Introductory Note
Sydney Smith (1771-1845) was an English clergyman noted as the wittiest man of his
time. He was educated at Winchester and Oxford, and in 1798 went to Edinburgh as tutor to
the son of an English gentleman. While there he proposed the founding of the
"Edinburgh Review," and with Jeffrey, Brougham, and Francis Horner shared in its
actual establishment. He superintended the first three numbers, and continued to write for
it for twenty-five years. On leaving Edinburgh he lectured in London, held livings in
Yorkshire and Somersetshire, was made prebendary of Bristol and Canon of St. Paul's.
The review of Bentham's "Book of Fallacies" exhibits at once the method
of the Edinburgh Reviewers, Smith's vigorous, pointed, and witty style, and the general
trend of his political opinions. He was a stanch Whig, and in such issues as that of
Catholic Emancipation he fought for liberal opinions at the cost of injury to his personal
prospects. As a clergyman he was kindly and philanthropic, a good preacher, and a hater of
mysticism. No political writing of his time was more telling than his on the side of
toleration and reform; and his wit, while spontaneous and exuberant, was employed in the
service of good sense and with careful consideration for the feelings of others. If he
lacks the terrific power of Swift, he lacks also his bitterness and savagery; his honesty
and sincerity were no less, and his personality was as winning as it was amusing.
Fallacies Of Anti-Reformers
Part I - Introductory Remarks And Critique
There are a vast number of absurd and mischievous fallacies, which pass readily in the
world for sense and virtue, while in truth they tend only to fortify error and encourage
crime. Mr. Bentham has enumerated the most conspicuous of these in the book before us.
Whether it be necessary there should be a middleman between the cultivator and the
possessor, learned economists have doubted; but neither gods, men, nor booksellers can
doubt the necessity of a middleman between Mr. Bentham and the public. Mr. Bentham is
long; Mr. Bentham is occassionally involved and obscure; Mr. Bentham invents new and
alarming expressions; Mr. Bentham loves division and subdivision - and he loves method
itself, more than its consequences. Those only, therefore, who know his originality, his
knowledge, his vigor, and his boldness, will recur to the works themselves. The great mass
of readers will not purchase improvement at so dear a rate; but will choose rather to
become acquainted with Mr. Bentham through the medium of reviews - after that eminent
philosopher has been washed, trimmed, shaved, and forced into clean linen. One great use
of a review, indeed, is to make men wise in ten pages, who have no appetite for a hundred
pages; to condense nourishment, to work with pulp and essence, and to guard the stomach
from idle burden and unmeaning bulk. For half a page, sometimes for a whole page, Mr.
Bentham writes with a power which few can equal; and by selecting and omitting, an
admirable style may be formed from the text. Using this liberty, we shall endeavor to give
an account of Mr. Bentham's doctrines, for the most part in his own words. Wherever an
expression is particularly happy, let it be considered to be Mr. Bentham's - the dullness
we take to ourselves.
Our Wise Ancestors - The Wisdom of Our Ancestors - The Wisdom of Ages Venerable
Antiquity - Wisdom of Old Times. - This mischievous and absurd fallacy springs from the
grossest perversion of the meaning of words. Experience is certainly the mother of wisdom,
and the old have, of course, a greater experience than the young; but the question is who
are the old? and who are the young? Of individuals living at the same period, the oldest
has, of course, the greatest experience; but among generations of men the reverse of this
is true. Those who come first (our ancestors) are the young people, and have the least
experience. We have added to their experience the experience of many centuries; and,
therefore, as far as experience goes, are wiser, and more capable of forming an opinion
than they were. The real feeling should be, not can we be so presumptuous as to put our
opinions in opposition to those of our ancestors? but can such young, ignorant,
inexperienced persons as our ancestors necessarily were, be expected to have understood a
subject as well as those who have seen so much more, lived so much longer, and enjoyed the
experience of so many centuries? All this cant, then, about our ancestors is merely an
abuse of words, by transferring phrases true of contemporary men to succeeding ages.
Whereas (as we have before observed) of living men the oldest has, caeteris paribus,2 the most experience; of generations, the oldest has caeteris paribus, the least
experience. Our ancestors, up to the Conquest, were children in arms; chubby boys in the
time of Edward I; striplings under Elizabeth; men in the reign of Queen Anne; and we only
are the white-bearded, silver-headed ancients, who have treasured up, and are prepared to
profit by, all the experience which human life can supply. We are not disputing with our
ancestors the palm of talent, in which they may or may not be our superiors, but the palm
of experience in which it is utterly impossible they can be our superiors. And yet,
whenever the Chancellor comes forward to protect some abuse, or to oppose some plan which
has the increase of human happiness for its object, his first appeal is always to the
wisdom of our ancestors; and he himself, and many noble lords who vote with him, are, to
this hour, persuaded that all alterations and amendments on their devices are an
unblushing controversy between youthful temerity and mature experience! and so, in truth
they are - only that much - loved magistrate mistakes the young for the old, and the old
for the young - and is guilty of that very sin against experience which he attributes to
the lovers of innovation.
[Footnote 2: "Other things being equal."]
We cannot of course be supposed to maintain that our ancestors wanted wisdom, or that
they were necessarily mistaken in their institutions, because their means of information
were more limited than ours. But we do confidently maintain that when we find it expedient
to change anything which our ancestors have enacted, we are the experienced persons, and
not they. The quantity of talent is always varying in any great nation. To say that we are
more or less able than our ancestors is an assertion that requires to be explained. All
the able men of all ages, who have ever lived in England, probably possessed, if taken
altogether, more intellect than all the able men England can now boast of. But if
authority must be resorted to rather than reason, the question is, What was the wisdom of
the single age which enacted the law, compared with the wisdom of the age which proposes
to alter it? What are the eminent men of one and the other period? If you say that our
ancestors were wiser than us, mention your date and year. If the splendor of names is
equal, are the circumstances the same? If the circumstances are the same, we have a
superiority of experience, of which the difference between the two periods is the measure.
It is necessary to insist upon this; for upon sacks of wool, and on benches forensic, sit
grave men, and agricolous persons in the Commons, crying out: "Ancestors, ancestors!
hodie non!3 Saxons, Danes, save us! Fiddlefrig, help us! Howel, Ethelwolf,
protect us!" Any cover for nonsense any veil for trash - any pretext for repelling
the innovations of conscience and of duty!
