of the revelation, must be one and the same; and, since human nature proceeds
upon fixed laws, the statement of that impression must be one and the same, so that we may
as well say that there are two Gods as two Creeds. And considering the strong feelings and
energetic acts and severe sufferings which age after age have been involved in the
maintenance of the Catholic dogmas, it is surely a very shallow philosophy to account such
maintenance a mere contest about words, and a very abject philosophy to attribute it to
mere party spirit, or to personal rivalry, or to ambition, or to covetousness.
19. Reasonable, however, as is this view of doctrinal developments in
general, it cannot be denied that those which relate to the Objects of Faith, of which I
am particularly speaking, have a character of their own, and must be considered
separately. Let us, then, consider how the case stands, as regards the sacred doctrines of
the Trinity and the Incarnation.
20. The Apostle said to the Athenians, "Whom ye ignorantly
worship, Him declare I unto you;" and the mind which is habituated to the thought of God, of Christ, of
the Holy Spirit, naturally turns, as I have said, with a devout curiosity to the
contemplation of the Object of its adoration, and begins to form statements concerning Him
before it knows whither, or how far, it will be carried. One proposition necessarily leads
to another, and a second to a third; then some limitation is required; and the combination
of these opposites occasions some fresh evolutions from the original idea, which indeed
can never be said to be entirely exhausted. This process is its development, and results
in a series, or rather body of dogmatic statements, till what was at first an impression
on the Imagination has become a system or creed in the Reason.
21. Now such impressions are obviously individual and complete above
other theological ideas, because they are the impressions of Objects. Ideas and their developments are commonly
not identical, the development being but the carrying out of the idea into its
consequences. Thus the doctrine of Penance may be called a development of'the doctrine of
Baptism, yet still is a distinct doctrine; whereas the developments in the doctrines of
the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation are mere portions of the original impression, and
modes of representing it. As God is one, so the impression which He gives us of Himself is
one; it is not a thing of parts; it is not a system; nor is it any thing imperfect, and
needing a counterpart. It is the vision of an object. When we pray, we pray, not to an
assemblage of notions, or to a creed, but to One Individual Being; and when we speak of
Him we speak of a Person, not of a Law or a Manifestation. This being the case, all our
attempts to delineate our impression of Him go to bring out one idea, not two or three or
four; not a philosophy, but an individual idea in its separate aspects.
22. This may be fitly compared to the impressions made on us through
the senses. Material objects are whole, and individual; and the impressions which they
make on the mind, by means of the senses, are of a corresponding nature, complex and
manifold in their relations and bearings, but considered in themselves integral and one.
And in like manner the ideas which we are granted of Divine Objects under the Gospel, from
the nature of the case and because they are ideas, answer to the Originals so far as this,
that they are whole, indivisible, substantial, and may be called real, as being images of
what is real. Objects which are conveyed to us through the senses, stand out in our minds,
as I may say, with dimensions and aspects and influences various, and all of these
consistent with one another, and many of them beyond our memory or even knowledge, while
we contemplate the objects themselves; thus forcing on us a persuasion of their reality
from the spontaneous congruity and coincidence of these accompaniments, as if they could
not be creations of our minds, but were the images of external and independent beings.
This of course will take place in the case of the sacred ideas which are the objects of
our faith. Religious men, according to their measure, have an idea or vision of the
Blessed Trinity in Unity, of the Son Incarnate and of His Presence, not as a number of
qualities, attributes, and actions, not as the subject of a number of propositions, but as
one, and individual, and independent of words, as an impression conveyed through the
senses.
23. Particular propositions, then, which are used to express portions
of the great idea vouchsafed to us, can never really be confused with the idea itself,
which all such propositions taken together can but reach, and cannot exceed. As
definitions are not intended to go beyond their subject, but to be adequate to it, so the
dogmatic statements of the Divine Nature used in our confessions, however multiplied,
cannot say more than is implied in the original idea, considered in its completeness,
without the risk of heresy. Creeds and dogmas live in the one idea which they are designed
to express, and which alone is substantive; and are necessary only because the human mind
cannot reflect upon that idea, except piecemeal, cannot use it in its oneness and
entireness, nor without resolving it into a series of aspects and relations. And in matter
of fact these expressions are never equivalent to it; we are able, indeed, to define the
creations of our own minds, for they are what we make them and
nothing else; but it were as easy to create what is real as to define it; and thus the
Catholic dogmas are, after all, but symbols of a Divine fact, which, far from being
compassed by those very propositions, would not be exhausted, nor fathomed, by a thousand.
