Aristotle is not usually given as a major author on homosexuality.
Nevertheless, his writings how great familiarity with the subject,
and with men with male lovers in particular. The following are
passages in the Politics in which the subject comes up. All are
from the translation by Benjamin Jowett.
The complete chapter in which the reference comes up has been
retained for contextual purposes, but the "homosexual"
passages are highlighted. For these passages the standard reference
form is also indicated (so that you can check the Greek at the
Perseus Project).
For discussion of some of the issues raised here, see David
Cohen, "Consent and Sexual Relations in Classical Athens",
in Consent and Coercion to Sex and Marriage in Ancient and
Medieval Societies, ed. Angeliki Laiou, (Washington DC: Dumbarton
Oaks, 1993), 5-16
Book Two : Chapter XII
Of those who have treated of governments, some have
never taken any part at all in public affairs, but have passed
their lives in a private station; about most of them, what was
worth telling has been already told. Others have been lawgivers,
either in their own or in foreign cities, whose affairs they have
administered; and of these some have only made laws, others have
framed constitutions; for example, Lycurgus and Solon did both.
Of the Lacedaemonian constitution I have already spoken. As to
Solon, he is thought by some to have been a good legislator, who
put an end to the exclusiveness of the oligarchy, emancipated
the people, established the ancient Athenian democracy, and harmonized
the different elements of the state. According to their view,
the council of Areopagus was an oligarchical element, the elected
magistracy, aristocratical, and the courts of law, democratical.
The truth seems to be that the council and the elected magistracy
existed before the time of Solon, and were retained by him, but
that he formed the courts of law out of an the citizens, thus
creating the democracy, which is the very reason why he is sometimes
blamed. For in giving the supreme power to the law courts, which
are elected by lot, he is thought to have destroyed the non-democratic
element. When the law courts grew powerful, to please the people
who were now playing the tyrant the old constitution was changed
into the existing democracy. Ephialtes and Pericles curtailed
the power of the Areopagus; Pericles also instituted the payment
of the juries, and thus every demagogue in turn increased the
power of the democracy until it became what we now see. All this
is true; it seems, however, to be the result of circumstances,
and not to have been intended by Solon. For the people, having
been instrumental in gaining the empire of the sea in the Persian
War, began to get a notion of itself, and followed worthless demagogues,
whom the better class opposed. Solon, himself, appears to have
given the Athenians only that power of electing to offices and
calling to account the magistrates which was absolutely necessary;
for without it they would have been in a state of slavery and
enmity to the government. All the magistrates he appointed from
the notables and the men of wealth, that is to say, from the pentacosio-medimni,
or from the class called zeugitae, or from a third class of so-called
knights or cavalry. The fourth class were laborers who had no
share in any magistracy.
Mere legislators were Zaleucus, who gave laws to
the Epizephyrian Locrians, and Charondas, who legislated for his
own city of Catana, and for the other Chalcidian cities in Italy
and Sicily. Some people attempt to make out that Onomacritus was
the first person who had any special skill in legislation, and
that he, although a Locrian by birth, was trained in Crete, where
he lived in the exercise of his prophetic art; that Thales was
his companion, and that Lycurgus and Zaleucus were disciples of
Thales, as Charondas was of Zaleucus. But their account is quite
inconsistent with chronology.
[1274] There was also Philolaus, the Corinthian,
who gave laws to the Thebans. This Philolaus was one of the family
of the Bacchiadae, and a lover of Diocles, the Olympic victor,
who left Corinth in horror of the incestuous passion which his
mother Halcyone had conceived for him, and retired to Thebes,
where the two friends together ended their days. The inhabitants
still point out their tombs, which are in full view of one another,
but one is visible from the Corinthian territory, the other not.
