- I. A general refutation of Gaunilo's argument. It
is shown that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived exists in reality
- II. The argument is continued. It is shown that a
being than which a greater is inconceivable can be conceived, and also in so far, exists
- III. A criticism of Gaunilo's example, in which
he tries to show that in this way the real existence of a lost island might be inferred
from the fact of its being conceived
- IV. The difference between the possibility of
conceiving of non-existence, and understanding non-existence
- V. A particular discussion of certain statements
of Gaunilo's
- VI. A discussion of Gaunilo's argument, that any
unreal beings can be understood in the same way, and would, to that extent, exist
- VII. In answer to another objection; that the
supremely great being may be conceived not to exist, just as by the fool God is conceived
not to exist
- VIII. The example of the picture, treated in
Gaunilo's third chapter, is examined. -- From what source a notion may be formed of the
supremely great being of which Gaunilo inquired in his fourth chapter
- IX. The possibility of understanding and
conceiving of the supremely great being. The argument advanced against the fool is
confirmed
- X. The certainty of the foregoing argument. -- The
conclusion of the book
IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL.
AN ANSWER TO THE ARGUMENT OF ANSELM IN THE PROSLOGIUM
BY GAUNILO, A MONK OF MARMOUTIER.
1. IF one doubts or denies the existence of a being of such a nature that nothing
greater than it can be conceived, he receives this answer:
The existence of this being is proved, in the first place, by the fact that he himself,
in his doubt or denial regarding this being, already has it in his understanding; for in
hearing it spoken of he understands what is spoken of. It is proved, therefore, by the
fact that what he understands must exist not only in his understanding, but in reality
also.
And the proof of this is as follows. -- It is a greater thing to exist both in the
understanding and in reality than to be in the understanding alone. And if this being is
in the understanding alone, whatever has even in the past existed in reality will be
greater than this being. And so that which was greater than all beings will be less than
some being, and will not be greater than all: which is a manifest contradiction.
And hence, that which is greater than all, already proved to be in the understanding,
must exist not only in the understanding, but also in reality: for otherwise it will not
be greater than all other beings.
2. The fool might make this reply:
This being is said to be in my understanding already, only because I understand what is
said. Now could it not with equal justice be said that I have in my understanding all
manner of unreal objects, having absolutely no existence in themselves, because I
understand these things if one speaks of them, whatever they may be?
Unless indeed it is shown that this being is of such a character that it cannot be held
in concept like all unreal objects, or objects whose existence is uncertain: and hence I
am not able to conceive of it when I hear of it, or to hold it in concept; but I must
understand it and have it in my understanding; because, it seems, I cannot conceive of it
in any other way than by understanding it, that is, by comprehending in my knowledge its
existence in reality.
But if this is the case, in the first place there will be no distinction between what
has precedence in time -- namely, the having of an object in the understanding -- and what
is subsequent in time -- namely, the understanding that an object exists; as in the
example of the picture, which exists first in the mind of the painter, and afterwards in
his work.
Moreover, the following assertion can hardly be accepted: that this being, when it is
spoken of and heard of, cannot be conceived not to exist in the way in which even God can
be conceived not to exist. For if this is impossible, what was the object of this argument
against one who doubts or denies the existence of such a being?
Finally, that this being so exists that it cannot be perceived by an understanding
convinced of its own indubitable existence, unless this being is afterwards conceived of
-- this should be proved to me by an indisputable argument, but not by that which you have
advanced: namely, that what I understand, when I hear it, already is in my understanding.
For thus in my understanding, as I still think, could be all sorts of things whose
existence is uncertain, or which do not exist at all, if some one whose words I should
understand mentioned them. And so much the more if I should be deceived, as often happens,
and believe in them: though I do not yet believe in the being whose existence you would
prove.