[Footnote 3: "Not to-day!"]
"So long as they keep to vague generalities - so long as the two objects of
comparison are each of them taken in the lump - wise ancestors in one lump, ignorant and
foolish mob of modern times in the other - the weakness of the fallacy may escape
detection. But let them assign for the period of superior wisdom any determinate period
whatsoever, not only will the groundlessness of the notion be apparent (class being
compared with class in that period and the present one), but unless the antecedent period
be comparatively speaking a very modern one, so wide will be the disparity, and to such an
amount in favor of modern times, that, in comparison of the lowest class of the people in
modern times (always supposing them proficient in the art of reading, and their
proficiency employed in the reading of newspapers), the very highest and best-informed
class of these wise ancestors will turn out to be grossly ignorant.
"Take, for example, any year in the reign of Henry VIII, from 1509 to 1546. At
that time the House of Lords would probably have been in possession of by far the larger
proportion of what little instruction the age afforded; in the House of Lords, among the
laity, it might even then be a question whether, without exception, their lordships were
all of them able so much as to read. But even supposing them all in the fullest possession
of that useful art, political science being the science in question, what instruction on
the subject could they meet with at that time of day?
"On no one branch of legislation was any book extant from which, with regard to
the circumstances of the then present times, any useful instruction could be derived:
distributive law, penal law, international law, political economy, so far from existing as
sciences, had scarcely obtained a name: in all those departments under the head of quid
faciendum, a mere blank: the whole literature of the age consisted of a meagre chronicle
or two, containing short memorandums of the usual occurrences of war and peace, battles,
sieges, executions, revels, deaths, births, processions, ceremonies, and other external
events; but with scarce a speech or an incident that could enter into the composition of
any such work as a history of the human mind - with scarce an attempt at investigation
into causes, characters, or the state of the people at large. Even when at last, little by
little, a scrap or two of political instruction came to be obtainable, the proportion of
error and mischievous doctrine mixed up with it was so great, that whether a blank
unfilled might not have been less prejudicial than a blank thus filled, may reasonably be
matter of doubt.
"If we come down to the reign of James I, we shall find that Solomon of his time
eminently eloquent as well as learned, not only among crowned but among uncrowned heads,
marking out for prohibition and punishment the practices of devils and witches, and
without the slightest objection on the part of the great characters of that day in their
high situations, consigning men to death and torment for the misfortune of not being so
well acquainted as he was with the composition of the Godhead.
"Under the name of exorcism the Catholic liturgy contains a form of procedure for
driving out devils; - even with the help of this instrument, the operation cannot be
performed with the desired success, but by an operator qualified by holy orders for the
working of this as well as so many other wonders. In our days and in our country the same
object is attained, and beyond comparison more effectually, by so cheap an instrument as a
common newspaper; before this talisman, not only devils but ghosts, vampires, witches, and
all their kindred tribes, are driven out of the land, never to return again! The touch of
holy water is not so intolerable to them as the bare smell of printers' ink."4
[Footnote 4: From Bentham, pp. 74-77.]
Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws. - A law, says Mr. Bentham (no matter to what effect) is
proposed to a legislative assembly, who are called upon to reject it, upon the single
ground that by those who in some former period exercised the same power, a regulation was
made, having for its object to preclude forever, or to the end of an unexpired period, all
succeeding legislators from enacting a law to any such effect as that now proposed.
Now it appears quite evident that, at every period of time, every legislature must be
endowed with all those powers which the exigency of the times may require; and any attempt
to infringe on this power is inadmissible and absurd. The sovereign power, at any one
period, can only form a blind guess at the measures which may be necessary for any future
period; but by this principle of immutable laws, the government is transferred from those
who are necessarily the best judges of what they want, to others who can know little or
nothing about the matter. The thirteenth century decides for the fourteenth. The
fourteenth makes laws for the fifteenth. The fifteenth hermetically seals up the
sixteenth, which tyrannizes over the seventeenth, which again tells the eighteenth how it
is to act, under circumstances which cannot be foreseen, and how it is to conduct itself
in exigencies which no human wit can anticipate.
"Men who have a century more experience to ground their judgments on, surrender
their intellect to men who had a century less experience, and who, unless that deficiency
constitutes a claim, have no claim to preference. If the prior generation were, in respect
of intellectual qualification, ever so much superior to the subsequent generation - if it
understood so much better than the subsequent generation itself the interest of that
subsequent generation - could it have been in an equal degree anxious to promote that
interest, and consequently equally attentive to those facts with which, though in order to
form a judgment it ought to have been, it is impossible that it should have been,
acquainted? In a word, will its love for that subsequent generation be quite so great as
that same generation's love for itself?
"Not even here, after a moment's deliberate reflection, will the assertion be in
the affirmative. And yet it is their prodigious anxiety for the welfare of their posterity
that produces the propensity of these sages to tie up the hands of this same posterity
forever more - to act as guardians to its perpetual and incurable weakness, and take its
conduct forever out of its own hands.
"If it be right that the conduct of the nineteenth century should be determined
not by its own judgment but by that of the eighteenth, it will be equally right that the
conduct of the twentieth century should be determined not by its own judgment but by that
of the nineteenth. And if the same principle were still pursued, what at length would be
the consequence? - that in process of time the practice of legislation would be at an end.
The conduct and fate of all men would be determined by those who neither knew nor cared
anything about the matter; and the aggregate body of the living would remain forever in
subjection to an inexorable tyranny, exercised as it were by the aggregate body of the
Dead."5
[Footnote 5: Ibid., pp. 84-86.]
The despotism, as Mr. Bentham well observes, of Nero or Caligula would be more
tolerable than an "irrevocable law." The despot, through fear or favor, or in a
lucid interval, might relent; but how are the Parliament who made the Scotch Union, for
example, to be awakened from that dust in which they repose - the jobber and the patriot,
the speaker and the doorkeeper, the silent voters and the men of rich allusions, Cannings
and cultivators, Barings and beggars - making irrevocable laws for men who toss their
remains about with spades, and use the relics of these legislators to give breadth to
broccoli, and to aid the vernal eruption of asparagus?