Tradition says the two friends arranged them thus, Diocles out
of horror at his misfortunes, so that the land of Corinth might
not be visible from his tomb; Philolaus that it might. This is
the reason why they settled at Thebes, and so Philolaus legislated
for the Thebans, and, besides some other enactments, gave them
laws about the procreation of children, which they call the 'Laws
of Adoption.' These laws were peculiar to him, and were intended
to preserve the number of the lots.
In the legislation of Charondas there is nothing
remarkable, except the suits against false witnesses. He is the
first who instituted denunciation for perjury. His laws are more
exact and more precisely expressed than even those of our modern
legislators.
(Characteristic of Phaleas is the equalization of
property; of Plato, the community of women, children, and property,
the common meals of women, and the law about drinking, that the
sober shall be masters of the feast; also the training of soldiers
to acquire by practice equal skill with both hands, so that one
should be as useful as the other.)
Draco has left laws, but he adapted them to a constitution
which already existed, and there is no peculiarity in them which
is worth mentioning, except the greatness and severity of the
punishments.
Pittacus, too, was only a lawgiver, and not the author
of a constitution; he has a law which is peculiar to him, that,
if a drunken man do something wrong, he shall be more heavily
punished than if he were sober; he looked not to the excuse which
might be offered for the drunkard, but only to expediency, for
drunken more often than sober people commit acts of violence.
Androdamas of Rhegium gave laws to the Chalcidians
of Thrace. So
Book Five: Chap X
I have still to speak of monarchy, and the causes
of its destruction and preservation. What I have said already
respecting forms of constitutional government applies almost equally
to royal and to tyrannical rule. For royal rule is of the nature
of an aristocracy, and a tyranny is a compound of oligarchy and
democracy in their most extreme forms; it is therefore most injurious
to its subjects, being made up of two evil forms of government,
and having the perversions and errors of both. These two forms
of monarchy are contrary in their very origin. The appointment
of a king is the resource of the better classes against the people,
and he is elected by them out of their own number, because either
he himself or his family excel in virtue and virtuous actions;
whereas a tyrant is chosen from the people to be their protector
against the notables, and in order to prevent them from being
injured. History shows that almost all tyrants have been demagogues
who gained the favor of the people by their accusation of the
notables. At any rate this was the manner in which the tyrannies
arose in the days when cities had increased in power. Others which
were older originated in the ambition of kings wanting to overstep
the limits of their hereditary power and become despots. Others
again grew out of the class which were chosen to be chief magistrates;
for in ancient times the people who elected them gave the magistrates,
whether civil or religious, a long tenure. Others arose out of
the custom which oligarchies had of making some individual supreme
over the highest offices. In any of these ways an ambitious man
had no difficulty, if he desired, in creating a tyranny, since
he had the power in his hands already, either as king or as one
of the officers of state. Thus Pheidon at Argos and several others
were originally kings, and ended by becoming tyrants; Phalaris,
on the other hand, and the Ionian tyrants, acquired the tyranny
by holding great offices. Whereas Panaetius at Leontini, Cypselus
at Corinth, Peisistratus at Athens, Dionysius at Syracuse, and
several others who afterwards became tyrants, were at first demagogues.
And so, as I was saying, royalty ranks with aristocracy,
for it is based upon merit, whether of the individual or of his
family, or on benefits conferred, or on these claims with power
added to them. For all who have obtained this honor have benefited,
or had in their power to benefit, states and nations; some, like
Codrus, have prevented the state from being enslaved in war; others,
like Cyrus, have given their country freedom, or have settled
or gained a territory, like the Lacedaemonian, Macedonian, and
Molossian kings. The idea of a king is to be a protector of the
rich against unjust treatment, of the people against insult and
oppression. Whereas a tyrant, as has often been repeated, has
no regard to any public interest, except as conducive to his private
ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of a king, honor. Wherefore
also in their desires they differ; the tyrant is desirous of riches,
the king, of what brings honor. And the guards of a king are citizens,
but of a tyrant mercenaries.