3. Hence, your example of the painter who already has in his understanding what he is
to paint cannot agree with this argument. For the picture, before it is made, is contained
in the artificer's art itself; and any such thing, existing in the art of an artificer, is
nothing but a part of his understanding itself. A joiner, St. Augustine says, when he is
about to make a box in fact, first has it in his art. The box which is made in fact is not
life; but the box which exists in his art is life. For the artificer's soul lives, in
which all these things are, before they are produced. Why, then, are these things life in
the living soul of the artificer, unless because they are nothing else than the knowledge
or understanding of the soul itself?
With the exception, however, of those facts which are known to pertain to the mental
nature, whatever, on being heard and thought out by the understanding, is perceived to be
real, undoubtedly that real object is one thing, and the understanding itself, by which
the object is grasped, is another. Hence, even if it were true that there is a being than
which a greater is inconceivable: yet to this being, when heard of and understood, the not
yet created picture in the mind of the painter is not analogous.
4. Let us notice also the point touched on above, with regard to this being which is
greater than all which can be conceived, and which, it is said, can be none other than God
himself. I, so far as actual knowledge of the object, either from its specific or general
character, is concerned, am as little able to conceive of this being when I hear of it, or
to have it in my understanding, as I am to conceive of or understand God himself: whom,
indeed, for this very reason I can conceive not to exist. For I do not know that reality
itself which God is, nor can I form a conjecture of that reality from some other like
reality. For you yourself assert that that reality is such that there can be nothing else
like it.
For, suppose that I should hear something said of a man absolutely unknown to me, of
whose very existence I was unaware. Through that special or general knowledge by which I
know what man is, or what men are, I could conceive of him also, according to the reality
itself, which man is. And yet it would be possible, if the person who told me of him
deceived me, that the man himself, of whom I conceived, did not exist ; since that reality
according to which I conceived of him, though a no less indisputable fact, was not that
man, but any man.
Hence, I am not able, in the way in which I should have this unreal being in concept or
in understanding, to have that being of which you speak in concept or in understanding,
when I hear the word God or the words, a being greater than all other beings.
For I can conceive of the man according to a fact that is real and familiar to me: but of
God, or a being greater than all others, I could not conceive at all, except merely
according to the word. And an object can hardly or never be conceived according to the
word alone.
For when it is so conceived, it is not so much the word itself (which is, indeed, a
real thing -- that is, the sound of the letters and syllables) as the signification of the
word, when heard, that is conceived. But it is not conceived as by one who knows what is
generally signified by the word; by whom, that is, it is conceived according to a reality
and in true conception alone. It is conceived as by a man who does not know the object,
and conceives of it only in accordance with the movement of his mind produced by hearing
the word, the mind attempting to image for itself the signification of the word that is
heard. And it would be surprising if in the reality of fact it could ever attain to this.
Thus, it appears, and in no other way, this being is also in my understanding, when I
hear and understand a person who says that there is a being greater than all conceivable
beings. So much for the assertion that this supreme nature already is in my understanding.
5. But that this being must exist, not only in the understanding but also in reality,
is thus proved to me:
If it did not so exist, whatever exists in reality would be greater than it. And so the
being which has been already proved to exist in my understanding, will not be greater than
all other beings.
I still answer: if it should be said that a being which cannot be even conceived in
terms of any fact, is in the understanding, I do not deny that this being is, accordingly,
in my understanding. But since through this fact it can in no wise attain to real
existence also, I do not yet concede to it that existence at all, until some certain proof
of it shall be given.
For he who says that this being exists, because otherwise the being which is greater
than all will not be greater than all, does not attend strictly enough to what he is
saying. For I do not yet say, no, I even deny or doubt that this being is greater than any
real object. Nor do I concede to it any other existence than this (if it should be called
existence) which it has when the mind, according to a word merely heard, tries to form the
image of an object absolutely unknown to it.
How, then, is the veritable existence of that being proved to me from the assumption,
by hypothesis, that it is greater than all other beings? For I should still deny this, or
doubt your demonstration of it, to this extent, that I should not admit that this being is
in my understanding and concept even in the way in which many objects whose real existence
is uncertain and doubtful, are in my understanding and concept. For it should be proved
first that this being itself really exists somewhere; and then, from the fact that it is
greater than all, we shall not hesitate to infer that it also subsists in itself.