If the law be good, it will support itself; if bad, it should not be supported by
"irrevocable theory," which is never resorted to but as the veil of abuses. All
living men must possess the supreme power over their own happiness at every particular
period. To suppose that there is anything which a whole nation cannot do, which they deem
to be essential to their happiness, and that they cannot do it, because another
generation, long ago dead and gone, said it must not be done, is mere nonsense. While you
are captain of the vessel, do what you please; but the moment you quit the ship I become
as omnipotent as you. You may leave me as much advice as you please, but you cannot leave
me commands; though, in fact, this is the only meaning which can be applied to what are
called irrevocable laws. It appeared to the legislature for the time being to be of
immense importance to make such and such a law. Great good was gained, or great evil
avoided, by enacting it. Pause before you alter an institution which has been deemed to be
of so much importance. This is prudence and common-sense; the rest is the exaggeration of
fools, or the artifice of knaves, who eat up fools. What endless nonsense has been talked
of our navigation laws! What wealth has been sacrificed to either before they were
repealed! How impossible it appeared to Noodledom to repeal them! They were considered of
the irrevocable class - a kind of law over which the dead only were omnipotent, and the
living had no power. Frost, it is true, cannot be put off by act of Parliament, nor can
spring be accelerated by any majority of both houses. It is, however, quite a mistake to
suppose that any alteration of any of the articles of union is as much out of the
jurisdiction of Parliament as these meteorological changes. In every year, and every day
of that year, living men have a right to make their own laws and manage their own affairs;
to break through the tyranny of the antespirants - the people who breathed before them -
and to do what they please for themselves. Such supreme power cannot indeed be well
exercised by the people at large; it must be exercised therefore by the delegates, or
Parliament, whom the people choose; and such Parliament, disregarding the superstitious
reverence for "irrevocable laws," can have no other criterion of wrong and right
than that of public utility.
When a law is considered as immutable, and the immutable law happens at the same time
to be too foolish and mischievous to be endured, instead of being repealed, it is
clandestinely evaded, or openly violated; and thus the authority of all law is weakened.
Where a nation has been ancestorially bound by foolish and improvident treaties, ample
notice must be given of their termination. Where the State has made ill-advised grants, or
rash bargains with individuals, it is necessary to grant proper compensation. The most
difficult case, certainly, is that of the union of nations, where a smaller number of the
weaker nation is admitted into the larger senate of the greater nation, and will be
overpowered if the question come to a vote; but the lesser nation must run this risk; it
is not probable that any violation of articles will take place till they are absolutely
called for by extreme necessity. But let the danger be what it may, no danger is so great,
no supposition so foolish, as to consider any human law as irrevocable. The shifting
attitude of human affairs would often render such a condition an intolerable evil to all
parties. The absurd jealousy of our countrymen at the Union secured heritable jurisdiction
to the owners; nine and thirty years afterward they were abolished, in the very teeth of
the Act of Union, and to the evident promotion of the public good.
Continuity of a law by Oath. - The sovereign of England at his coronation takes an oath
to maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant
religion, as established by law, and to preserve to the bishops and clergy of this realm
the rights and privileges which by law appertain to them, and to preserve inviolate the
doctrine, discipline, worship, and the government of the Church. It has been suggested
that by this oath the King stands precluded from granting those indulgences to the Irish
Catholics which are included in the bill for their emancipation. The true meaning of these
provisions is of course to be decided, if doubtful, by the same legislative authority
which enacted them. But a different notion it seems is now afloat. The King for the time
being (we are putting an imaginary case) thinks as an individual that he is not
maintaining the doctrine, discipline, and rights of the Church of England, if he grant any
extension of civil rights to those who are not members of that Church; that he is
violating his oath by so doing. This oath, then, according to this reasoning, is the great
palladium of the Church. As long as it remains inviolate the Church is safe. How, then,
can any monarch who has taken it ever consent to repeal it? How can he, consistently with
his oath for the preservation of the privileges of the Church, contribute his part to
throw down so strong a bulwark as he deems his oath to be! The oath, then, cannot be
altered. It must remain under all circumstances of society the same. The King who has
taken it is bound to continue it, and to refuse his sanction to any bill for its future
alteration, because it prevents him, and, he must needs think, will prevent others, from
granting dangerous immunities to the enemies of the Church.
Here, then, is an irrevocable law - a piece of absurd tyranny exercised by the rulers
of Queen Anne's time upon the government of 1825 - a certain art of potting and preserving
a kingdom in one shape, attitude, and flavor - and in this way it is that an institution
appears like old ladies' sweetmeats and made wines - Apricot Jam 1822 - Currant Wine 1819
- Court of Chancery 1427 Penal Laws against Catholics 1676. The difference is, that the
ancient woman is a better judge of mouldy commodities than the illiberal part of his
majesty's ministers. The potting lady goes sniffing about and admitting light and air to
prevent the progress of decay; while to him of the wool-sack all seems doubly dear in
proportion as it is antiquated, worthless, and unusable.
It ought not to be in the power of the sovereign to tie up his own hands, much less the
hands of his successors. If the sovereign were to oppose his own opinion to that of the
two other branches of the legislature, and himself to decide what he considers to be for
the benefit of the Protestant Church, and what not a king who has spent his whole life in
the frivolous occupation of a court may by perversion of understanding conceive measures
most salutary to the Church to be most pernicious, and, persevering obstinately in his own
error, may frustrate the wisdom of his parliament, and perpetuate the most inconceivable
folly! If Henry VIII had argued in this manner we should have had no Reformation. If
George III had always argued in this manner the Catholic code would never have been
relaxed. And thus a King, however incapable of forming an opinion upon serious subjects,
has nothing to do but pronounce the word "Conscience," and the whole power of
the country is at his feet.
Can there be greater absurdity than to say that a man is acting contrary to his
conscience who surrenders his opinion upon any subject to those who must understand the
subject better than himself? I think my ward has a claim to the estate; but the best
lawyers tell me he has none. I think my son capable of undergoing the fatigues of a
military life; but the best physicians say he is much too weak. My Parliament say this
measure will do the Church no harm; but I think it very pernicious to the Church. Am I
acting contrary to my conscience because I apply much higher intellectual powers than my
own to the investigation and protection of these high interests?