24. Now of such sacred ideas and their attendant expressions, I
observe:-
(1.) First, that an impression of this intimate kind seems to be what
Scripture means by "knowledge." "This is life eternal," says our
Saviour, "that they might know Thee the only True God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou
hast sent." In like manner St. Paul speaks of willingly losing all things, "for
the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus;" and St. Peter of "the
knowledge of Him who hath called us to glory and virtue." [John xvii. 3. Phil. iii. 8. 2 Pet. i. 3.] Knowledge is
the possession of those living ideas of sacred things, from which alone change of heart or
conduct can proceed. This awful vision is what Scripture seems to designate by the phrases
"Christ in us," "Christ dwelling in us by faith," "Christ formed
in us," and "Christ manifesting Himself unto us." And though it is faint
and doubtful in some minds, and distinct in others, as some remote object in the twilight
or in the day, this arises from the circumstances of the particular mind, and does not
interfere with the perfection of the gift itself.
25. (2.) This leads me next, however, to observe, that these religious
impressions differ from those of material objects, in the mode in which they are made. The
senses are direct, immediate, and ordinary informants, and act spontaneously without any
will or effort on our part; but no such faculties have been given us, as far as we know,
for realizing the Objects of Faith. It is true that inspiration may be a gift of this kind
to those who have been favoured with it; nor would it be safe to deny to the illuminating
grace of Baptism a power, at least of putting the mind into a capacity for receiving
impressions; but the former of these is not ordinary, and both are supernatural. The
secondary and intelligible means by which we receive the impression of Divine Verities,
are, for instance, the habitual and devout perusal of Scripture, which gradually acts upon
the mind; again, the gradual influence of intercourse with those who are in themselves in
possession of the sacred ideas; again, the study of Dogmatic Theology, which is our
present subject; again, a continual round of devotion; or again, sometimes, in minds both
fitly disposed and apprehensive, the almost instantaneous operation of a keen faith. This
obvious distinction follows between sensible and religious ideas, that we put the latter
into language in order to fix, teach, and transmit them, but not the
former. No one defines a material object by way of conveying to us what we know so much
better by the senses, but we form creeds as a chief mode of perpetuating the impression.
26. (3.) Further, I observe, that though the Christian mind reasons out
a series of dogmatic statements, one from another, this it has ever done, and always must
do, not from those statements taken in themselves, as logical propositions, but as being
itself enlightened and (as if) inhabited by that sacred impression which is prior to them,
which acts as a regulating principle, ever present, upon the reasoning, and without which
no one has any warrant to reason at all. Such sentences as "the Word was God,"
or "the Only-begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father," or "the Word was made flesh,"
or "the Holy Ghost which proceedeth from the Father," are not a mere letter
which we may handle by the rules of art at our own will, but august tokens of most simple,
ineffable, adorable facts, embraced, enshrined according to its measure in the believing
mind. For though the development of an idea is a deduction of proposition from
proposition, these propositions are ever formed in and round the idea itself (so to
speak), and are in fact one and all only aspects of it. Moreover, this will account both
for the mode of arguing from particular texts or single words of Scripture, practised by
the early Fathers, and for their fearless decision in practising it; for the great
Object of Faith on which they lived both enabled them to appropriate to itself particular
passages of Scripture, and became to them a safeguard against heretical deductions from
them. Also, it will account for the charge of weak reasoning, commonly
brought against those Fathers; for never do we seem so illogical to others as when we are
arguing under the continual influence of impressions to which they are insensible.
27. (4.) Again, it must of course be remembered, as I have just
implied, (though as being an historical matter it hardly concerns us here), that
Revelation itself has provided in Scripture the main outlines and also large details of
the dogmatic system. Inspiration has superseded the exercise of human Reason in great
measure, and left it but the comparatively easy task of finishing the sacred work. The
question, indeed, at first sight occurs, why such inspired statements are not enough
without further developments; but in truth, when Reason has once been put on the
investigation, it cannot stop till it has finished it; one dogma creates another, by the
same right by which it was itself created; the Scripture statements are sanctions as well
as informants in the inquiry; they begin and they do not exhaust.