6. For example: it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of
the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called
the lost island. And they say that this island has an inestimable wealth of all manner of
riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest; and
that having no owner or inhabitant, it is more excellent than all other countries, which
are inhabited by mankind, in the abundance with which it is stored.
Now if some one should tell me that there is such an island, I should easily understand
his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a
logical inference: "You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent
than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding.
And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in
the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist,
any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already
understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent."
If a man should try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, and
that its existence should no longer be doubted, either I should believe that he was
jesting, or I know not which I ought to regard as the greater fool: myself, supposing that
I should allow this proof; or him, if he should suppose that he had established with any
certainty the existence of this island. For he ought to show first that the hypothetical
excellence of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no wise as any
unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.
7. This, in the mean time, is the answer the fool could make to the arguments urged
against him. When he is assured in the first place that this being is so great that its
non-existence is not even conceivable, and that this in turn is proved on no other ground
than the fact that otherwise it will not be greater than all things, the fool may make the
same answer, and say:
When did I say that any such being exists in reality, that is, a being greater than all
others? -- that on this ground it should be proved to me that it also exists in reality to
such a degree that it cannot even be conceived not to exist? Whereas in the first place it
should be in some way proved that a nature which is higher, that is, greater and better,
than all other natures, exists; in order that from this we may then be able to prove all
attributes which necessarily the being that is greater and better than all possesses.
Moreover, it is said that the non-existence of this being is inconceivable. It might
better be said, perhaps, that its non-existence, or the possibility of its non-existence,
is unintelligible. For according to the true meaning of the word, unreal objects are
unintelligible. Yet their existence is conceivable in the way in which the fool conceived
of the non-existence of God. I am most certainly aware of my own existence; but I know,
nevertheless, that my non-existence is possible. As to that supreme being, moreover, which
God is, I understand without any doubt both his existence, and the impossibility of his
non-existence. Whether, however, so long as I am most positively aware of my existence, I
can conceive of my non-existence, I am not sure. But if I can, why can I not conceive of
the non-existence of whatever else I know with the same certainty? If, however, I cannot,
God will not be the only being of which it can be said, it is impossible to conceive of
his non-existence.
8. The other parts of this book are argued with such truth, such brilliancy, such
grandeur; and are so replete with usefulness, so fragrant with a certain perfume of devout
and holy feeling, that though there are matters in the beginning which, however rightly
sensed, are weakly presented, the rest of the work should not be rejected on this account.
The rather ought these earlier matters to be reasoned more cogently, and the whole to be
received with great respect and honor.
ANSELM'S APOLOGETIC
IN REPLY TO GAUNILO'S ANSWER IN BEHALF OF THE FOOL.
IT was a fool against whom the argument of my Proslogium was directed. Seeing, however,
that the author of these objections is by no means a fool, and is a Catholic, speaking in
behalf of the fool, I think it sufficient that I answer the Catholic.
CHAPTER I.
A general refutation of Gaunilo's argument. It is shown that a being than which a
greater cannot be conceived exists in reality.
You say -- whosoever you may be, who say that a fool is capable of making these
statements -- that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is not in the
understanding in any other sense than that in which a being that is altogether
inconceivable in terms of reality, is in the understanding. You say that the inference
that this being exists in reality, from the fact that it is in the understanding, is no
more just than the inference that a lost island most certainly exists, from the fact that
when it is described the hearer does not doubt that it is in his understanding.
But I say: if a being than which a greater is inconceivable is not understood or
conceived, and is not in the understanding or in concept, certainly either God is not a
being than which a greater is inconceivable, or else he is not understood or conceived,
and is not in the understanding or in concept. But I call on your faith and conscience to
attest that this is most false. Hence, that than which a greater cannot be conceived is
truly understood and conceived, and is in the understanding and in concept. Therefore
either the grounds on which you try to controvert me are not true, or else the inference
which you think to base logically on those grounds is not justified.