"According to the form in which it is conceived, any such engagement is in effect
either a check or a license: - a license under the appearance of a check, and for that
very reason but the more efficiently operative.
"Chains to the man in power? Yes: - but only such as he figures with on the stage;
to the spectators as imposing, to himself as light as possible. Modelled by the wearer to
suit his own purposes, they serve to rattle but not to restrain.
"Suppose a king of Great Britain and Ireland to have expressed his fixed
determination, in the event of any proposed law being tendered to him for his assent, to
refuse such assent, and this not on the persuasion that the law would not be 'for the
utility of the subjects,' but that by his coronation oath he stands precluded from so
doing, the course proper to be taken by Parliament, the course pointed out by principle
and precedent, would be a vote of abdication - a vote declaring the king to have abdicated
his royal authority, and that, as in case of death or incurable mental derangement, now is
the time for the person next in succession to take his place. In the celebrated case in
which a vote to this effect was actually passed, the declaration of abdication was, in
lawyers' language, a fiction - in plain truth, a falsehood, and that falsehood a mockery;
not a particle of his power was it the wish of James to abdicate, to part with, but to
increase it to a maximum was the manifest object of all his efforts. But in the case here
supposed, with respect to a part, and that a principal part of the royal authority, the
will and purpose to abdicate is actually declared; and this being such a part, without
which the remainder cannot, 'to the utility of the subjects,' be exercised, the remainder
must of necessity be, on their part and for their sake, added."6
[Footnote 6: Ibid., pp. 110, 111.]
Self-Trumpeter's Fallacy. - Mr. Bentham explains the self-trumpeter's fallacy as
follows:
"There are certain men in office who, in discharge of their functions, arrogate to
themselves a degree of probity, which is to exclude all imputations and all inquiry. Their
assertions are to be deemed equivalent to proof, their virtues are guaranties for the
faithful discharge of their duties, and the most implicit confidence is to be reposed in
them on all occasions. If you expose any abuse, propose any reform, call for securities,
inquiry, or measures to promote publicity, they set up a cry of surprise, amounting almost
to indignation, as if their integrity were questioned or their honor wounded. With all
this, they dexterously mix up intimations that the most exalted patriotism, honor, and
perhaps religion, are the only sources of all their actions."7
[Footnote 7: Ibid., p. 120.]
Of course every man will try what he can effect by these means; but (as Mr. Bentham
observes) if there be any one maxim in politics more certain than another, it is that no
possible degree of virtue in the governor can render it expedient for the governed to
dispense with good laws and good institutions. Madame De Stael (to her disgrace) said to
the Emperor of Russia: "Sire, your character is a constitution for your country, and
your conscience its guaranty." His reply was: "Quand cela serait, je ne serais
jamais qu'un accident heureux;"8 and this we think one of the truest and
most brilliant replies ever made by monarch.
[Footnote 8: "If that were so, I should be only a happy accident."]
Laudatory Personalities. - "The object of laudatory personalities is to effect the
rejection of a measure on account of the alleged good character of those who oppose it,
and the argument advanced is: 'The measure is rendered unnecessary by the virtues of those
who are in power - their opposition is a sufficient authority for the rejection of the
measure. The measure proposed implies a distrust of the members of his Majesty's
Government; but so great is their integrity, so complete their disinterestedness, so
uniformly do they prefer the public advantage to their own, that such a measure is
altogether unnecessary. Their disapproval is sufficient to warrant an opposition;
precautions can only be requisite where danger is apprehended; here the high character of
the individuals in question is a sufficient guaranty against any ground of alarm.'"9
[Footnote 9: Ibid., pp. 123, 124.]
The panegyric goes on increasing with the dignity of the lauded person. All are
honorable and delightful men. The person who opens the door of the office is a person of
approved fidelity; the junior clerk is a model of assiduity; all the clerks are models -
seven years' models, eight years' models, nine years' models, and upward. The first clerk
is a paragon, and ministers the very perfection of probity and intelligence; and as for
the highest magistrate of the State, no adulation is equal to describe the extent of his
various merits! It is too condescending, perhaps, to refute such folly as this. But we
would just observe that, if the propriety of the measure in question be established by
direct arguments, these must be at least as conclusive against the character of those who
oppose it as their character can be against the measure.
The effect of such an argument is to give men of good or reputed good character the
power of putting a negative on any question not agreeable to their inclinations.
"In every public trust the legislator should for the purpose of prevention,
suppose the trustee disposed to break the trust in every imaginable way in which it would
be possible for him to reap from the breach of it any personal advantage. This is the
principle on which public institutions ought to be formed, and when it is applied to all
men indiscriminately, it is injurious to none. The practical inference is to oppose to
such possible (and what will always be probable) breaches of trust every bar that can be
opposed consistently with the power requisite for the efficient and due discharge of the
trust. Indeed, these arguments, drawn from the supposed virtues of men in power, are
opposed to the first principles on which all laws proceed.
"Such allegations of individual virtue are never supported by specific proof, are
scarce ever susceptible of specific disproof, and specific disproof, if offered, could not
be admitted in either House of Parliament. If attempted elsewhere, the punishment would
fall not on the unworthy trustee, but on him by whom the unworthiness has been
proved."10
[Footnote 10: Ibid., pp. 125, 126.]
Part II - More Specific Fallacies
Fallacies of Pretended Danger. - Imputations of Bad Design; of Bad Character; of Bad
Motives; of Inconsistency; of Suspicious Connections. - The object of this class of
fallacies is to draw aside attention from the measure to the man, and this in such a
manner that, for some real or supposed defect in the author of the measure, a
corresponding defect shall be imputed to the measure itself. Thus, "the author of the
measure entertains a bad design; therefore the measure is bad. His character is bad,
therefore the measure is bad; his motive is bad, I will vote against the measure. On
former occasions this same person who proposed the measure was its enemy, therefore the
measure is bad. He is on footing of intimacy with this or that dangerous man, or has been
seen in his company, or is suspected of entertaining some of his opinions, therefore the
measure is bad. He bears a name that at a former period was borne by a set of men now no
more, by whom bad principles were entertained, therefore the measure is bad!"