That tyranny has all the vices both of democracy
and oligarchy is evident. As of oligarchy so of tyranny, the end
is wealth; (for by wealth only can the tyrant maintain either
his guard or his luxury). Both mistrust the people, and therefore
deprive them of their arms. Both agree too in injuring the people
and driving them out of the city and dispersing them. From democracy
tyrants have borrowed the art of making war upon the notables
and destroying them secretly or openly, or of exiling them because
they are rivals and stand in the way of their power; and also
because plots against them are contrived by men of this dass,
who either want to rule or to escape subjection. Hence Periander
advised Thrasybulus by cutting off the tops of the tallest ears
of corn, meaning that he must always put out of the way the citizens
who overtop the rest. And so, as I have already intimated, the
beginnings of change are the same in monarchies as in forms of
constitutional government; subjects attack their sovereigns out
of fear or contempt, or because they have been unjustly treated
by them. And of injustice, the most common form is insult, another
is confiscation of property.
[1311] The ends sought by conspiracies against
monarchies, whether tyrannies or royalties, are the same as the
ends sought by conspiracies against other forms of government.
Monarchs have great wealth and honor, which are objects of desire
to all mankind. The attacks are made sometimes against their lives,
sometimes against the office; where the sense of insult is the
motive, against their lives. Any sort of insult (and there are
many) may stir up anger, and when men are angry, they commonly
act out of revenge, and not from ambition. For example, the attempt
made upon the Peisistratidae arose out of the public dishonor
offered to the sister of Harmodius and the insult to himself.
He attacked the tyrant for his sister's sake, and Aristogeiton
joined in the attack for the sake of Harmodius. A conspiracy was
also formed against Periander, the tyrant of Ambracia, because,
when drinking with a favorite youth, he asked him whether by this
time he was not with child by him. Philip, too, was attacked by
Pausanias because he permitted him to be insulted by Attalus and
his friends, and Amyntas the little, by Derdas, because he boasted
of having enjoyed his youth. Evagoras of Cyprus, again, was slain
by the eunuch to revenge an insult; for his wife had been carried
off by Evagoras's son. Many conspiracies have originated in shameful
attempts made by sovereigns on the persons of their subjects.
Such was the attack of Crataeas upon Archelaus; he had always
hated the connection with him, and so, when Archelaus, having
promised him one of his two daughters in marriage, did not give
him either of them, but broke his word and married the elder to
the king of Elymeia, when he was hard pressed in a war against
Sirrhas and Arrhabaeus, and the younger to his own son Amyntas,
under the idea that Amyntas would then be less likely to quarrel
with his son by Cleopatra- Crataeas made this slight a pretext
for attacking Archelaus, though even a less reason would have
sufficed, for the real cause of the estrangement was the disgust
which he felt at his connection with the king. And from a like
motive Hellonocrates of Larissa conspired with him; for when Archelaus,
who was his lover, did not fulfill his promise of restoring him
to his country, he thought that the connection between them had
originated, not in affection, but in the wantonness of power.
Pytho, too, and Heracleides of Aenos, slew Cotys in order to avenge
their father, and Adamas revolted from Cotys in revenge for the
wanton outrage which he had committed in mutilating him when a
child.
Many, too, irritated at blows inflicted on the person
which they deemed an insult, have either killed or attempted to
kill officers of state and royal princes by whom they have been
injured. Thus, at Mytilene, Megacles and his friends attacked
and slew the Penthilidae, as they were going about and striking
people with clubs. At a later date Smerdis, who had been beaten
and torn away from his wife by Penthilus, slew him. In the conspiracy
against Archelaus, Decamnichus stimulated the fury of the assassins
and led the attack; he was enraged because Archelaus had delivered
him to Euripides to be scourged; for the poet had been irritated
at some remark made by Decamnichus on the foulness of his breath.
Many other examples might be cited of murders and conspiracies
which have arisen from similar causes.