But you hold, moreover, that supposing that a being than which a greater cannot be
conceived is understood, it does not follow that this being is in the understanding; nor,
if it is in the understanding, does it therefore exist in reality.
In answer to this, I maintain positively: if that being can be even conceived to be, it
must exist in reality. For that than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived
except as without beginning. But whatever can be conceived to exist, and does not exist,
can be conceived to exist through a beginning. Hence what can be conceived to exist, but
does not exist, is not the being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Therefore, if
such a being can be conceived to exist, necessarily it does exist.
Furthermore: if it can be conceived at all, it must exist. For no one who denies or
doubts the existence of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, denies or doubts
that if it did exist, its non-existence, either in reality or in the understanding, would
be impossible. For otherwise it would not be a being than which a greater cannot be
conceived. But as to whatever can be conceived, but does not exist -- if there were such a
being, its non-existence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be possible.
Therefore if a being than which a greater is inconceivable can be even conceived, it
cannot be nonexistent.
But let us suppose that it does not exist, even if it can be conceived. Whatever can be
conceived, but does not exist, if it existed, would not be a being than which a greater is
inconceivable. If, then, there were a being a greater than which is inconceivable, it
would not be a being than which a greater is inconceivable: which is most absurd. Hence,
it is false to deny that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, if it
can be even conceived; much the more, therefore, if it can be understood or can be in the
understanding.
Moreover, I will venture to make this assertion: without doubt, whatever at any place
or at any time does not exist -- even if it does exist at some place or at some time --
can be conceived to exist nowhere and never, as at some place and at some time it does not
exist. For what did not exist yesterday, and exists to-day, as it is understood not to
have existed yesterday, so it can be apprehended by the intelligence that it never exists.
And what is not here, and is elsewhere, can be conceived to be nowhere, just as it is not
here. So with regard to an object of which the individual parts do not exist at the same
places or times: all its parts and therefore its very whole can be conceived to exist
nowhere or never.
For, although time is said to exist always, and the world everywhere, yet time does not
as a whole exist always, nor the world as a whole everywhere. And as individual parts of
time do not exist when others exist, so they can be conceived never to exist. And so it
can be apprehended by the intelligence that individual parts of the world exist nowhere,
as they do not exist where other parts exist. Moreover, what is composed of parts can be
dissolved in concept, and be non-existent. Therefore, whatever at any place or at any time
does not exist as a whole, even if it is existent, can be conceived not to exist.
But that than which a greater cannot be conceived, if it exists, cannot be conceived
not to exist. Otherwise, it is not a being than which a greater cannot be conceived: which
is inconsistent. By no means, then, does it at any place or at any time fail to exist as a
whole: but it exists as a whole everywhere and always.
Do you believe that this being can in some way be conceived or understood, or that the
being with regard to which these things are understood can be in concept or in the
understanding? For if it cannot, these things cannot be understood with reference to it.
But if you say that it is not understood and that it is not in the understanding, because
it is not thoroughly understood; you should say that a man who cannot face the direct rays
of the sun does not see the light of day, which is none other than the sunlight. Assuredly
a being than which a greater cannot be conceived exists, and is in the understanding, at
least to this extent -- that these statements regarding it are understood.
CHAPTER II.
The argument is continued. It is shown that a being than which a greater is
inconceivable can be conceived, and also, in so far, exists.
I HAVE said, then, in the argument which you dispute, that when the fool hears
mentioned a being than which a greater is inconceivable, he understands what he hears.
Certainly a man who does not understand when a familiar language is spoken, has no
understanding at all, or a very dull one. Moreover, I have said that if this being is
understood, it is in the understanding. Is that in no understanding which has been proved
necessarily to exist in the reality of fact?
But you will say that although it is in the understanding, it does not follow that it
is understood. But observe that the fact of its being understood does necessitate its
being in the understanding. For as what is conceived, is conceived by conception, and what
is conceived by conception, as it is conceived, so is in conception; so what is
understood, is understood by understanding, and what is understood by understanding, as it
is understood, so is in the understanding. What can be more clear than this?