Now, if the measure be really inexpedient, why not at once show it to be so? If the
measure be good, is it bad because a bad man is its author? If bad, is it good because a
good man has produced it? What are these arguments but to say to the assembly who are to
be the judges of any measure, that their imbecility is too great to allow them to judge of
the measure by its own merits, and that they must have recourse to distant and feebler
probabilities for that purpose?
"In proportion to the degree of efficiency with which a man suffers these
instruments of deception to operate upon his mind, he enables bad men to exercise over him
a sort of power, the thought of which ought to cover him with shame. Allow this argument
the effect of a conclusive one, you put it into the power of any man to draw you at
pleasure from the support of every measure which in your own eyes is good, to force you to
give your support to any and every measure which in your own eyes is bad. Is it good? -
the bad man embraces it, and by the supposition, you reject it. Is it bad? - he
vituperates it, and that suffices for driving you into its embrace. You split upon the
rocks because he has avoided them; you miss the harbor because he has steered into it!
Give yourself up to any such blind antipathy, you are no less in the power of your
adversaries than if, by a correspondently irrational sympathy and obsequiousness, you put
yourself into the power of your friends."11
[Footnote 11: Ibid., pp. 132, 133.]
"Besides, nothing but laborious application and a clear and comprehensive
intellect can enable a man on any given subject to employ successfully relevant arguments
drawn from the subject itself. To employ personalities, neither labor or intellect is
required. In this sort of contest the most idle and the most ignorant are quite on a par
with, if not superior to, the most industrious and the most highly gifted individuals.
Nothing can be more convenient for those who would speak without the trouble of thinking.
The same ideas are brought forward over and over again, and all that is required is to
very the turn of expression. Close and relevant arguments have very little hold on the
passions, and serve rather to quell than to inflame them; while in personalities there is
always something stimulant, whether on the part of him who praises or him who blames.
Praise forms a kind of connection between the party praising and the party praised, and
vituperation gives an air of courage and independence to the party who blames.
"Ignorance and indolence, friendship and enmity, concurring and conflicting
interest, servility and independence, all conspire to give personalities the ascendency
they so unhappily maintain. The more we lie under the influence of our own passions, the
more we rely on others being affected in a similar degree. A man who can repel these
injuries with dignity may often convert them into triumph: 'Strike me, but hear,' says he,
and the fury of his antagonist redounds to his own discomfiture."12
[Footnote 12: Ibid., pp. 141, 142.]
No Innovation! - To say that all things new are bad is to say that all old things were
bad in their commencement: for of all the old things ever seen or heard of there is not
one that was not once new. Whatever is now establishment was once innovation. The first
inventor of pews and parish clerks was no doubt considered as a Jacobin in his day.
Judges, juries, criers of the court, are all the inventions of ardent spirits, who filled
the world with alarm, and were considered as the great precursors of ruin and dissolution.
No inoculation, no turnpikes, no reading, no writing, no popery! The fool sayeth in his
heart and crieth with his mouth, "I will have nothing new!"
Fallacy of Distrust! - "What's at the Bottom?" - This fallacy begins with a
virtual admission of the propriety of the measure considered in itself, and thus
demonstrates its own futility, and cuts up from under itself the ground which it
endeavours to make. A measure is to be rejected for something that, by bare possibility,
may be found amiss in some other measure! This is vicarious reprobation; upon this
principle Herod instituted his massacre. It is the argument of a driveller to other
drivellers, who says: "We are not able to decide upon the evil when it arises; our
only safe way is to act upon the general apprehension of evil."
Official Malefactor's Screen - "Attack Us, You Attack Government." - If this
notion is acceded to, everyone who derives at present any advantage from misrule has it in
fee-simple, and all abuses, present and future, are without remedy. So long as there is
anything amiss in conducting the business of government, so long as it can be made better,
there can be no other mode of bringing it nearer to perfection than the indication of such
imperfections as at the time being exist.
"But so far is it from being true that a man's aversion or contempt for the hands
by which the powers of government, or even for the system under which they are exercised,
is a proof of his aversion or contempt toward government itself, that, even in proportion
to the strength of that aversion or contempt, it is a proof of the opposite affection.
What, in consequence of such contempt or aversion, he wishes for is not that there be no
hands at all to exercise these powers, but that the hands may be better regulated; - not
that those powers should not be exercised at all, but that they should be better
exercised; - not that in the exercise of them no rules at all should be pursued, but that
the rules by which they are exercised should be a better set of rules.
"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and
immemorially acknowledged so to be; it is only by the magnitude of the scale that public
differ from private trusts. I complain of the conduct of a person in the character of
guardian, as domestic guardian, having the care of a minor or insane person. In so doing
do I say that guardianship is a bad institution? Does it enter into the head of anyone to
suspect me of so doing? I complain of an individual in the character of a commercial agent
or assignee of the effects of an insolvent. In so doing do I say that commercial agency is
a bad thing? that the practice of vesting in the hands of trustees or assignees the
effects of an insolvent for the purpose of their being divided among his creditors is a
bad practice? Does any such conceit ever enter into the head of man as that of suspecting
me of so doing."13
[Footnote 13: Ibid., pp. 162, 163.]
There are no complaints against government in Turkey - no motions in Parliament, no
"Morning Chronicles," and no "Edinburgh Reviews": yet of all countries
in the world it is that in which revolts and revolutions are the most frequent.
It is so far from true that no good government can exist consistently with such
disclosure, that no good government can exist without it. It is quite obvious to all who
are capable of reflection that by no other means than by lowering the governors in the
estimation of the people can there be hope or chance of beneficial change. To infer from
this wise endeavor to lessen the existing rulers in the estimation of the people, a wish
of dissolving the government, is either artifice or error. The physician who intentionally
weakens the patient by bleeding him has no intention he should perish.
The greater the quantity of respect a man receives, independently of good conduct, the
less good is his bevahior likely to be. It is the interest, therefore, of the public in
the case of each to see that the respect paid to him should, as completely as possible,
depend upon the goodness of his behavior in the execution of his trust. But it is, on the
contrary, the interest of the trustee that the respect, the money, or any other advantage
he receives in virtue of his office, should be as great, as secure, and as independent of
conduct as possible. Soldiers expect to be shot at; public men must expect to be attacked,
and sometimes unjustly. It keeps up the habit of considering their conduct as exposed to
scrutiny; on the part of the people at large it keeps alive the expectation of witnessing
such attacks, and the habit of looking out for them. The friends and supporters of
government have always greater facility in keeping and raising it up than its adversaries
have for lowering it.