28. (5.) Scripture, I say, begins a series of developments which it
does not finish; that is to say, in other words, it is a mistake to look for every
separate proposition of the Catholic doctrine in Scripture. This is plain from what has
gone before. For instance, the Athanasian Creed professes to lay down the right faith,
which we must hold on its most sacred subjects, in order to be saved. This must mean that
there is one view concerning the Holy Trinity, or concerning the Incarnation, which is
true, and distinct from all others; one definite, consistent, entire view, which cannot be
mistaken, not contained in any certain number of propositions, but held as a view by the
believing mind, and not held, but denied by Arians, Sabellians, Tritheists, Nestorians,
Monophysites, Socinians, and other heretics. That idea is not enlarged, if propositions
are added, nor impaired if they are withdrawn: if they are added, this is with a view of
conveying that one integral view, not of amplifying it. That view does not depend on such
propositions: it does not consist in them; they are but specimens and indications of it.
And they may be multiplied without limit. They are necessary, but not needful to it, being
but portions or aspects of that previous impression which has at length come under the
cognizance of Reason and the terminology of science. The question, then, is not whether
this or that proposition of the Catholic doctrine is in terminis in
Scripture, unless we would be slaves to the letter, but whether that one
view of the Mystery, of which all such are the exponents, be not there; a view which would
be some other view, and not itself, if any one of such propositions, if any one of a
number of similar propositions, were not true. Those propositions imply each other, as
being parts of one whole; so that to deny one is to deny all, and to invalidate one is to
deface and destroy the view itself. One thing alone has to be impressed on us by
Scripture, the Catholic idea, and in it they all are included. To object, then, to the
number of propositions, upon which an anathema is placed, is altogether to mistake their
use; for their multiplication is not intended to enforce many things, but to express
one,-to form within us that one impression concerning Almighty God, as the ruling
principle of our minds, and that, whether we can fully recognize our own possession of it
or no. And surely it is no paradox to say that such ruling ideas may exert a most powerful
influence, at least in their various aspects, on our moral character, and on the whole
man: as no one would deny in the case of belief or disbelief of a Supreme Being.
29. (6.) And here we see the ordinary mistake of doctrinal innovators,
viz. to go away with this or that proposition of the Creed, instead of embracing that one
idea which all of them together are meant to convey; it being almost a definition of
heresy, that it fastens on some one statement as if the whole truth, to the denial of all
others, and as the basis of a new faith; erring rather in what it rejects, than in what it
maintains: though, in truth, if the mind deliberately rejects any portion of the doctrine,
this is a proof that it does not really hold even that very statement for the sake of
which it rejects the others. Realizing is the very life of true developments; it is
peculiar to the Church, and the justification of her definitions.
30. Enough has now been said on the distinction, yet connexion, between
the implicit knowledge and the explicit confession of the Divine Objects of Faith, as they
are revealed to us under the Gospel. An objection, however, remains, which cannot be
satisfactorily treated in a few words. And what is worse than prolixity, the discussion
may bear with it some appearance of unnecessary or even wanton refinement; unless, indeed,
it is thrown into the form of controversy, a worse evil. Let it suffice to say, that my
wish is, not to discover difficulties in any subject, but to solve them.
31. It may be asked, then, whether the mistake of words and names for
things is not incurred by orthodox as well as heretics, in dogmatizing at all about the
"secret things which belong unto the Lord our God," inasmuch as the idea of a
supernatural object must itself be supernatural, and since no such ideas are claimed by
ordinary Christians, no knowledge of Divine Verities is possible to them. How should any
thing of this world convey ideas which are beyond and above this world? How can teaching
and intercourse, how can human words, how can earthly images, convey to the mind an idea
of the Invisible? They cannot rise above themselves. They can suggest no idea but what is
resolvable into ideas natural and earthly. The words "Person," "Substance
... .. Consubstantial," "Generation," "Procession,"
"Incarnation," "Taking of the manhood into God," and the like, have
either a very abject and human meaning, or none at all. In other words, there is no such
inward view of these doctrines, distinct from the dogmatic language used to express them,
as was just now supposed. The metaphors by which they are signified are not mere symbols
of ideas which exist independently of them, but their meaning is coincident and identical
with the ideas. When, indeed, we have knowledge of a thing from other sources, then the
metaphors we may apply to it are but accidental appendages to that knowledge; whereas our
ideas of Divine things are just coextensive with the figures by which we express them,
neither more nor less, and without them are not; and when we draw inferences from those
figures, we are not illustrating one existing idea, but drawing mere
logical inferences. We speak, indeed, of material objects freely, because our senses
reveal them to us apart from our words; but as to these ideas about heavenly things, we
learn them from words, yet (it seems) we are to say what we, without words, conceive of
them, as if words could convey what they do not contain. It follows that our anathemas,
our controversies, our struggles, our sufferings, are merely about the poor ideas conveyed
to us in certain figures of speech.