After this, I have said that if it is even in the understanding alone, it can be
conceived also to exist in reality, which is greater. If, then, it is in the understanding
alone, obviously the very being than which greater cannot be conceived is one than which a
greater can be conceived. What is more logical? For if it exists even in the understanding
alone, can it not be conceived also to exist in reality? And if it can be so conceived,
does not he who conceives of this conceive of a thing greater than that being, if it
exists in the understanding alone? What more consistent inference, then, can be made than
this: that if a being than which a greater cannot be conceived is in the understanding
alone, it is not that than which a greater cannot be conceived?
But, assuredly, in no understanding is a being than which a greater is conceivable a
being than which a greater is inconceivable. Does it not follow, then, that if a being
than which a greater cannot be conceived is in any understanding, it does not exist in the
understanding alone? For if it is in the understanding alone, it is a being than which a
greater can be conceived, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
CHAPTER III.
A criticism of Gaunilo's example, in which he tries to show that in this way the real
existence of a lost island might be inferred from the fact of its being conceived.
BUT, you say, it is as if one should suppose an island in the ocean, which surpasses
all lands in its fertility, and which, because of the difficulty, or the impossibility, of
discovering what does not exist, is called a lost island; and should say that the be no
doubt that this island truly exists in reality, for this reason, that one who hears it
described easily understands what he hears.
Now I promise confidently that if any man shall devise anything existing either in
reality or in concept alone (except that than which a greater be conceived) to which he
can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing, and will give him his
lost island, not to be lost again.
But it now appears that this being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be
conceived not to be, because it exists on so assured a ground of truth; for otherwise it
would not exist at all.
Hence, if any one says that he conceives this being not to exist, I say that at the
time when he conceives of this either he conceives of a being than which a greater is
inconceivable, or he does not conceive at all. If he does not conceive, he does not
conceive of the non-existence of that of which he does not conceive. But if he does
conceive, he certainly conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist.
For if it could be conceived not to exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and
an end. But this is impossible.
He, then, who conceives of this being conceives of a being which cannot be even
conceived not to exist; but he who conceives of this being does not conceive that it does
not exist; else he conceives what is inconceivable. The non-existence, then, of that than
which a greater cannot be conceived is inconceivable.
CHAPTER IV.
The difference between the possibility of conceiving of non-existence,
and understanding non-existence.
You say, moreover, that whereas I assert that this supreme being cannot be conceived not to exist, it might better be said that its non-existence, or even the possibility of
its non-existence, cannot be understood.
But it was more proper to say, it cannot be conceived. For if I had said that the
object itself cannot be understood not to exist, possibly you yourself, who say that in
accordance with the true meaning of the term what is unreal cannot be understood, would
offer the objection that nothing which is can be understood not to be, for the
non-existence of what exists is unreal: hence God would not be the only being of which it
could be said, it is impossible to understand its non-existence. For thus one of those
beings which most certainly exist can be understood not to exist in the same way in which
certain other real objects can be understood not to exist.
But this objection, assuredly, cannot be urged against the term conception, if
one considers the matter well. For although no objects which exist can be understood not
to exist, yet all objects, except that which exists in the highest degree, can be
conceived not to exist. For all those objects, and those alone, can be conceived not to
exist, which have a beginning or end or composition of parts: also, as I have already
said, whatever at any place or at any time does not exist as a whole.
That being alone, on the other hand, cannot be conceived not to exist, in which any
conception discovers neither beginning nor end nor composition of parts, and which any
conception finds always and everywhere as a whole.
Be assured, then, that you can conceive of your own non-existence, although you are
most certain that you exist. I am surprised that you should have admitted that you are
ignorant of this. For we conceive of the non-existence of many objects which we know to
exist, and of the existence of many which we know not to exist; not by forming the opinion
that they so exist, but by imagining that they exist as we conceive of them.
And indeed, we can conceive of the non-existence of an object, although we know it to
exist, because at the same time we can conceive of the former and know the latter. And we
cannot conceive of the nonexistence of an object, so long as we know it to exist, because
we cannot conceive at the same time of existence and non-existence.