Accusation-scarer's Device - "Infamy Must Attach Somewhere." - This fallacy
consists in representing the character of a calumniator as necessarily and justly
attaching upon him who, having made a charge of misconduct against any person possessed of
political power or influence, fails of producing evidence sufficient for their conviction.
"If taken as a general proposition, applying to all public accusations, nothing
can be more mischievous as well as fallacious. Supposing the charge unfounded, the
delivery of it may have been accompanied with mala fides (consciousness of its injustice),
with temerity only, or it may have been perfectly blameless. It is in the first case alone
that infamy can with propriety attach upon him who brings it forward. A charge really
groundless may have been honestly believed to be well founded, i. e., believed with a sort
of provisional credence, sufficient for the purpose of engaging a man to do his part
toward the bringing about an investigation, but without sufficient reasons. But a charge
may be perfectly groundless without attaching the smallest particle of blame upon him who
brings it forward. Suppose him to have heard from one or more, presenting themselves to
him in the character of percipient witnesses, a story which, either in toto, or perhaps
only in circumstances, though in circumstances of the most material importance, should
prove false and mendacious, how is the person who hears this and acts accordingly to
blame? What sagacity can enable a man previously to legal investigation, a man who has no
power that can enable him to insure correctness or completeness on the part of this
extrajudicial testimony, to guard against deception in such a case?"14
[Footnote 14: Ibid., pp. 185, 186.]
Fallacy of False Consolation - "What is the Matter with You? - What Would You
Have? - Look at the People There, and There; Think how much Better Off You Are than They
Are - Your Prosperity and Liberty are Objects of Their Envy; Your Institutions, Models of
Their Imitation." - It is not the desire to look to the bright side that is blamed,
but when a particular suffering, produced by an assigned cause, has been pointed out, the
object of many apologists is to turn the eyes of inquirers and judges into any other
quarter in preference. If a man's tenants were to come with a general encomium on the
prosperity of the country instead of a specified sum, would it be accepted? In a court of
justice in an action for damages did ever any such device occur as that of pleading assets
in the hands of a third person? There is in fact no country so poor and so wretched in
every element of prosperity, in which matter for this argument might not be found. Were
the prosperity of the country tenfold as great as at present, the absurdity of the
argument would not in the least degree be lessened. Why should the smallest evil be
endured which can be cured because others suffer patiently under greater evils? Should the
smallest improvement attainable be neglected because others remain contented in a state of
still greater inferiority?
"Seriously and pointedly in the character of a bar to any measure of relief, no,
nor to the most trivial improvement, can it ever be employed. Suppose a bill brought in
for converting an impassable road anywhere into a passable one, would any man stand up to
oppose it who could find nothing better to urge against it than the multitude and goodness
of the roads we have already? No: when in the character of a serious bar to the measure in
hand, be that measure what it may, an argument so palpably inapplicable is employed, it
can only be for the purpose of creating a diversion; - of turning aside the minds of men
from the subject really in hand to a picture which, by its beauty, it is hoped, may
engross the attention of the assembly, and make them forget for the moment for what
purpose they came there."15
[Footnote 15: Ibid., pp. 196, 197.]
The Quietest, or No Complaint. - "A new law of measure being proposed in the
character of a remedy for some incontestable abuse or evil, an objection is frequently
started to the following effect: - 'The measure is unnecessary. Nobody complains of
disorder in that shape, in which it is the aim of your measure to propose a remedy to it.
But even when no cause of complaint has been found to exist, especially under governments
which admit of complaints, men have in general not been slow to complain; much less where
any just cause of complaint has existed.' The argument amounts to this: - Nobody
complains, therefore nobody suffers. It amounts to a veto on all measures of precaution or
prevention, and goes to establish a maxim in legislation directly opposed to the most
ordinary prudence of common life; it enjoins us to build no parapets to a bridge till the
number of accidents has raised a universal clamor."16
[Footnote 16: Ibid., pp. 190, 191.]
Procrastinator's Argument - "Wait a Little; This is Not the Time." - This is
the common argument of men who, being in reality hostile to a measure, are ashamed or
afraid of appearing to be so. To-day is the plea - eternal exclusion commonly the object.
It is the same sort of quirk as a plea of abatement in law - which is never employed but
on the side of a dishonest defendant, whose hope it is to obtain an ultimate triumph, by
overwhelming his adversary with despair, impoverishment, and lassitude. Which is the
properest day to do good? which is the properest day to remove a nuisance? We answer, the
very first day a man can be found to propose the removal of it; and whoever opposes the
removal of it on that day will (if he dare) oppose it on every other. There is in the
minds of many feeble friends to virtue and improvement, an imaginary period for the
removal of evils, which it would certainly be worth while to wait for, if there was the
smallest chance of its ever arriving - a period of unexampled peace and prosperity, when a
patriotic king and an enlightened mob united their ardent efforts for the amelioration of
human affairs; when the oppressor is as delighted to give up the oppression, as the
oppressed is to be liberated from it; when the difficulty and the unpopularity would be to
continue the evil, not to abolish it! These are the periods when fair-weather philosophers
are willing to venture out and hazard a little for the general good. But the history of
human nature is so contrary to all this, that almost all improvements are made after the
bitterest resistance, and in the midst of tumults and civil violence - the worst period at
which they can be made, compared to which any period is eligible, and should be seized
hold of by the friends of salutary reform.
Snail's Pace Argument - "One Thing at a Time! - Not Too Fast! - Slow and Sure! -
Importance of the business - extreme difficulty of the business danger of innovation -
need of caution and circumspection - impossibility of foreseeing all consequences - danger
of precipitation - everything should be gradual - one thing at a time - this is not the
time - great occupation at present - wait for more leisure - people well satisfied - no
petitions presented - no complaints heard - no such mischief has yet taken place - stay
till it has taken place! Such is the prattle which the magpie in office, who,
understanding nothing, yet understands that he must have something to say on every
subject, shouts out among his auditors as a succedaneum to thought."17
[Footnote 17: Ibid., pp. 203, 204.]
Vague Generalities. - Vague generalities comprehend a numerous class of fallacies
resorted to by those who, in preference to the determinate expressions which they might
use, adopt others more vague and indeterminate.