Fear is another motive which, as we have said, has
caused conspiracies as well in monarchies as in more popular forms
of government. Thus Artapanes conspired against Xerxes and slew
him, fearing that he would be accused of hanging Darius against
his orders-he having been under the impression that Xerxes would
forget what he had said in the middle of a meal, and that the
offense would be forgiven.
Another motive is contempt, as in the case of Sardanapalus,
whom some one saw carding wool with his women, if the storytellers
say truly; and the tale may be true, if not of him, of some one
else. Dion attacked the younger Dionysius because he despised
him, and saw that he was equally despised by his own subjects,
and that he was always drunk. Even the friends of a tyrant will
sometimes attack him out of contempt; for the confidence which
he reposes in them breeds contempt, and they think that they will
not be found out. The expectation of success is likewise a sort
of contempt; the assailants are ready to strike, and think nothing
of the danger, because they seem to have the power in their hands. [1312] Thus generals of armies attack monarchs; as, for example,
Cyrus attacked Astyages, despising the effeminacy of his life,
and believing that his power was worn out. Thus again, Seuthes
the Thracian conspired against Amadocus, whose general he was.
And sometimes men are actuated by more than one motive,
like Mithridates, who conspired against Ariobarzanes, partly out
of contempt and partly from the love of gain.
Bold natures, placed by their sovereigns in a high
military position, are most likely to make the attempt in the
expectation of success; for courage is emboldened by power, and
the union of the two inspires them with the hope of an easy victory.
Attempts of which the motive is ambition arise in
a different way as well as in those already mentioned. There are
men who will not risk their lives in the hope of gains and honors
however great, but who nevertheless regard the killing of a tyrant
simply as an extraordinary action which will make them famous
and honorable in the world; they wish to acquire, not a kingdom,
but a name. It is rare, however, to find such men; he who would
kill a tyrant must be prepared to lose his life if he fail. He
must have the resolution of Dion, who, when he made war upon Dionysius,
took with him very few troops, saying 'that whatever measure of
success he might attain would be enough for him, even if he were
to die the moment he landed; such a death would be welcome to
him.' this is a temper to which few can attain.
Once more, tyrannies, like all other governments,
are destroyed from without by some opposite and more powerful
form of government. That such a government will have the will
to attack them is clear; for the two are opposed in principle;
and all men, if they can, do what they will. Democracy is antagonistic
to tyranny, on the principle of Hesiod, 'Potter hates Potter,'
because they are nearly akin, for the extreme form of democracy
is tyranny; and royalty and aristocracy are both alike opposed
to tyranny, because they are constitutions of a different type.
And therefore the Lacedaemonians put down most of the tyrannies,
and so did the Syracusans during the time when they were well
governed.
Again, tyrannies are destroyed from within, when
the reigning family are divided among themselves, as that of Gelo
was, and more recently that of Dionysius; in the case of Gelo
because Thrasybulus, the brother of Hiero, flattered the son of
Gelo and led him into excesses in order that he might rule in
his name. Whereupon the family got together a party to get rid
of Thrasybulus and save the tyranny; but those of the people who
conspired with them seized the opportunity and drove them all
out. In the case of Dionysius, Dion, his own relative, attacked
and expelled him with the assistance of the people; he afterwards
perished himself.
There are two chief motives which induce men to attack
tyrannies- hatred and contempt. Hatred of tyrants is inevitable,
and contempt is also a frequent cause of their destruction. Thus
we see that most of those who have acquired, have retained their
power, but those who have inherited, have lost it, almost at once;
for, living in luxurious ease, they have become contemptible,
and offer many opportunities to their assailants. Anger, too,
must be included under hatred, and produces the same effects.
It is often times even more ready to strike- the angry are more
impetuous in making an attack, for they do not follow rational
principle. And men are very apt to give way to their passions
when they are insulted. To this cause is to be attributed the
fall of the Peisistratidae and of many others. Hatred is more
reasonable, for anger is accompanied by pain, which is an impediment
to reason, whereas hatred is painless.