If, then, one will thus distinguish these two senses of this statement, he will
understand that nothing, so long as it is known to exist, can be conceived not to exist;
and that whatever exists, except that being than which a greater cannot be conceived, can
be conceived not to exist, even when it is known to exist.
So, then, of God alone it can be said that it is impossible to conceive of his
non-existence; and yet many objects, so long as they exist, in one sense cannot be
conceived not to exist. But in what sense God is to be conceived not to exist, I think has
been shown clearly enough in my book.
CHAPTER V.
A particular discussion of certain statements of Gaunilo's. In the first place, he
misquoted the argument which he undertook to refute.
THE nature of the other objections which you, in behalf of the fool, urge against me it
is easy, even for a man of small wisdom, to detect; and I had therefore thought it
unnecessary to show this. But since I hear that some readers of these objections think
they have some weight against me, I will discuss them briefly.
In the first place, you often repeat that I assert that what is greater than all other
beings is in the understanding; and if it is in the understanding, it exists also in
reality, for otherwise the being which is greater than all would not be greater than all.
Nowhere in all my writings is such a demonstration found. For the real existence of a
being which is said to be greater than all other beings cannot be demonstrated in
the same way with the real existence of one that is said to be a being than which a
greater cannot be conceived.
If it should be said that a being than which a greater cannot be conceived has no real
existence, or that it is possible that it does not exist, or even that it can be conceived
not to exist, such an assertion can be easily refuted. For the non-existence of what does
not exist is possible, and that whose non-existence is possible can be conceived not to
exist. But whatever can be conceived not to exist, if it exists, is not a being than which
a greater cannot be conceived; but if it does not exist, it would not, even if it existed,
be a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. But it cannot be said that a being
than which a greater is inconceivable, if it exists, is not a being than which a greater
is inconceivable; or that if it existed, it would not be a being than which a greater is
inconceivable.
It is evident, then, that neither is it non-existent, nor is it possible that it does
not exist, nor can it be conceived not to exist. For otherwise, if it exists, it is not
that which it is said to be in the hypothesis; and if it existed, it would not be what it
is said to be in the hypothesis.
But this, it appears, cannot be so easily proved of a being which is said to be greater
than all other beings. For it is not so evident that what can be conceived not to
exist is not greater than all existing beings, as it is evident that it is not a being
than which a greater cannot be conceived. Nor is it so indubitable that if a being greater
than all other beings exists, it is no other than the being than which a greater cannot be
conceived; or that if it were such a being, some other might not be this being in like
manner; as it is certain with regard to a being which is hypothetically posited as one
than which a greater cannot be conceived.
For consider: if one should say that there is a being greater than all other beings,
and that this being can nevertheless be conceived not to exist; and that a being greater
than this, although it does not exist, can be conceived to exist: can it be so clearly
inferred in this case that this being is therefore not a being greater than all other
existing beings, as it would be most positively affirmed in the other case, that the being
under discussion is not, therefore, a being than which a greater cannot be conceived?
For the former conclusion requires another premise than the predication, greater
than all other beings. In my argument, on the other hand, there is no need of any
other than this very predication, a being than which a greater cannot be conceived.
If the same proof cannot be applied when the being in question is predicated to be
greater than all others, which can be applied when it is predicated to be a being than
which a greater cannot be conceived, you have unjustly censured me for saying what I did
not say; since such a predication differs so greatly from that which I actually made. If,
on the other hand, the other argument is valid, you ought not to blame me so for having
said what can be proved.
Whether this can be proved, however, he will easily decide who recognises that this
being than which a greater cannot be conceived is demonstrable. For by no means can this
being than which a greater cannot be conceived be understood as any other than that which
alone is greater than all. Hence, just as that than which a greater cannot be conceived is
understood, and is in the understanding, and for that reason is asserted to exist in the
reality of fact: so what is said to be greater than all other beings is understood and is
in the understanding, and therefore it is necessarily inferred that it exists in reality.