Take, for instance, the terms government, laws, morals, religion. Everybody will admit
that there are in the world bad governments, bad laws, bad morals, and bad religions. The
bare circumstance, therefore, of being engaged in exposing the defects of government, law,
morals, and religion does not of itself afford the slightest presumption that a writer is
engaged in anything blamable. If his attack be only directed against that which is bad in
each, his efforts may be productive of good to any extent. This essential distinction,
however, the defender of abuses uniformly takes care to keep out of sight; and boldly
imputes to his antagonists an intention to subvert all government, law, morals, and
religion. Propose anything with a view to the improvement of the existing practice, in
relation to law, government, and religion, he will treat you with an oration upon the
necessity and utility of law, government, and religion. Among the several cloudy
appellatives which have been commonly employed as cloaks for misgovernment, there is none
more conspicuous in this atmosphere of illusion than the word order. As often as any
measure is brought forward which has for its object to lessen the sacrifice made by the
many to the few, social order is the phrase commonly opposed to its progress.
"By a defalcation made from any part of the mass of fictitious delay, vexation,
and expense, out of which, and in proportion to which, lawyers' profit is made to flow-by
any defalcation made from the mass of needless and worse than useless emolument to office,
with or without service or pretence of service - by any addition endeavored to be made to
the quantity, or improvement in the quality of service rendered, or time bestowed in
service rendered in return for such emolument - by every endeavor that has for its object
the persuading the people to place their fate at the disposal of any other agents than
those in whose hands breach of trust is certain, due fulfilment of it morally and
physically impossible - social order is said to be endangered, and threatened to be
destroyed."18
[Footnote 18: Ibid., p. 234.]
In the same way "Establishment" is a word in use to protect the bad parts of
establishments, by charging those who wish to remove or alter them, with a wish to subvert
all good establishments.
Part III - More Fallacies And The Noodle's Oration
Mischievous fallacies also circulate from the convertible use of what Mr. B. is pleased
to call dyslogistic and eulogistic terms. Thus, a vast concern is expressed for the
"liberty of the press," and the utmost abhorrence of its
"licentiousness": but then, by the licentiousness of the press is meant every
disclosure by which any abuse is brought to light and exposed to shame - by the
"liberty of the press" is meant only publications from which no such
inconvenience is to be apprehended; and the fallacy consists in employing the sham
approbation of liberty as a mask for the real opposition to all free discussion. To write
a pamphlet so ill that nobody will read it; to animadvert in terms so weak and insipid
upon great evils, that no disgust is excited at the vice, and no apprehension in the
evil-doer, is a fair use of the liberty of the press, and is not only pardoned by the
friends of government, but draws from them the most fervent eulogium. The licentiousness
of the press consists in doing the thing boldly and well, in striking terror into the
guilty, and in rousing the attention of the public to the defence of their highest
interests. This is the licentiousness of the press held in the greatest horror by timid
and corrupt men, and punished by semi-animous, semi-cadaverous judges, with a captivity of
many years. In the same manner the dyslogistic and eulogistic fallacies are used in the
case of reform.
"Between all abuses whatsoever there exists that connection - between all persons
who see, each of them, any one abuse in which an advantage results to himself, there
exists, in point of interest, that close and sufficiently understood connection, of which
intimation has been given already. To no one abuse can correction be administered without
endangering the existence of every other.
"If, then, with this inward determination not to suffer, so far as depends upon
himself, the adoption of any reform which he is able to prevent, it should seem to him
necessary or advisable to put on for a cover the profession or appearance of a desire to
contribute to such reform - in pursuance of the device or fallacy here in question, he
will represent that which goes by the name of reform as distinguishable into two species;
one of them a fit subject for approbation, the other for disapprobation. That which he
thus professes to have marked for approbation, he will accordingly for the expression of
such approbation, characterize by some adjunct of the eulogistic cast, such as moderate,
for example, or temperate, or practical, or practicable.
"To the other of these nominally distinct species, he will, at the same time,
attach some adjunct of the dyslogistic cast, such as violent, intemperate, extravagant,
outrageous, theoretical, speculative, and so forth.
"Thus, then, in profession and to appearance, there are in his conception of the
matter two distinct and opposite species of reform, to one of which his approbation, to
the other his disapprobation, is attached. But the species to which his approbation is
attached is an empty species - a species in which no individual is, or is intended to be,
contained.
"The species to which his disapprobation is attached is, on the contrary, a
crowded species, a receptacle in which the whole contents of the genus - of the genus
'Reform' - are intended to be included."19
[Footnote 19: Ibid., pp. 277, 278.]
Anti-rational Fallacies. - When reason is in opposition to a man's interests his study
will naturally be to render the faculty itself, and whatever issues from it, an object of
hatred and contempt. The sarcasm and other figures of speech employed on the occasion are
directed not merely against reason but against thought, as if there were something in the
faculty of thought that rendered the exercise of it incompatible with useful and
successful practice. Sometimes a plan, which would not suit the official person's
interest, is without more ado pronounced a speculative one; and, by this observation, all
need of rational and deliberate discussion is considered to be superseded. The first
effort of the corruptionist is to fix the epithet speculative upon any scheme which he
thinks may cherish the spirit of reform. The expression is hailed with the greatest
delight by bad and feeble men, and repeated with the most unwearied energy; and to the
word "speculative," by way of reinforcement, are added: theoretical, visionary,
chimerical, romantic, Utopian.
"Sometimes a distinction is taken, and thereupon a concession made. The plan is
good in theory, but it would be bad in practice, i.e., its being good in theory does not
hinder its being bad in practice.
"Sometimes, as if in consequence of a further progress made in the art of
irrationality, the plan is pronounced to be "too good to be practicable"; and
its being so good as it is, is thus represented as the very cause of its being bad in
practice.
"In short, such is the perfection at which this art is at length arrived, that the
very circumstances of a plan's being susceptible of the appellation of a plan, has been
gravely stated as a circumstance sufficient to warrant its being rejected - rejected, if
not with hatred, at any rate with a sort of accompaniment which, to the million, is
commonly felt still more galling with contempt."20
[Footnote 20: Ibid., p. 296.]