In a word, all the causes which I have mentioned
as destroying the last and most unmixed form of oligarchy, and
the extreme form of democracy, may be assumed to affect tyranny;
indeed the extreme forms of both are only tyrannies distributed
among several persons. Kingly rule is little affected by external
causes, and is therefore lasting; it is generally destroyed from
within. And there are two ways in which the destruction may come
about; (1) when the members of the royal family quarrel among
themselves, and (2) when the kings attempt to administer the state
too much after the fashion of a tyranny, and to extend their authority
contrary to the law. Royalties do not now come into existence;
where such forms of government arise, they are rather monarchies
or tyrannies. For the rule of a king is over voluntary subjects,
and he is supreme in all important matters; but in our own day
men are more upon an equality, and no one is so immeasurably superior
to others as to represent adequately the greatness and dignity
of the office. Hence mankind will not, if they can help, endure
it, and any one who obtains power by force or fraud is at once
thought to be a tyrant. In hereditary monarchies a further cause
of destruction is the fact that kings often fall into contempt,
and, although possessing not tyrannical power, but only royal
dignity, are apt to outrage others. Their overthrow is then readily
effected; for there is an end to the king when his subjects do
not want to have him, but the tyrant lasts, whether they like
him or not.
The destruction of monarchies is to be attributed
to these and the like causes.
Book Five: Chap XI
And they are preserved, to speak generally, by the
opposite causes; or, if we consider them separately, (1) royalty
is preserved by the limitation of its powers. The more restricted
the functions of kings, the longer their power will last unimpaired;
for then they are more moderate and not so despotic in their ways;
and they are less envied by their subjects. This is the reason
why the kingly office has lasted so long among the Molossians.
And for a similar reason it has continued among the Lacedaemonians,
because there it was always divided between two, and afterwards
further limited by Theopompus in various respects, more particularly
by the establishment of the Ephoralty. He diminished the power
of the kings, but established on a more lasting basis the kingly
office, which was thus made in a certain sense not less, but greater.
There is a story that when his wife once asked him whether he
was not ashamed to leave to his sons a royal power which was less
than he had inherited from his father, 'No indeed,' he replied,
'for the power which I leave to them will be more lasting.'
As to (2) tyrannies, they are preserved in two most
opposite ways. One of them is the old traditional method in which
most tyrants administer their government. Of such arts Periander
of Corinth is said to have been the great master, and many similar
devices may be gathered from the Persians in the administration
of their government. There are firstly the prescriptions mentioned
some distance back, for the preservation of a tyranny, in so far
as this is possible; viz., that the tyrant should lop off those
who are too high; he must put to death men of spirit; he must
not allow common meals, clubs, education, and the like; he must
be upon his guard against anything which is likely to inspire
either courage or confidence among his subjects; he must prohibit
literary assemblies or other meetings for discussion, and he must
take every means to prevent people from knowing one another (for
acquaintance begets mutual confidence). Further, he must compel
all persons staying in the city to appear in public and live at
his gates; then he will know what they are doing: if they are
always kept under, they will learn to be humble. In short, he
should practice these and the like Persian and barbaric arts,
which all have the same object. A tyrant should also endeavor
to know what each of his subjects says or does, and should employ
spies, like the 'female detectives' at Syracuse, and the eavesdroppers
whom Hiero was in the habit of sending to any place of resort
or meeting; for the fear of informers prevents people from speaking
their minds, and if they do, they are more easily found out. Another
art of the tyrant is to sow quarrels among the citizens; friends
should be embroiled with friends, the people with the notables,
and the rich with one another. Also he should impoverish his subjects;
he thus provides against the maintenance of a guard by the citizen
and the people, having to keep hard at work, are prevented from
conspiring. The Pyramids of Egypt afford an example of this policy;
also the offerings of the family of Cypselus, and the building
of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Peisistratidae, and the
great Polycratean monuments at Samos; all these works were alike
intended to occupy the people and keep them poor. Another practice
of tyrants is to multiply taxes, after the manner of Dionysius
at Syracuse, who contrived that within five years his subjects
should bring into the treasury their whole property. The tyrant
is also fond of making war in order that his subjects may have
something to do and be always in want of a leader. And whereas
the power of a king is preserved by his friends, the characteristic
of a tyrant is to distrust his friends, because he knows that
all men want to overthrow him, and they above all have the power.