32. Some obvious remarks suggest themselves in answer to this
representation. First, it is difficult to determine what divine grace may not do for us,
if not in immediately implanting new ideas, yet in refining and elevating those which we
gain through natural informants. If, as we all acknowledge, grace renews our moral
feelings, yet through outward means, if it opens upon us new ideas about virtue and
goodness and heroism and heavenly peace, it does not appear why, in a certain sense, it
may not impart ideas concerning the nature of God. Again, the various terms and figures
which are used in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity or of the Incarnation, surely may by
their combination create ideas which will be altogether new, though they are still of an
earthly character. And further, when it is said that such figures convey no knowledge of
the Divine Nature itself, beyond those figures, whatever they are, it should be considered
whether our senses can be proved to suggest any real idea of matter. All that we know,
strictly speaking, is the existence of the impressions our senses make on us; and yet we
scruple not to speak as if they conveyed to us the knowledge of material substances. Let,
then, the Catholic dogmas, as such, be freely admitted to convey no true idea of Almighty
God, but only an earthly one, gained from earthly. figures, provided it be allowed, on the
other hand, that the senses do not convey to us any true idea of matter, but only an idea
commensurate with sensible impressions.
33. Nor is there any reason why this should not be fully granted. Still
there may be a certain correspondence between the idea, though earthly, and its heavenly
archetype, such, that that idea belongs to the archetype, in a sense in which no other
earthly idea belongs to it, as being the nearest approach to it which our present state
allows. Indeed Scripture itself intimates the earthly nature of our present ideas of
Sacred Objects, when it speaks of our now "seeing in a glass darkly, (en ainigmati) but then face to face" and it
has ever been the doctrine of divines that the Beatific Vision, or true sight of Almighty
God, is reserved for the world to come. Meanwhile we are allowed such an approximation to
the truth as earthly images and figures may supply to us.
34. It must not be supposed that this is the only case in which we are
obliged to receive information needful to us, through the medium of our existing ideas,
and consequently with but a vague apprehension of its subject-matter. Children, who are
made our pattern in Scripture, are taught, by an accommodation, on the part of their
teachers, to their immature faculties and their scanty vocabulary. To answer their
questions in the language which we should use towards grown men, would be simply to
mislead them, if they could construe it at all. We must dispense and "divide"
the word of truth, if we would not have it changed, as far as they are concerned, into a
word of falsehood; for what is short of truth in the letter may be to them the most
perfect truth, that is, the nearest approach to truth, compatible with their condition*.
The case is the same as regards those who have any natural defect or deprivation which
cuts them off from the circle of ideas common to mankind in general. To speak to a blind
man of light and colours, in terms proper to those phenomena, would be to mock him; we
must use other media of information accommodated to his circumstances, according to the
well-known instance in which his own account of scarlet was to liken it to the sound of a
trumpet. And so again, as regards savages, or the ignorant, or weak, or narrow-minded, our
representations and arguments must take a certain form, if they are to gain admission into
their minds at all, and to reach them. Again, what impediments do the diversities of
language place in the way of communicating ideas! Language is a sort of analysis of
thought; and, since ideas are infinite, and infinitely combined, and infinitely modified,
whereas language is a method definite and limited, and confined to an arbitrary selection
of a certain number of these innumerable materials, it were idle to expect that the
courses of thought marked out in one language should, except in their great outlines and
main centres, correspond to those of another. Multitudes of ideas expressed in the one do
not even enter into the other, and can only be conveyed by some economy or accommodation,
by circumlocutions, phrases, limiting words, figures, or some bold and happy expedient.