You see, then, with how much justice you have compared me with your fool, who, on the
sole ground that he understands what is described to him, would affirm that a lost island
exists.
CHAPTER VI.
A discussion of Gaunilo's argument in his second chapter: that any unreal beings can be
understood in the same way, and would, to that extent, exist.
ANOTHER of your objections is that any unreal beings, or beings whose existence is
uncertain, can be understood and be in the understanding in the same way with that being
which I discussed. I am surprised that you should have conceived this objection, for I was
attempting to prove what was still uncertain, and contented myself at first with showing
that this being is understood in any way, and is in the understanding. It was my intention
to consider, on these grounds, whether this being is in the understanding alone, like an
unreal object, or whether it also exists in fact, as a real being. For if unreal objects,
or objects whose existence is uncertain, in this way are understood and are in the
understanding, because, when they are spoken of, the hearer understands what the speaker
means, there is no reason why that being of which I spoke should not be understood and be
in the understanding.
How, moreover, can these two statements of yours be reconciled: (1) the assertion that
if a man should speak of any unreal objects, whatever they might be, you would understand,
and (2) the assertion that on hearing of that being which does exist, and not in that way
in which even unreal objects are held in concept, you would not say that you conceive of
it or have it in concept; since, as you say, you cannot conceive of it in any other way
than by understanding it, that is, by comprehending in your knowledge its real existence?
How, I ask, can these two things be reconciled: that unreal objects are understood, and
that understanding an object is comprehending in knowledge its real existence? The
contradiction does not concern me: do you see to it. But if unreal objects are also in
some sort understood, and your definition is applicable, not to every understanding, but
to a certain sort of understanding, I ought not to be blamed for saying that a being than
which a greater cannot be conceived is understood and is in the understanding, even before
I reached the certain conclusion that this being exists in reality.
CHAPTER VII.
In answer to another objection: that the supremely great being may be conceived not to
exist, just as by the fool God is conceived not to exist.
AGAIN, you say that it can probably never be believed that this being, when it is
spoken of and heard of, cannot be conceived not to exist in the same way in which even God
may be conceived not to exist.
Such an objection could be answered by those who bave attained but little skill in
disputation and argument. For is it compatible with reason for a man to deny the existence
of what he understands, because it is said to be that being whose existence he denies
because he does not understand it? Or, if at some times its existence is denied, because
only to a certain extent is it understood, and that which is not at all understood is the
same to him: is not what is still undetermined more easily proved of a being which exists
in some understanding than of one which exists is no understanding?
Hence it cannot be credible that any man denies the existence of a being than which a
greater cannot be conceived, which, when he hears of it, he understands in a certain
degree: it is incredible, I say, that any man denies the existence of this being because
he denies the existence of God, the sensory perception of whom he in no wise conceives of.
Or if the existence of another object, because it is not at all understood, is denied,
yet is not the existence of what is understood in some degree more easily proved than the
existence of an object which is in no wise understood?
Not irrationally, then, has the hypothesis of a being a greater than which cannot be
conceived been employed in controverting the fool, for the proof of the existence of God:
since in some degree he would understand such a being, but in no wise could he understand
God.
CHAPTER VIII.
The example of the picture, treated in Gaunilo's third chapter, is examined. -- From
what source a notion may be formed of the supremely great being, of which Gaunilo inquired
in his fourth chapter.
MOREOVER, your so careful demonstration that the being than which a greater cannot be
conceived is not analogous to the not yet executed picture in the understanding of the
painter, is quite unnecessary. It was not for this purpose that I suggested the
preconceived picture. I had no thought of asserting that the being which I was discussing
is of such a nature; but I wished to show that what is not understood to exist can be in
the understanding.
Again, you say that when you hear of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, you
cannot conceive of it in terms of any real object known to you either specifically or
generally, nor have it in your understanding. For, you say, you neither know such a being
in itself, nor can you form an idea of it from anything like it.