Again, the evil practices of the last and worst form
of democracy are all found in tyrannies. Such are the power given
to women in their families in the hope that they will inform against
their husbands, and the license which is allowed to slaves in
order that they may betray their masters; for slaves and women
do not conspire against tyrants; and they are of course friendly
to tyrannies and also to democracies, since under them they have
a good time. For the people too would fain be a monarch, and therefore
by them, as well as by the tyrant, the flatterer is held in honor;
in democracies he is the demagogue; and the tyrant also has those
who associate with him in a humble spirit, which is a work of
flattery.
Hence tyrants are always fond of bad men, because
they love to be flattered, but no man who has the spirit of a
freeman in him will lower himself by flattery; good men love others,
or at any rate do not flatter them. Moreover, the bad are useful
for bad purposes; 'nail knocks out nail,' as the proverb says.
It is characteristic of a tyrant to dislike every one who has
dignity or independence; he wants to be alone in his glory, but
any one who claims a like dignity or asserts his independence
encroaches upon his prerogative, and is hated by him as an enemy
to his power. Another mark of a tyrant is that he likes foreigners
better than citizens, and lives with them and invites them to
his table; for the one are enemies, but the Others enter into
no rivalry with him.
Such are the notes of the tyrant and the arts by
which he preserves his power; there is no wickedness too great
for him. All that we have said may be summed up under three heads,
which answer to the three aims of the tyrant. These are, (1) the
humiliation of his subjects; he knows that a mean-spirited man
will not conspire against anybody; (2) the creation of mistrust
among them; for a tyrant is not overthrown until men begin to
have confidence in one another; and this is the reason why tyrants
are at war with the good; they are under the idea that their power
is endangered by them, not only because they would not be ruled
despotically but also because they are loyal to one another, and
to other men, and do not inform against one another or against
other men; (3) the tyrant desires that his subjects shall be incapable
of action, for no one attempts what is impossible, and they will
not attempt to overthrow a tyranny, if they are powerless. Under
these three heads the whole policy of a tyrant may be summed up,
and to one or other of them all his ideas may be referred: (1)
he sows distrust among his subjects; (2) he takes away their power;
(3) he humbles them.
This then is one of the two methods by which tyrannies
are preserved; and there is another which proceeds upon an almost
opposite principle of action. The nature of this latter method
may be gathered from a comparison of the causes which destroy
kingdoms, for as one mode of destroying kingly power is to make
the office of king more tyrannical, so the salvation of a tyranny
is to make it more like the rule of a king. But of one thing the
tyrant must be careful; he must keep power enough to rule over
his subjects, whether they like him or not, for if he once gives
this up he gives up his tyranny. But though power must be retained
as the foundation, in all else the tyrant should act or appear
to act in the character of a king. In the first place he should
pretend a care of the public revenues, and not waste money in
making presents of a sort at which the common people get excited
when they see their hard-won earnings snatched from them and lavished
on courtesans and strangers and artists. He should give an account
of what he receives and of what he spends (a practice which has
been adopted by some tyrants); for then he will seem to be a steward
of the public rather than a tyrant; nor need he fear that, while
he is the lord of the city, he will ever be in want of money.
Such a policy is at all events much more advantageous for the
tyrant when he goes from home, than to leave behind him a hoard,
for then the garrison who remain in the city will be less likely
to attack his power; and a tyrant, when he is absent from home,
has more reason to fear the guardians of his treasure than the
citizens, for the one accompany him, but the others remain behind.