And sometimes, from the continual demand, foreign words become naturalized. Again, the
difficulty is extreme, as all persons know, of leading certain individuals (to use a
familiar phrase) to understand one another; their habits of thought turning apparently on
points of mutual repulsion. Now this is always in a measure traceable to moral diversities
between the parties; still, in many cases, it arises mainly from difference in the
principle on which they have divided and subdivided that world of ideas, which comes
before them both. They seem ever to be dodging each other, and need a common measure or
economy to mediate between them.
*Hence it is not more than an hyperbole to say that, in
certain cases, a lie is the nearest approach to the truth. [Vide Hist. of Arians, p. 67,
&c. Edit. 3.] We are told that "God is not the son of man, that He should
repent;" yet "it repented the Lord that He had made man."]
35. Fables, again, are economies or accommodations, being truths and
principles cast into that form in which they will be most vividly recognized; as in the
well-known instance attributed to Menenius Agrippa. Again, mythical representations, at
least in their better form, may be considered facts or narratives, untrue, but like the
truth, intended to bring out the action of some principle, point of character, and the
like. For instance, the tradition that St. Ignatius was the child whom our Lord took in
His arms, may be unfounded; but it realizes to us his special relation to Christ and His
Apostles, with a keenness peculiar to itself. The same remark may be made upon certain
narratives of martyrdoms, or of the details of such narratives, or of certain alleged
miracles, or heroic acts, or speeches, all which are the spontaneous produce of religious
feeling under imperfect knowledge. If the alleged facts did not occur, they ought to have
occurred (if I may so speak); they are such as might have occurred, and would have
occurred, under circumstances; and they belong to the parties to whom they are attributed,
potentially, if not actually; or the like of them did occur; or occurred to others
similarly circumstanced, though not to those very persons. Many a theory or view of
things, on which an institution is founded, or a party held together, is of the same kind.
Many an argument, used by zealous and earnest men, has this economical character, being
not the very ground on which they act, (for they continue in the same course, though it be
refuted,) yet, in a certain sense, a representation of it, a proximate description of
their feelings in the shape of argument, on which they can rest, to which they can recur
when perplexed, and appeal when questioned. Now, in this reference to accommodation or
economy in human affairs, I do not meddle with the question of casuistry, viz. which of
such artifices, as they may be called, are innocent, or where the line is to be drawn.
That some are immoral, common sense tells us; but it is enough for my purpose, if some are
necessary, as the same common sense will allow; and then the very necessity of the use
will account for the abuse and perversion.
36. Even between man and man, then, constituted, as men are, alike,
various distinct instruments, keys, or calculi of thought obtain, on which their ideas and
arguments shape themselves respectively, and which we must use, if we would reach them.
The cogitative method, as it may be called, of one man is notoriously very different from
that of another; of the lawyer from that of the soldier, of the rich from that of the
poor. The territory of thought is portioned out in a hundred different ways. Abstractions,
generalizations, definitions, propositions, all are framed on distinct standards; and if
this is found in matters of this world between man and man, surely much more must it exist
between the ideas of men, and the thoughts, ways, and works of God.
37. One of the obvious instances of this contrariety is seen in the
classifications we make of the subjects of the animal or vegetable kingdoms. Here a very
intelligible order has been observed by the Creator Himself; still one of which we have
not, after all, the key. We are obliged to frame one of our own; and when we apply it, we
find that it will not exactly answer the Divine idea of arrangement, as it discovers
itself to us; there being phenomena which we cannot locate, or which, upon our system of
division, are anomalies in the general harmony of the Creation.
38. Mathematical science will afford us a more extended illustration of
this distinction between supernatural and eternal laws, and our attempts to represent
them, that is, our economies. Various methods or calculi have been adopted to
embody those immutable principles and dispositions of which the science treats, which are
really independent of any, yet cannot be contemplated or pursued without one or other of
them. The first of these instruments of investigation employs the medium of extension; the
second, that of number; the third, that of motion; the fourth proceeds on a more subtle
hypothesis, that of increase. These methods are very distinct from each other, at least
the geometrical and the differential; yet they are, one and all, analyses, more or less
perfect, of those same necessary truths, for which we have not a name, of which we have no
idea, except in the terms of such economical representations. They are all developments of
one and the same range of ideas; they are all instruments of discovery as to those ideas. They stand for real things, and we can reason with them,
though they be but symbols, as if they were the things themselves,
for which they stand. Yet none of them carries out the lines of truth to their limits;
first, one stops in the analysis, then another; like some calculating tables which answer
for a thousand times, and miss in the thousand and first. While they answer, we can use
them just as if they were the realities which they represent, and without thinking of
those realities; but at length our instrument of discovery issues in some great impossibility or contradiction, or what we call in religion, a mystery. It has run its
length; and by its failure shows that all along it has been but an expedient for practical
purposes, not a true analysis or adequate image of those recondite laws which are
investigated by means of it. It has never fathomed their depth, because it now fails to
measure their course. At the same time, no one, because it cannot do every thing, would
refuse to use it within the range in which it will act; no one would say that it was a
system of empty symbols, though it be but a shadow of the unseen. Though we use it with
caution, still we use it, as being the nearest approximation to the truth which our
condition admits.