There is a propensity to push theory too far; but what is the just inference? not that
theoretical propositions (i.e., all propositions of any considerable comprehension or
extent) should, from such their extent, be considered to be false in toto, but only that,
in the particular case, should inquiry be made whether, supposing the proposition to be in
the character of a rule generally true, an exception ought to be taken out of it. It might
almost be imagined that there was something wicked or unwise in the exercise of thought;
for everybody feels a necessity for disclaiming it. "I am not given to speculation, I
am no friend to theories." Can a man disclaim theory, can he disclaim speculation,
without disclaiming thought?
The description of persons by whom this fallacy is chiefly employed are those who,
regarding a plan as adverse to their interests, and not finding it on the ground of
general utility exposed to any preponderant objection, have recourse to this objection in
the character of an instrument of contempt, in the view of preventing those from looking
into it who might have been otherwise disposed. It is by the fear of seeing it practised
that they are drawn to speak of it as impracticable. "Upon the face of it (exclaims
some feeble or pensioned gentleman) it carries that air of plausibility, that, if you were
not upon your guard, might engage you to bestow more or less attention upon it; but were
you to take the trouble, you would find that (as it is with all these plans which promise
so much) practicability would at last be wanting to it. To save yourself from this
trouble, the wisest course you can take is to put the plan aside, and to think no more
about the matter." This is always accompanied with a peculiar grin of triumph.
The whole of these fallacies may be gathered together in a little oration, which we
will denominate the "Noodle's Oration":
"What would our ancestors say to this, Sir? How does this measure tally with their
institutions? How does it agree with their experience? Are we to put the wisdom of
yesterday in competition with the wisdom of centuries? [Hear! hear!] Is beardless youth to
show no respect for the decisions of mature age? [Loud cries of hear! hear!] If this
measure be right, would it have escaped the wisdom of those Saxon progenitors to whom we
are indebted for so many of our best political institutions? Would the Dane have passed it
over? Would the Norman have rejected it? Would such a notable discovery have been reserved
for these modern and degenerate times? Besides, Sir, if the measure itself is good, I ask
the honorable gentleman if this is the time for carrying it into execution - whether, in
fact, a more unfortunate period could have been selected than that which he has chosen? If
this were an ordinary measure I should not oppose it with so much vehemence; but, Sir, it
calls in question the wisdom of an irrevocable law - of a law passed at the memorable
period of the Revolution. What right have we, Sir, to break down this firm column on which
the great men of that age stamped a character of eternity? Are not all authorities against
this measure - Pitt, Fox, Cicero, and the Attorney - and Solicitor - General? The
proposition is new, Sir; it is the first time it was ever heard in this House. I am not
prepared, Sir - this House is not prepared - to receive it. The measure implies a distrust
of his Majesty's Government; their disapproval is sufficient to warrant opposition.
Precaution only is requisite where danger is apprehended. Here the high character of the
individuals in q gradual; the example of a neighboring nation should fill us with alarm!
The honorable gentleman has taxed me with illiberality, Sir; I deny the charge. I hate
innovation, but I love improvement. I am an enemy to the corruption of government, but I
defend its influence. I dread reform, but I dread it only when it is intemperate. I
consider the liberty of the press as the great palladium of the Constitution; but, at the
same time, I hold the licentiousness of the press in the greatest abhorrence. Nobody is
more conscious than I am of the splendid abilities of the honorable mover, but I tell him
at once his scheme is too good to be practicable. It savors of Utopia. It looks well in
theory, but it won't do in practice. It will not do, I repeat, Sir, in practice; and so
the advocates of the measure will find, if, unfortunately, it should find its way through
Parliament. [Cheers.] The source of that corruption to which the honorable member alludes
is in the minds of the people; so rank and extensive is that corruption, that no political
reform can have any effect in removing it. Instead of reforming others - instead of
reforming the State, the Constitution, and everything that is most excellent, let each man
reform himself! let him look at home, he will find there enough to do without looking
abroad and aiming at what is out of his power. [Loud cheers.] And now, Sir, as it is
frequently the custom in this House to end with a quotation, and as the gentleman who
preceded me in the debate has anticipated me in my favorite quotation of the 'Strong pull
and the long pull,' I shall end with the memorable words of the assembled barons: 'Nolumus
leges Angliae mutari.'21
[Footnote 21: "We do not wish the laws of England to be changed."]
Part IV - Conclusion
"Upon the whole, the following are the characters which appertain in common to all
the several arguments here distinguished by the name of fallacies:
"1. Whatsoever be the measure in hand, they are, with relation to it, irrelevant.
"2. They are all of them such, that the application of these irrelevant arguments
affords a presumption either of the weakness or total absence of relevant arguments on the
side of which they are employed.
"3. To any good purpose they are all of them unnecessary.
"4. They are all of them not only capable of being applied, but actually in the
habit of being applied, and with advantage, to bad purposes, viz.: to the obstruction and
defeat of all such measures as have for their object the removal of the abuses or other
imperfections still discernible in the frame and practice of the government.
"5. By means of the irrelevancy, they all of them consume and misapply time,
thereby obstructing the course and retarding the progress of all necessary and useful
business.
"6. By that irritative quality which, in virtue of their irrelevancy, with the
improbity or weakness of which it is indicative, they possess, all of them, in a degree
more or less considerable, but in a more particular degree such of them as consist in
personalities, are productive of ill-humor, which in some instances has been productive of
bloodshed, and is continually productive, as above, of waste of time and hindrance of
business.
"7. On the part of those who, whether in spoken or written discourses, give
utterance to them, they are destined to operate.
"8. On the part of those on whom they operate, they are indicative either of
improbity or intellectual weakness, or of a contempt for the understanding of those on
whose minds they are indicative of intellectual weakness; and on the part of those in and
by whom they are pretended to operate, they are indicative of improbity, viz., in the
shape of insincerity.
"The practical conclusion is, that in proportion as the acceptance, and thence the
utterance, of them can be prevented, the understanding of the public will be strengthened,
the morals of the public will be purified, and the practice of government improved."22
[Footnote 22: From Bentham, pp. 359, 360.]
Source:
A review of "The Book of Fallacies: from Unfinished Papers of Jeremy Bentham. By a
Friend. London, 1824."
reprinted in the Harvard classics series, 1909
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