But obviously this is not true. For everything that is less good, in so far as it is
good, is like the greater good. It is therefore evident to any rational mind, that by
ascending from the lesser good to the greater, we can form a considerable notion of a
being than which a greater is inconceivable.
For instance, who (even if he does not believe that what he conceives of exists in
reality) supposing that there is some good which has a beginning and an end, does not
conceive that a good is much better, which, if it begins, does not cease to be? And that
as the second good is better than the first, so that good which has neither beginning nor
end, though it is ever passing from the past through the present to the future, is better
than the second? And that far better than this is a being -- whether any being of such a
nature exists or not -- which in no wise requires change or motion, nor is compelled to
undergo change or motion?
Is this inconceivable, or is some being greater than this conceivable? Or is not this
to form a notion from objects than which a greater is conceivable, of the being than which
a greater cannot be conceived? There is, then, a means of forming a notion of a being than
which a greater is inconceivable.
So easily, then, can the fool who does not accept sacred authority be refuted, if he
denies that a notion may be formed from other objects of a being than which a greater is
inconceivable. But if any Catholic would deny this, let him remember that the invisible
things of God, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the
things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead. (Romans i. 20.)
CHAPTER IX.
The possibility of understanding and conceiving of the supremely great being. The
argument advanced against the fool is confirmed.
BUT even if it were true that a being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be
conceived or understood; yet it would not be untrue that a being than which a greater
cannot be conceived is conceivable and intelligible. There is nothing to prevent one's
saying ineffable, although what is said to be ineffable cannot be spoken of. Inconceivable is conceivable, although that to which the word inconceivable can be applied is not
conceivable. So, when one says, that than which nothing greater is conceivable,
undoubtedly what is heard is conceivable and intelligible, although that being itself,
than which a greater is inconceivable, cannot be conceived or understood.
Or, though there is a man so foolish as to say that there is no being than which a
greater is inconceivable, he will not be so shameless as to say that he cannot understand
or conceive of what he says. Or, if such a man is found, not only ought his words to be
rejected, but he himself should be contemned.
Whoever, then, denies the existence of a being than which a greater cannot be
conceived, at least understands and conceives of the denial which he makes. But this
denial he cannot understand or conceive of without its component terms; and a term of this
statement is a being than which a greater cannot be conceived. Whoever, then, makes
this denial, understands and conceives of that than which a greater is inconceivable.
Moreover, it is evident that in the same way it is possible to conceive of and
understand a being whose non-existence is impossible; but he who conceives of this
conceives of a greater being than one whose nonexistence is possible. Hence, when a being
than which a greater is inconceivable is conceived, if it is a being whose non-existence
is possible that is conceived, it is not a being than which a greater cannot be conceived.
But an object cannot be at once conceived and not conceived. Hence he who conceives of a
being than which a greater is inconceivable, does not conceive of that whose non-existence
is possible, but of that whose non-existence is impossible. Therefore, what he conceives
of must exist; for anything whose non-existence is possible, is not that of which he
conceives.
CHAPTER X.
The certainty of the foregoing argument. -- The conclusion of the book.
I BELIEVE that I have shown by an argument which is not weak, but sufficiently cogent,
that in my former book I proved the real existence of a being than which a greater cannot
be conceived; and I believe that this argument cannot be invalidated by the validity of
any objection. For so great force does the signification of this reasoning contain in
itself, that this being which is the subject of discussion, is of necessity, from the very
fact that it is understood or conceived, proved also to exist in reality, and to be
whatever we should believe of the divine substance.
For we attribute to the divine substance anything of which it can be conceived that it
is better to be than not to be that thing. For example: it is better to be eternal than
not eternal; good, than not good; nay, goodness itself, than not goodness itself. But it
cannot be that anything of this nature is not a property of the being than which a greater
is inconceivable. Hence, the being than which a greater is inconceivable must be whatever
should be attributed to the divine essence.
I thank you for your kindness both in your blame and in your praise for my book. For
since you have commended so generously those parts of it which seem to you worthy of
acceptance, it is quite evident that you have criticised in no unkind spirit those parts
of it which seemed to you weak.