39. Let us take another instance, of an outward and earthly form, or
economy, under which great wonders unknown seem to be typified; I mean musical sounds, as
they are exhibited most perfectly in instrumental harmony. There are seven notes in the
scale; make them fourteen; yet what a slender outfit for so vast an enterprise! What
science brings so much out of so little? Out of what poor elements does some great master
in it create his new world! Shall we say that all this exuberant inventiveness is a mere
ingenuity or trick of art, like some game or fashion of the day, without reality, without
meaning? We may do so; and then, perhaps, we shall also account the science of theology to
be a matter of words; yet, as there is a divinity in the theology of the Church, which
those who feel cannot communicate, so is there also in the wonderful creation of sublimity
and beauty of which I am speaking. To many men the very names which the science employs
are utterly incomprehensible. To speak of an idea or a subject seems to be fanciful or
trifling, to speak of the views which it opens upon us to be childish extravagance; yet is
it possible that that inexhaustible evolution and disposition of notes, so rich yet so
simple, so intricate yet so regulated, so various yet so majestic, should be a mere sound,
which is gone and perishes? Can it be that those mysterious stirrings of heart, and keen
emotions, and strange yearnings after we know not what, and awful impressions from we know
not whence, should be wrought in us by what is unsubstantial, and comes and goes, and
begins and ends in itself? It is not so; it cannot be. No; they have escaped from some
higher sphere; they are the outpourings of eternal harmony in the medium of created sound;
they are echoes from our Home; they are the voice of Angels, or the Magnificat of Saints,
or the living laws of Divine Governance, or the Divine Attributes; something are they
besides themselves, which we cannot compass, which we cannot utter,-though mortal man, and
he perhaps not otherwise distinguished above his fellows, has the gift of eliciting them.
40. So much on the subject of musical sound; but what if the whole
series of impressions, made on us through the senses, be, as I have already hinted, but a
Divine economy suited to our need, and the token of realities distinct from themselves,
and such as might be revealed to us, nay, more perfectly, by other senses, different from
our existing ones as they from each other? What if the properties of matter, as we
conceive of them, are merely relative to us, so that facts and events, which seem
impossible when predicated concerning it in terms of those impressions, are impossible
only in those terms, not in themselves,impossible only because of the imperfection of the
idea, which, in consequence of those impressions, we have conceived of material
substances? If so, it would follow that the laws of physics, as we consider them, are
themselves but generalizations of economical exhibitions, inferences from figure and
shadow, and not more real than the phenomena from which they are drawn. Scripture, for
instance, says that the sun moves and the earth is stationary; and science, that the earth
moves, and the sun is comparatively at rest. How can we determine which of these opposite
statements is the very truth, till we know what motion is? If our idea of motion be but an
accidental result of our present senses, neither proposition is true, and both are true;
neither true philosophically, both true for certain practical purposes in the system in
which they are respectively found; and physical science will have no better meaning when
it says that the earth moves, than plane astronomy when it says that the earth is still.
41. And should any one fear lest thoughts such as these should tend to
a dreary and hopeless scepticism, let him take into account the Being and Providence of
God, the Merciful and True; and he will at once be relieved of his anxiety. All is dreary
till we believe, what our hearts tell us, that we are subjects of His Governance; nothing
is dreary, all inspires hope and trust, directly we understand that we are under His hand,
and that whatever comes to us is from Him, as a method of discipline and guidance. What is
it to us whether the knowledge He gives us be greater or less, if it be He who gives it?