In the second place, he should be seen to collect taxes and to
require public services only for state purposes, and that he may
form a fund in case of war, and generally he ought to make himself
the guardian and treasurer of them, as if they belonged, not to
him, but to the public. He should appear, not harsh, but dignified,
and when men meet him they should look upon him with reverence,
and not with fear. Yet it is hard for him to be respected if he
inspires no respect, and therefore whatever virtues he may neglect,
at least he should maintain the character of a great soldier,
and produce the impression that he is one. [1311] Neither he
nor any of his associates should ever be guilty of the least offense
against modesty towards the young of either sex who are his subjects,
and the women of his family should observe a like self-control
towards other women; the insolence of women has ruined many tyrannies.
In the indulgence of pleasures he should be the opposite of our
modern tyrants, who not only begin at dawn and pass whole days
in sensuality, but want other men to see them, that they may admire
their happy and blessed lot. In these things a tyrant should if
possible be moderate, or at any rate should not parade his vices
to the world; for a drunken and drowsy tyrant is soon despised
and attacked; not so he who is temperate and wide awake. His conduct
should be the very reverse of nearly everything which has been
said before about tyrants. He ought to adorn and improve his
city, as though he were not a tyrant, but the guardian of the
state. Also he should appear to be particularly earnest in the
service of the Gods; for if men think that a ruler is religious
and has a reverence for the Gods, they are less afraid of suffering
injustice at his hands, and they are less disposed to conspire
against him, because they believe him to have the very Gods fighting
on his side. At the same time his religion must not be thought
foolish. And he should honor men of merit, and make them think
that they would not be held in more honor by the citizens if they
had a free government. The honor he should distribute himself,
but the punishment should be inflicted by officers and courts
of law. It is a precaution which is taken by all monarchs not
to make one person great; but if one, then two or more should
be raised, that they may look sharply after one another. If after
all some one has to be made great, he should not be a man of bold
spirit; for such dispositions are ever most inclined to strike.
And if any one is to be deprived of his power, let it be diminished
gradually, not taken from him all at once. The tyrant should abstain
from all outrage; in particular from personal violence and from
wanton conduct towards the young. He should be especially careful
of his behavior to men who are lovers of honor; for as the lovers
of money are offended when their property is touched, so are the
lovers of honor and the virtuous when their honor is affected.
Therefore a tyrant ought either not to commit such acts at all;
or he should be thought only to employ fatherly correction, and
not to trample upon others- and his acquaintance with youth should
be supposed to arise from affection, and not from the insolence
of power, and in general he should compensate the appearance of
dishonor by the increase of honor.
Of those who attempt assassination they are the most
dangerous, and require to be most carefully watched, who do not
care to survive, if they effect their purpose. Therefore special
precaution should be taken about any who think that either they
or those for whom they care have been insulted; for when men are
led away by passion to assault others they are regardless of themselves.
As Heracleitus says, 'It is difficult to fight against anger;
for a man will buy revenge with his soul.'
And whereas states consist of two classes, of poor
men and of rich, the tyrant should lead both to imagine that they
are preserved and prevented from harming one another by his rule,
and whichever of the two is stronger he should attach to his government;
for, having this advantage, he has no need either to emancipate
slaves or to disarm the citizens; either party added to the force
which he already has, will make him stronger than his assailants.
But enough of these details; what should be the general
policy of the tyrant is obvious. He ought to show himself to his
subjects in the light, not of a tyrant, but of a steward and a
king. He should not appropriate what is theirs, but should be
their guardian; he should be moderate, not extravagant in his
way of life; he should win the notables by companionship, and
the multitude by flattery. For then his rule will of necessity
be nobler and happier, because he will rule over better men whose
spirits are not crushed, over men to whom he himself is not an
object of hatred, and of whom he is not afraid. His power too
will be more lasting. His disposition will be virtuous, or at
least half virtuous; and he will not be wicked, but half wicked
only.
Source.
From: Aristotle, Politics
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© Paul Halsall, 1998, 2023