What is it to us whether it be exact or vague, if He bids us trust it? What have we to
care whether we are or are not given to divide substance from shadow, if He is training us
heavenwards by means of either? Why should we vex ourselves to find whether our deductions
are philosophical or no, provided they are religious? If our senses supply the media by
which we are put on trial, by which we are all brought together, and hold
intercourse with each other, and are disciplined and are taught, and enabled to benefit
others, it is enough. We have an instinct within us, impelling us, we have external
necessity forcing us, to trust our senses, and we may leave the question of their
substantial truth for another world, "till the day break, and the shadows flee
away."* And what is true of reliance on our senses, is true of
all the information which it has pleased God to vouchsafe to us, whether in nature or in
grace.
[*The senses
convey to the mind "substantial truth," in so far as they bring home to us that
certain things are, and in confuso what they are. But has a man born blind, by means of
hearing, smelling, taste, and touch, such an idea of physical nature, as may be called substantially true, or, on
the contrary, an idea which at best is but the shadow of the truth? for, in whichever respect, whether as in
substance or by a shadow, the blind man knows the objects of sight, in the same are those
things, in "which eye has not seen, nor ear heard," apprehended by us now,
"in a glass darkly," per speculum, in aenigmate.]
42. Instances, then, such as these, will be found both to sober and to encourage us
in our theological studies,-to impress us with a profound sense of our ignorance of Divine
Verities, when we know most; yet to hinder us from relinquishing their contemplation,
though we know so little. On the one hand, it would appear that even the most subtle
questions of the schools may have a real meaning, as the most intricate formuix in
analytics; and, since we cannot tell how far our instrument of thought reaches in the
process of investigation, and at what point it fails us, no questions may safely be
despised. "Whether God was any where before creation?" "whether He knows
all creatures in Himself?" "whether the blessed see all things possible and
future in Him?" "whether relation is the form of the Divine Persons?"
"in what sense the Holy Spirit is Divine Love?" these, and a multitude of
others, far more minute and remote, are all sacred from their subject.
43. On the other hand, it must be recollected that not even the
Catholic reasonings and conclusions, as contained in Confessions, and most thoroughly
received by us, are worthy of the Divine Verities which they represent, but are the truth
only in as full a measure as our minds can admit it; the truth as far as they go, and
under the conditions of thought which human feebleness imposes. It is true that God is
without beginning, if eternity may worthily be considered to imply succession; in every
place, if He who is a Spirit can have relations with space. It is right to speak of His
Being and Attributes, if He be not rather super-essential; it is true to say that He is
wise or powerful, if we may consider Him as other than the most simple Unity. He is truly
Three, if He is truly One; He is truly One, if the idea of Him falls under earthly number.
He has a triple Personality, in the sense in which the Infinite can be understood to have
Personality at all. If we know anything of Him,-if we may speak of Him in any way,-if we
may emerge from Atheism or Pantheism into religious faith,-if we would have any saving
hope, any life of truth and holiness within us,-this only do we know, with this only
confession, we must begin and end our worship-that the Father is the One God, the Son the
One God, and the Holy Ghost the One God; and that the Father is not the Son, the Son not
the Holy Ghost, and the Holy Ghost not the Father.
44. The fault, then, which we must guard against in receiving such
Divine intimations, is the ambition of being wiser than what is written; of employing the
Reason, not in carrying out what is told us, but in impugning it; not in support, but in
prejudice of Faith. Brilliant as are such exhibitions of its powers, they bear no fruit.
Reason can but ascertain the profound difficulties of our condition, it cannot remove
them; it has no work, it makes no beginning, it does but continually fall back, till it is
content to be a little child, and to follow where Faith guides it.
45. What remains, then, but to make our prayer to the Gracious and
Merciful God, the Father of Lights, that in all our exercises of Reason, His gift, we may
thus use it,-as He would have us, in the obedience of Faith, with a view to His glory,
with an aim at His Truth, in dutiful submission to His will, for the comfort of His elect,
for the edification of Holy Jerusalem, His Church, and in recollection of His own solemn
warning, "Every idle word that men shall speak, they shall give account thereof in
the day of judgment; for by the words thou shalt be justified, and by thy words thou shalt
be condemned."
Source:
John Henry Newman, "The Theory of Developments in Religious Doctrine, 1843",
repr. in John Henry Newman, Conscience, Concensus and the Development of Doctrine:
Revolutionary Texts by John Henry Cardinal Newman, ed. James Gaffney, (New York:
Image/Doubleday, 1992), 6-30
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